The Man of The Moment
The Palestinians have consistently taken an all-or-nothing approach and thus enshrined their reputation as a people who, in Abba Eban's telling phrase, never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. This was so in 1947, with the United Nations partition, and was repeated in 1979, with the Camp David Accords. In each case, the Palestinians insisted on everything and wound up with nothing. This time, instead of establishing a state, they are faced with the collapse of the Palestinian Authority. Will they ever learn?
One thing, at least, seems clear: President Bush and his aides can learn much from the failures of the Clinton administration in the Middle East. Clinton's policies brought insecurity for Israel and diminished credibility for the United States. One lesson is that Washington cannot remain evenhanded in the traditional sense, criticizing both sides equally, regardless of the true balance of blame or praise that should be accorded in specific instances. The United States does not enhance its credibility by blaming the party that has gone the extra mile for peace equally with the party that has chosen war over compromise. Instead, both sides must be measured by an equal standard, such as criticizing aggression by either side and defending the right of each to self-defense. It did not help that the Clinton administration refused to appropriately condemn Palestinian violence in the face of their violation of two cease-fires mediated by Washington. Self-defense and aggression, and terrorism and the response to it, are not equivalent.
The Clinton administration failed to force the Palestinian side to implement the conditions and obligations it assumed under Oslo, such as confiscating illegal weapons, ending incitement, and the like. This was never taken seriously by the Clinton administration--and, to some degree, by some Israeli governments. It set the stage for the Palestinian choice of violence over negotiations that we saw after Camp David. The Palestinians concluded then that violations of their commitments to resolve the conflict through peaceful means would have no real consequences. Indeed, Palestinian intransigence came to be seen by the United States not as an obstacle but as a given. It actually reduced the pressure on Arafat to compromise when he saw that violence paid.
The new American administration must ensure that violence is not rewarded, so that Palestinians do not think they can get a better deal by fighting. Sharon will have to do for the Palestinians what Ronald Reagan did for the Soviets. As the author Jonathan Rauch has pointed out, Sharon will have to demonstrate that only long-term failure can result from a long-term war of attrition. The Palestinian economy will wither, and the quality of life for Palestinians will decline even further.
Ronald Reagan believed the United States would not win the Cold War as long as Moscow believed it would win. He pushed the Soviets to help them understand that, for them, the Cold War was not a winning proposition and that they were wrong to think that they could fight forever and that their adversaries could not. Sharon and Reagan assumed their nations' highest positions of trust late in their lives. Reagan, finally, saw his view vindicated. Time will tell whether Sharon will be similarly blessed.
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