Time for a reality check
The world is enjoying a moment of hope for Israeli-Palestinian relations--a moment of dangerous hope because expectations are being raised too high. The election of Mahmoud Abbas as president of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to succeed Yasser Arafat is a positive. Abbas, also known as Abu Mazen, has advocated an end to the intifada terrorism, and Palestinian public opinion seems to have recoiled from the corruption and violence associated with Arafat's regime. A Palestinian majority, finally, may have come to recognize that their war of terror will never lead to peace. But Abbas must now convince Palestinians that they will have to detoxify their society before anything like a real peace can exist. Too many Palestinians have devoted themselves for far too long not to the creation of a two-state solution but to the eradication of one state and one people: Israel and the Jews.
There is thus no prospect yet of a diplomatic Hail Mary, in terms of realizing a full peace agreement, but there would be a real chance of the first step--an improved atmosphere that would lead to a peace based on trust--if President Abbas can deliver. Alas, realism requires us to recognize that he is not a strong leader and that, in fact, he has a long history of weakness in the face of Palestinian terrorism. Missing from his entire campaign was a serious discussion in which the Palestinian leadership prepared their people for a more honest approach, one in which Palestinian leaders would announce, in Arabic to their own people, the words of accommodation they mouth in English to convince the western media and governments of their commitment to peace.
The power of the gun. For Abu Mazen, the real test is now. Arafat made moderation synonymous with treason. He established a cult of total victory and a culture of hatred toward Israel; he legitimized terrorism and suicide bombings; he used the mosques, the media, and the schools to instill his animus in his people, even among the youngest children. Abu Mazen, as a result, now faces a range of serious problems. There are the splits between the young guard and the old; between the Tunis crowd that came to Palestine and the local intifada veterans; between Gazans and West Bank residents; and, finally, between refugees and nonrefugees. Then there is the squabbling among the different Palestinian security services, the absence of security in Palestinian neighborhoods ruled by armed gangs, and the corruption in the PA. Worst of all is the intransigence of the terrorist organizations headed by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Their habitual resort to violence is compounded by the Arafat legacy of more than a dozen different security agencies that function largely as individual fiefdoms, following orders only if it suits them.
Taken together, all of these factors will limit Abu Mazen's ability to make compromises for peace. No one has yet found a Palestinian security force willing to obey an order to confront the militants in the West Bank and Gaza. In fact, Abu Mazen has declared, "I will not use weapons against any Palestinian." So he has fraternized with Hamas, snuggled up to Islamic Jihad, and promised terrorists that he will not disarm them but will protect them. In a culture where the roots of power, and even legitimacy, grow out of the power of the gun, the likelihood is that Abu Mazen will try to create the facade of dealing with these terrorist groups while he focuses his agenda on strengthening his political authority.
While it is too early to foretell the outcome, it is clear that combating terrorism is both a practical necessity and an essential litmus test of peaceful relations. A temporary cease-fire is no solution. It will simply raise Israeli suspicions that time is being bought to give Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades a respite to rebuild their arsenals. None of them will forswear the destruction of Israel. Why? Simply because terrorist groups are rarely, if ever, truly neutralized unless they are disbanded and disarmed, for their credo is "I kill, therefore I am." So Abu Mazen cannot restrict himself to co-opting the terrorist groups, as he proposes. He will have to confront them, brutally if necessary.
This election should be seen then as but one component of a larger reform effort that will take much longer to enact. The election campaign itself explains why. Yes, Abu Mazen was duly elected, but his speeches often sounded as if they were being delivered by Arafat, under whom Abu Mazen served as deputy for 40 years. Could we possibly imagine a deputy who served under Saddam Hussein for so long as an Iraqi reformer? Abu Mazen is also a Holocaust denier who asserts that the Temple never existed in Jerusalem. He supported Arafat when he rejected the Camp David proposals four years ago. He presented himself as Arafat's natural successor, celebrating his legacy of failure rather than shunning it. Abu Mazen's posturing arises in part from conviction, in part as a reflection of political weakness. Palestinians see him as a member of the old guard, the Tunis thugocracy that came to Palestine and became rich men. Abu Mazen lacks Arafat's ability to connect with the people via speeches. When he was prime minister, his public support was at just 2 percent, and, as somebody put it, "the 2 percent was soft."
Abu Mazen has refused to confront the terrorist groups, who he knows vow to kill anyone who does not accept their demands. The terrorists made this point plain when they killed two of Abu Mazen's bodyguards and fired shots in the air at a post-Arafat burial ceremony in Gaza. Their purpose was not to kill Abu Mazen but merely to warn him against compromise with Israel. So Abu Mazen mouthed Arafat's doctrines, including a pledge to return all of Palestinian refugees, now totaling 4 million, to the pre-1948 original home of their ancestors in Israel and to oust Israel from all of the West Bank. The "right of return," he said, was a nonnegotiable prerequisite. The implementation of this demand would destroy the Jewish character of Israel and is clearly a nonstarter.
Abu Mazen has attacked Israelis as "Zionist enemies" and vowed that he would not only never attack members of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and al-Aqsa but defend them instead, allowing himself to be hoisted on the shoulders of cheering Palestinian gunmen and wanted terrorists. In fact, Abu Mazen's objections to violence against Israel were couched not in terms of morality and law but in terms of expediency: Now is not the time. Indeed, the quiet within the Palestinian community for the moment can be explained only by Abu Mazen's having told the terrorist organizations and their political leaders that he has no intention of forcing them to abjure violence.
Repeating the past? How long Abu Mazen can maintain this balancing act, maintaining two faces, one to his own side and one to the West, we cannot say. His election may be perceived in the West as giving Abu Mazen a certain mandate for moderation, but it is critical that nobody--in the West or in Israel--should be under any illusions about his character and the constraints on him. What cannot be wished away is the culture that glorifies terrorists. Abu Mazen must be held responsible for ending the propagation of hatreds. Failure to hold the Palestinian leadership accountable now would be to simply repeat the wishful thinking and missteps of the Clinton administration.
Yes, it's true that peace must be made with one's adversaries, not one's friends, but it cannot be made if the adversaries do not want to make peace with you. As British Prime Minister Tony Blair put it, "Israel wants one thing . . . a Palestinian state that [is] democratic and not a security threat" to itself. Increased western aid will improve the economy of the West Bank, but it will not end the deeply held ideological and religious force of rejectionism that has long fueled Palestinian terrorists. Europeans, of course, will put as much pressure as they can on Washington to engage with Israel, which means forcing Israel back to the cease-fire positions at the end of the 1948-49 war, with the abandonment of major population centers Israelis have built as buffers to vulnerable frontiers. The Bush administration knows better, and no Israeli prime minister or chief of staff since the 1967 war has ever doubted that the long-term security of Israel is incompatible with the return to the 1948 armistice lines. Nor can Israelis depend for their defense on guarantees by other countries, especially Europe, whose leaders, as Henry Kissinger put it, "could not be relied on to understand the nuances of Israel's security" --never mind assuming a European public willing to make major sacrifices on behalf of Israel's security.
The Bush administration should focus on what is realistic. First, press the Palestinians for real reform at home to expand the rule of law, consolidate their security services, and root out the corruption so that western aid begins to build a self-sustaining economy and not cosset a corrupt elite. Next, Abu Mazen should be pressed to clean up the vile texts in Palestinian schools and media. Why should we subsidize hatred? The subsidies from the United States and Europe are put to such perverted uses, as Arafat once acknowledged in an unusual moment of candor.
The administration must also work to gain European and Arab support for the joint efforts of Israelis and Palestinians to make the successor government in Gaza--after Israel withdraws its army and its citizens--an example of responsible, orderly, and peaceful self-rule. In this way the Gaza experience might become a template for what could happen, over time, in the West Bank. Above all, what the West--especially America--must not do is indulge in self-deception and repeat the mistakes of the past--not if it wants something more than a photo opportunity that ultimately leads to further conflict and loss of life.
The Palestinians deserve peace and the opportunity to live in a democracy as much as the Israelis do. The Palestinians also deserve leaders who are accountable. But progress for the Palestinians is incompatible with a culture of hatred in which every public platform, every mosque, every educational program is used for exhortations to destroy Israel. Which is why, sadly, the poisonous legacy of Arafat may take a generation to excise. And why, in the Middle East, it is wise to remember that hope is a good breakfast but a very poor supper.
This story appears in the January 24, 2005 print edition of U.S. News & World Report.