The price of intransigence
Good fences. The fence has attained a certain credibility because none of the suicide bombers over the past three years have come out of the Gaza Strip, where such a fence has been in place. It reflects the geography of the West Bank, with its relatively short distances between major towns--literally, in some cases, a 15-minute walk or drive. Prevention of terrorist attacks emanating from the West Bank without a physical barrier is virtually impossible. Now, because they are prevented from striking in the northern part of the West Bank down to the coastal plain of Israel, the terrorists have been forced to shift their attacks south, toward Jerusalem. The fence, as the head of Israel's Shin Bet security service put it, has already paid for itself many times over in lives saved. No wonder that 80 percent of Israelis from both the left and the right consider the fence an absolute necessity as a last resort in protecting themselves and their children from terror. Their calculation is simple: Fences can be built and torn down; human lives are irreplaceable.
For the most part, the fence lies close to the Green Line of the 1967 border, but not exclusively. It has been attacked as a massive land grab because to secure the high ground and protect substantial Jewish communities, it deviates from the Green Line into the West Bank by several miles. It is critical, however, to understand why the fence is taking the route it is. To build exactly along the 1967 line would play directly into the Palestinian strategy. How? By creating the outline of a de facto Palestinian state in the West Bank, without requiring the Palestinians to cease terrorism, without requiring them to recognize Israel's right to exist, without their abandoning the use of the right of return--without formally ending this terrible conflict.
Some argue that the fence is a barrier to peace. Wrong. It is the very lack of a fence that has made it possible for Hamas and Islamic Jihad to hold the peace process hostage, since they initiate attacks every time progress seems possible. By taking the strategic threat of suicide bombings off the table, both sides would have more latitude for serious negotiations.
Everyone knows that the Palestinians will not negotiate seriously as long as they believe the terrorist attacks will demoralize the Israelis and push them back without the Palestinians paying a price.
The real reason for Palestinian objections is that, deprived of the terrorist card, they will have to rethink their unwillingness to confront their own terrorists. They also know that the fence would transform the Israeli role from that of fighting terrorists in the West Bank to preventing terrorists from breaching the security fence. This would make it possible for the Israelis to withdraw their soldiers from the West Bank, to end their roadblocks, and give up their remaining responsibility over the Palestinian population. Thus, the Palestinians would lose the propaganda benefit of TV pictures of the Israeli Army in the West Bank.
There are positive benefits, too. Such a political separation would contribute to the two-state solution. On the one side would be a culturally Jewish, democratic society; on the other, a Palestinian sovereignty whose contours one now might only guess at.
The fence is a warning to the Palestinians that their unwillingness to negotiate a compromise will result in the unilateral imposition of a border that might be less advantageous to them than a negotiated outcome. It is also a warning to Israeli settlers determined to remain on the eastern side of the fence that their evacuation is a foregone conclusion--not a matter of if but when.
If there were ever a successful negotiation between Israelis and Palestinians resulting in a peace agreement truly worthy of the name, the precise location of the fence could be discussed and, perhaps, changed. But until such time, a fence will remain an imperative, given how many Palestinians still want to see the onslaught of terrorism against Israel continue. Until then, the message must be that when one society declares war on another, there will be a price to pay. A substantial price.
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