Seeing the Job Through
We should contemplate the prospect of a jihadist Iraq because it puts our struggles there in the proper perspective. We are fighting a guerrilla war while trying to reconstruct a broken society, so there will inevitably be ebbs and flows in violence, civil amenities, and oil flow. A straight line of progress is harder to measure than in a conventional war, in which claiming territorial gains is the mark of success. The news media's instinct, naturally, is to focus on the violence. The large majority of the Iraqi-related news reports on the three main U.S. TV networks, in the six months after the June 2004 handover of sovereignty, were dedicated to daily violence; there was barely a mention of the step-by-step reconstruction successes. There will no doubt be another upswing in violence before the December 15 voting, but we know, too, that the number of suicide bombings in November was the lowest in seven months. The assaults are the work of a few, not the many. The Sunni insurgency does not even enjoy the support of the 20 percent of the population who are Sunnis--who are not even a majority in Baghdad--and certainly not of the Shiites and the Kurds, the overwhelming majority in Iraq.
Zarqawi is focused on attacking Iraq's Shiite population, who he believes are the foes of the revolution. From his perspective, they are apostates, heretics, and historic collaborators with the enemies of Islam--that is, Sunni Islam. So Zarqawi, a Sunni, refers to them as "the lurking snakes and the crafty scorpions, the spying enemy," and "the most evil of mankind." His program is to provoke the Shiite community to act against the Sunnis, but the Shiites have ignored the bait and turned against the jihadist rank whose suicide murders have alienated them and many other ordinary Muslims.
Of course, this doesn't mean they wish to embrace us, for all the good we did in ridding them of Saddam Hussein. An army of liberation that becomes an army of occupation is never going to be wildly popular. That was one of the most cogent points in Murtha's recantation. In the short term, however, most Iraqis want American forces to remain until enough indigenous troops and police are recruited and trained. They know that the American presence is a major deterrent to an all-out civil war, with Shiites storming Sunni villages while the insurgents would focus their attacks on those who collaborated with the Americans. Think of what it would do to our credibility and moral stature if our allies in Iraq were to be massacred.
Courage. President Bush did well to spell out the progress being made to train the Iraqis to take over. "There are over 120 Iraqi Army and police combat battalions," he declared. "Of these, about 80 Iraqi battalions are fighting side by side with coalition forces, and about 40 others are taking the lead in the fight. Most of these 40 battalions are controlling their own battle spaces and conducting their own operations." The president's judgment is supported by that of Democratic Sen. Joseph Lieberman, just returned from his fourth visit to Iraq. This progress cannot be maintained, however, if we continue to sow doubts about our willingness to persevere. That can only create mistrust and insecurity among Iraqis, causing many to look the other way regarding guerrilla and terrorist activities. Their reasoning is simple: fear of retaliation when the Americans leave. Let us remember that after Desert Storm, America left the Shiites and the Kurds to Saddam. That was a betrayal that still lingers in the minds of the victims--and if we flee again, moderates in Iraq and all across the Middle East, which accounts for some 60 percent of the world's oil reserves, will never again believe America's assurances of support for reform.
advertisement
