From Bad to Unthinkable
Nobody should underestimate the capacity of Middle East leaders for making bad situations worse. Headlines about the "agreement" in Mecca between President Mahmoud Abbas and the terrorist group Hamas implied that something agreeable had come out of the Saudi initiative to bring them together in a unity government. On the contrary. The terrible result of the weakness of Abbas—a weakness of character and a weakness of his organization—is that the conflict with Israel will torment still another generation of Palestinians. The agreement drove a stake through the heart of the two-state dream, because it left no one with whom the Israelis could make a peaceful settlement.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was left looking ill on her first joint meeting with Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, because the "moderate" Abbas had just pulled the rug out from under the United States. Abbas had been committed to disarming Hamas and calling early elections. Those might well have dislodged Hamas, since its obduracy has only increased the misery of ordinary Palestinians. Washington was supporting Abbas in this, but what does he do in Mecca? He agrees to share power with Hamas. As recently as last December, Abbas had rejected a unity government based on the limited concept of a technocratic government under which Hamas would have neither the prime ministership nor control of key government ministries. Yet, under the Mecca terms, Hamas's Ismail Haniyeh will stay on as prime minister and as head of the coalition, and Hamas will hold the majority of the cabinet, with 12 seats, with Fatah holding only six. Yes, the key ministries of finance, foreign affairs, and interior will be headed by independents selected by Abbas, but from a list submitted by Fatah and Hamas! Why did Abbas cave? Quite simply, because, in the recent clashes between Palestinians in Gaza, the Hamas forces were clearly superior to those of Fatah.
On the ground, the Mecca accord guarantees only more bloodshed. Hamas's armed men will be incorporated into the Palestinian security forces, with salaries to be paid by the Palestinian Finance Ministry. Haniyeh and the Hamas-nominated interior minister in the Palestinian National Security Council will set military strategy for the Palestinians. Hamas loyalists will be placed in the bureaucracy of the Palestinian Authority and foreign service, again with the PA paying those expenses, rather than Hamas having to cover them from its own budget.
Representatives of the quartet—the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia, whose "road map" peace plan has now been thoroughly exploded by Mecca—cannot be unaware of Hamas's using the respected new finance minister, a moderate named Salaam Fayad, to funnel money into the hands of Hamas ministers, including those heading military and security forces. Any financial support post-Mecca will serve only to strengthen the radical forces of Hamas.
Black magic. Wait, it gets worse. Hamas had been internationally isolated while the Palestinian Liberation Organization was recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Under Saudi Arabia's misbegotten maneuver in Mecca, however, Hamas becomes an integral part of the PLO, rescued, as if by magic, from its isolation. Thus Hamas has gained politically, institutionally, and bureaucratically—and in its relations with the Arab world—without meeting any of the international conditions for negotiations. Hamas was not made to concede power or ideology. It was not compelled to recognize Israel or renounce terrorism—nor even to agree to promise to honor previously signed agreements. And yet it now has obtained the unity government it wished for, along with hundreds of millions of dollars from Saudi Arabia to escape its financial crisis, to solidify its rule, and to reach the next Palestinian election with more strength and credibility.
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