The Man of The Moment
But just as his negotiations with Barak exposed the folly of concessions, Arafat's reliance on violence has unified Israelis in a way they have not been in years. The violence has brought together doves like Shimon Peres and nationalists like Sharon into a single cabinet, in response to an overwhelming vote that made it abundantly clear what the Israeli people wanted. More than ever, Israelis understand the importance of restoring the credibility of Israeli deterrence. And they believe Sharon understands that deterrence--and maybe only deterrence--is what will keep Israel secure.
Sharon's goal is simple. He wants to establish rules for coexistence in the framework of a long-term interim agreement. This is a lot less than what Barak offered the Palestinians, and they may be unwilling to accept it. What Israelis accept now is the following: There is an unsolvable conflict between two national communities within a small geographic area, each with incompatible national aspirations. This new realization crushed the hope that there could be an agreement between the leadership of the Israelis and the Palestinians. Arafat has the stature to sign such an accord, but instead of repudiating the violence, he has fueled it.
Good diplomacy, it is said, occurs when all other options have been exhausted. The only feasible option today is disengagement--to put as much space as possible between the two sides. Until there is supportable evidence that the Palestinians are really prepared to end the conflict, this is what we are left with. But disengagement will be complicated because of the intertwining of these two peoples in such a small place. Nevertheless, what is needed is an agreement that would involve a strategic Israeli withdrawal from most of the territory, in return for a protracted truce and, ultimately, the kind of nonbelligerence that Israel agreed to with Egypt in 1975. This would give the Palestinians a more viable, contiguous area, one that could be recognized and run as a truly independent state. It would require the Israelis to dismantle many of the smaller settlements in the territories outside of the areas closer to the major Israeli cities, where some 80 percent of the settlers now live. One Israeli newspaper reports that Sharon is already prepared to consider eliminating settlements in Gaza that are surrounded by thousands of hostile Palestinians.
Learning lessons. The whole objective is to establish boundaries and borders--to reduce the daily friction that has created so much conflict. The Palestinians may well not agree, and there is no reason to suppose at this point that they will. If that doesn't change, Israel may have to consider drawing its own territorial lines. But it must find a way to do this in a manner that Palestinians will not interpret unilateral dismantling of isolated settlements as a sign of more Israeli weakness. The Israelis will have to wait until the violence abates and the credibility of their deterrence is re-established.
And as for Jerusalem, it would seem appropriate to revisit the arrangements made by Moshe Dayan, after the Six-Day War in 1967. Under the protocols drafted by the legendary defense minister, the Arabs administered the shrines on the Temple Mount while the Jews exercised police power in all of Jerusalem. This remains the best and most tolerable arrangement.
advertisement
