Barnes Blog
"But," he adds, "we do not pretend to understand how tribal recognition of the sheiks really works." Hutson can draw on his map the divisions among the larger tribes, but it is clear that he uses his visits to smaller towns so that he can expand his knowledge of the differences among the various subtribes.
American officers consider it essential to cultivate the sheiks because they have found they control the information in rural areas. Even in poor small towns, satellite dishes are common. But al Jazeera does not deliver much in the way of local news. And the Sunni Arabs who live near Kirkuk are not in the habit of listening to the radio for news, and few newspapers reach them. Instead, they rely on the sheiks for political news and advice. And by making frequent visits to their homes, the Americans hope to influence the influencers.
The American officers are also more realistic, or at least more open, about what their missions are trying to accomplish. I have frequently heard soldiers cite the distribution of school supplies as evidence of the difference they are making in Iraqi lives. But it is hard to see how the distribution of pencils, paper, and soccer balls makes much of a real difference in people's lives. Even when the school supplies are not stolen, they make at best a temporary improvement in students' lives.
But Capt. Curtis Burden, the commander of the battalion's Charlie Company, talks plainly of clothes drops, medic visits, toy handouts, and school-supply giveaways as "information operations." Other officers call them "public relations." No matter what the term, the officers are plain that the main intention is to earn goodwill and potentially develop some sources. Burden says the goodwill visits are especially important after raiding a village.
"It's a totally different way of operating now," Burden says. "Forty-eight hours after an operation, we go in and give away toys and try to smooth things over."
To be sure, Burden believes the Army is making a difference in Iraq. But it is because of both sides of the effort—trying to win the hearts and minds of the people and killing the insurgents who lay bombs.
A sense of safety west of Kirkuk
Sheik Kamel Jasim, the leader of the small village of Mahuz, has an interesting view of the insurgency in his slice of Iraq—the rural Sunni Arab towns west of Kirkuk. Security, he said, remains on people's minds, but people are beginning to feel safer in his town as the number of Iraqi police and army units increases.
"The Iraqi Army is starting to get better," he said, speaking through an American Army translator. Kamel told me he thought the Americans should not withdraw until the Iraqi Army is ready, though it was hard to tell if that answer was really meant for the ears of the U.S. soldiers sitting nearby.
The bulk of the violence in the region, according to Kamel, is caused by foreign fighters from Iran and Syria. That is also a common sentiment among the Iraqi Army soldiers in the area but one that is not necessarily shared by all the American officers. Interestingly, although Kamel believes there are foreign fighters, he does not believe they are really led by Abu Musab Zarqawi, the head of al Qaeda in Iraq. Indeed, Kamel says Zarqawi is not a real person but someone made up by the Americans.
"I don't know if there really is a Zarqawi," Kamel says. "The Americans have enough powers to stop anyone. They could have caught Zarqawi. Therefore, I don't think he exists."
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