China Is Making Friends and Influencing People
Why Beijing's rising power is good—and Bad—for America
The outskirts of Mandalay, the largest city in northern Myanmar, still look like they might have to British colonials in the 19th century. Buddhist monks in long robes wander through villages of small huts, begging for rice in the early morning before returning to crumbling monasteries. But the city center looks far different. Inside a new multistory shopping mall, recent Chinese migrants have opened stores selling Chinese-made stereos and mobile phones, while outside vendors sell Chinese apples. Says one resident: "Everything here is from China."
For years, China insisted it had a limited role in places like Myanmar (formerly Burma). It would invest and trade, yes, but not get involved in politics like the United States, which has imposed tough sanctions on the repressive Myanmar dictatorship. But as China's stakes grow—it has become one of the biggest investors in Myanmar—China's leaders find they cannot avoid getting more involved. Chinese diplomats publicly complain, for instance, about the regime's bizarre and costly decision to relocate the capital to a remote, malaria-infested jungle area some 200 miles north of the longtime capital Yangon. And while they hardly regard human rights as a priority, Chinese officials are aware that they risk a backlash if they ignore the protests of exile Myanmar activists—and even some local residents—that Beijing is backing a regime that imprisons hundreds of political prisoners.
Myanmar provides an early glimpse of what China is becoming. After years focusing on its own economy, China has begun to go global in influence as well as economics. With growing interests around the globe—from mines in Peru to peacekeepers across Africa to pipelines into Central Asia—China is finding it can no longer live by its doctrine of "nonintervention." In Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East, China is beginning to use its influence in ways that may prove problematic for the United States.
Partner or rival? For now, the Bush administration is applauding when China plays a complementary role. For instance, Washington has encouraged Beijing to do the diplomatic heavy lifting for negotiations to rid North Korea of its nuclear weapons program. But at some point, the United States may not look so approvingly on the rise of another global player, a rival for influence, for alliances, and for access to natural resources. China desperately needs new sources of energy to sustain its expanding economy, and by 2030 it probably will be importing some 80 percent of its oil. This potentially puts China into competition with other major oil-importing nations, including the United States.
Ten years ago, most Chinese officials denied any global pretensions. Even as recently as 2000, China's trade with Africa, now one of China's largest economic partners, was relatively modest and China's direct investment in Africa was insignificant. China's military focused on preparing for local conflicts, such as a war with Taiwan, rather than far-away challenges, such as peacekeeping operations. "Nonintervention is our brand, like intervention is the Americans' brand," declared Zhou Yuxiao, a Chinese diplomat, during a trip to Africa last year.
Such vows of nonintervention play well. A recent study by the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that nearly every nation studied in Africa had a favorable view of China. That's also evident among China's Asian neighbors, who for years eyed Beijing with apprehension. Particularly remarkable is China's popularity in Cambodia, despite the fact that Beijing in the 1970s backed the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime that killed some 2 million Cambodians, a quarter of the population. As one internal U.S. State Department report written in 2004 observed, "The People's Republic of China has achieved this amazing volte-face."
With over $1 trillion in currency reserves, China is investing far and wide. Its direct foreign investment in Africa has grown to $1.6 billion, from $100 million a decade ago, and China has provided billions more in loans. It has about 800 companies on the continent, and has signed deals, for instance, to build railways across Angola, satellites in Nigeria, and a mobile phone network in Ethiopia. In Central Asia, China two years ago opened a $700 million pipeline linking it and oil-rich Kazakhstan, while Beijing has announced plans to invest $100 billion in Latin America over the next 10 years. In the Philippines, Francis Chua, head of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and industry, says he hosts one group of would-be Chinese investors after another. "There is no week that passes here without a [business] delegation from China," he says.
Beijing backs up its investments with new promises of direct aid and project financing. At a recent summit in Shanghai, for instance, China announced it would offer $20 billion to Africa, putting it in a league with the biggest donors and lenders. Some of China's money goes toward enhancing its "soft power," such as promoting language training and cultural exchanges. China is funding some 100 "Confucius Institutes" in Chinese studies at universities around the globe, and it offers scholarships for foreigners, so that China currently has over 140,000 overseas students at its own universities.
Nowadays, China no longer can just mind its own business. Beijing "cannot help but be embroiled in political developments in the countries in which it is investing," argues Frank Ching, a Hong Kong-based columnist. If Chinese leaders did not already see their growing footprint, other countries are beginning to remind them. Two years ago, in Zambia, an accident at a Chinese-owned mining-explosives factory killed some 50 workers. When the company rerebuffed angry miners' families—and a protest led to company guards firing on demonstrating workers—Zambians began to take out their anger on China. Protesters attacked Chinese-owned companies, and last year a leading opposition politician denounced Chinese immigrants as "infestors."
Activists in nations from Peru to the Philippines worry that Chinese support is propping up awful governments or exporting China's own weak labor and environmental policies. African and western activists have launched a "Genocide Olympics" campaign to pressure Beijing to stop supporting Sudan, where China National Petroleum Corp. owns the largest stake in Sudan's major oil firm, and Beijing consistently protected Khartoum from United Nations actions on Darfur.
Realizing that China stands accused of exploiting other nations' natural resources, President Hu Jintao on his February 2007 trip to Africa counseled Chinese investors to work more closely with locals and develop corporate social responsibility. Pouring on the charm, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao toured Africa like a big-city American mayor in the last 48 hours of a campaign, posing with groups of smiling children. Just to make sure Africans got the message, China announced new plans to fund antimalaria clinics across the continent.
Changes. China also has begun rethinking some of its nastiest partnerships. For instance, officials have sent signals to old friend Zimbabwe that Beijing might not continue to back Robert Mugabe's inept and repressive regime. And after years of stonewalling U.N. actions on Sudan's Darfur conflict, China this year appointed a special envoy, publicly criticized the Khartoum government, and joined with the United States in backing a U.N. force for Darfur. It may even contribute troops. This would not be unusual: China has become the second-largest source of peacekeeping troops (after France) among the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.
As China shoulders more international responsibility, the Bush administration has lavished it with praise. But Washington might not remain sanguine as Beijing sets its sights on nations with close ties to America. Already, China has built a close relationship with Saudi Arabia; Riyadh is considering building a strategic oil reserve for China. Elsewhere, too, China is increasingly assertive in satisfying its growing need for energy resources. "For China's leaders, energy security clearly is too important to be left to the markets," contends Mikkal Herberg, an energy specialist at the National Bureau of Asian Research in Seattle.
A nation with investments and friends spanning the world will want to protect those interests. Though China's military capabilities lag far behind America's, China has begun upgrading its forces, and its defense budget grew by nearly 20 percent this year. Beijing wants to expand its military reach, for instance extending its Navy's mission from coastal defense to offshore power projection.
Allies. To go along with a blue water navy in the future—a development being watched with concern by the Pentagon—China is building defense partnerships with longtime American friends like the Philippines and Thailand, which has agreed to hold joint training with the People's Liberation Army. "You have a generation of Philippine Army officers who are more comfortable working with China," says Rommel Banlaoi, a leading Philippine defense expert. While publicly accepting American power in Asia, China is taking some steps to push back. It has helped initiate multilateral forums, such as the East Asia Summit, that exclude the United States. One day, China may become powerful enough to really show its strength. Like a young America did 200 years ago, declaring a Monroe Doctrine for the Western Hemisphere, Beijing may make clear that it should be the dominant power in Asia.
Even short of that, there is no denying its rise. Cambodians, for instance, are mindful of China's influence as the nation's largest investor. "It used to be that if the U.S. criticized Cambodia, the Cambodian government had to listen," says local environmental scientist Sokhem Pech. "But now, they don't need to listen to the U.S. They already have accepted China is the big power here."
Former U.S. News Associate Editor Joshua Kurlantzick is author of Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World(Yale University Press, 2007).