History Holds Its Breath
Dismantling the settlements illustrates Israel's willingness to make painful concessions for peace. But Palestinian reciprocity is essential. Israel stands ready to release more prisoners, transfer more cities to Palestinian control, and lift more roadblocks, but it is unable to do all this without Palestinian efforts to enter into serious coordination with Israel. How can the disengagement be peaceable? What is the equitable way of transferring the infrastructure the Israelis have built up in Gaza, from utilities and agribusiness to greenhouses and homes?
Perils. The danger is that Palestinian terrorists will increase their activity during the implementation phase of disengagement, in order to suggest that the Israeli withdrawal is the result of terrorist pressure. The Palestinian Authority must demonstrate an ability to prevent these attacks and pursue those who perpetrate them or else the Israelis will be forced to respond in a way that may preclude further progress.
Until Abu Mazen can move beyond Arafat's legacy by reforming his government and rebuilding the security services, his attempt to build a moderate image abroad will fail, and no peace plan will be meaningful.
Dangerously, the Fatah movement has grown so weak and fractured that its political efforts for Legislative Council elections in July have virtually collapsed. The beneficiaries have been Hamas and Islamic Jihad, whose public support in polls now exceeds 50 percent, dominating that of Fatah, which is under 15 percent. Should Hamas emerge with a majority in the Legislative Council, the conflict will become even more dire, for as the Hamas leader Khaled Mashal said, "The lull for Hamas is a tactic of resistance, while for the PA, it's an alternative to resistance."
What happens if the leaders of Hamas assume key positions in the legislative and executive branches while still advocating jihad and the destruction of Israel? Nothing but more bloodshed. Everything could be lost for another generation if the new government is dominated by Hamas.
Sharon, on the other hand, is in a trap. To respond is to risk being accused of sabotaging the relative calm. To fail to respond is to enhance the terrorist risk to Israel. The only thing Israel can do is to refuse to lift some roadblocks that would expand the freedom of movement of Palestinians--a move that would provoke the usual outcry from those oblivious to facts on the ground.
Abu Mazen has succeeded in part in shifting the onus from the Palestinians to the Israelis because he is careful what he tells the Palestinian public. They do not know of his promise to disarm the 495 suspects on Israel's most-wanted list, any more than they know about the generous settlement terms the Israelis proposed at Camp David five years ago. So they believe that the Palestinian Authority has fulfilled its obligations and the Israelis are failing in theirs.
Western leaders must not repeat the mistakes of earlier administrations by failing to hold the Palestinians accountable. They must link at least a portion of their financial support to ending terrorism and incitement and to introducing genuine democratic reforms. This will require Lt. Gen. William Ward, the U.S. security adviser, to take a more proactive role. Washington must also press those Arab countries whose bank accounts are overflowing from high oil prices to increase funding for the Palestinian economy. They haven't even kept their minimum promises of economic help.
The Palestinians cannot be allowed the indulgence of believing they can get away with empty rhetoric and unfilled promises without following through to end corruption and terrorism. Mahmoud Abbas, so far, has been a partner for peace in words alone. This will not endure.
The next 100 days will determine the fate of the peace process and tell us whether there is any chance for stability in the region. To succeed, Abu Mazen must prevent violence before and after disengagement and take control of the land and property in Gaza in an orderly way. This will require leadership and the stature to make tough decisions and implement them, qualities not yet visible in Abu Mazen, whose real friends live not in Ramallah but Washington. The danger is not only that Abbas may be Arafat in a suit; it is that he may be Arafat in an empty suit. That would be the worst of all outcomes.
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