A Risky Bet on Fatah
Could the West Bank prosper under Fatah and Gaza fail under Hamas? That is the hope. Fatah's Mahmoud Abbas and Salam Fayyad, a former World Bank official well liked in the West, will receive hundreds of millions of dollars in western and Israeli support. As a political gesture, Israel has released 250 prisoners and will also remove some of the internal checkpoints in the West Bank.
The trouble is that Fatah is a broken reed. It lost elections in Gaza because of rampant financial corruption, abuse of power, mismanagement, and weak leadership. Its leadership is likely to go on in the same style with fancy villas and chauffeur-driven Mercedeses. Abbas is a pathetic figure. He has always found it hard to take decisive action. He even failed to order his Presidential Guard to fight back in Gaza when it had more than twice the number of guns as Hamas. When he finally ordered his men to fight, the die had been cast. Fatah's divisions, and its corruption, began with Arafat, but Abbas must bear responsibility now. Indeed, he is a part of it. At the time of the Gaza crisis, he was about to leave for Qatar, his usual refuge in stormy times, where he carries on his multiple lucrative private businesses. He has never proven himself as a leader in easier situations, so why should we suddenly expect him to display strong leadership now?
By contrast, Hamas enjoys a clear-cut and decisive political leadership. Its lifestyle is simpler, more in touch with the people. Conceivably, it might be able to end the chaos and anarchy engendered by the varying criminal gangs in Gaza and secure a safe day-to-day life for the average Palestinian. That would have a powerful effect on the West Bank.
The United States must not fall for the simplistic assumption that the West Bank is totally controlled by Fatah while Gaza is totally supportive of Hamas. Yes, Fatah gunmen now control the streets of the West Bank, but many Palestinians are fed up with them and disgusted by their humiliating performance in Gaza. The Fatah leadership of the Gaza armed forces fled weeks and months before the battle—including the commander, the deputy commanders, and 30 lower-level commanders. The West Bank Palestinians saw Fatah leaders leaving their soldiers behind to fight and leaving behind the weapons that the American military advisers persuaded the Israelis and the Americans to send to the Presidential Guard. Many of the weapons fell straight into the hands of Hamas. Nor did it help that when Abbas mounted punitive operations against Hamas operatives in the West Bank, he used the armed terrorist gangs of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades rather than Fatah's legitimate security organizations. This enraged many Palestinians, for it raised the specter of the rule of armed gangs—even if this time they were pro-Fatah. For example, for a few days Fatah gunmen in black masks ruled the streets of Nablus—a city of 180,000 in the West Bank—abducting rivals, looting and burning their property, and intimidating elected officials in the Hamas-run City Hall. Now, al-Aqsa, Fatah's longtime military wing and terrorist appendage that has killed and maimed hundreds of Israelis in a relentless wave of suicide bombings, has rejected Abbas's decree that it must disband and disarm and reaffirmed that it will not be committed to a truce with Israel.
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