Elusive Victory
In the first post-9/11 battlefield, the challenges remain complex—and deadly
Trust issues. Whatever the reality, they add, such rumors tend to erode trust in the government. The best way to rebuild it, many believe, is to strengthen Afghan security forces. But there aren't nearly enough trainers throughout the country, say U.S. military officials here. In Kandahar, their ranks have recently been more than tripled, but it is "nowhere near what we need," says Clancy. Recent congressional approval of additional money for security forces should help with the goal of increasing the national police force from the current 62,000 to 82,000.
In the meantime, U.S. planners have rolled out a national auxiliary police force with the aim, says Clancy, "just to get us a lot of numbers very quickly." Training police in two weeks and then sending them back to their home villages to supplement sparse local forces, the program initially prompted concerns it could produce a glorified militia, or be infiltrated by the Taliban. In fact, U.S. military officials say, there are some Taliban in the forces, but most are young former Taliban who are simply looking for a job. Better they find it in the auxiliary police then fighting against International Security Assistance Forces. Rigorous screening measures, including consultation with village elders, remain in place, say officials, to root out the real troublemakers.
Yet there remain lingering charges that international forces are failing to coordinate with their Afghan counterparts. Such coordination is vital, says Jawad, even when it comes to something as simple as searching a house. "The door as part of Afghan culture is like your face," and breaking it down is like "a slap in the face." International forces, he adds, need to "trust more the role of Afghans"—or risk losing "entire villages for being bullish." A spate of civilian deaths in the aftermath of U.S. and international military operations here was caused in large part, said Karzai last month, because of a "lack of coordination with the Afghan government."
Anger. At a joint operations center in Kabul, a wall map is marked with locations of recent protests against airstrikes. Though the protests have been peaceful, notes the Afghan operations officer on duty, some have been harshly suppressed by local leaders. The U.S. military grapples with the aftermath of civilian anger. When 19 civilians were killed and 50 injured in Nangarhar province last March following a Taliban attack on Marine special forces, Col. John Nicholson, commander of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 10th Mountain Division, told reporters that "events such as that do set us back with the population and they have to be addressed very directly and forthrightly with the Afghan people."
To that end, Nicholson issued an apology, which read in part, "I stand before you today, deeply, deeply ashamed and terribly sorry that the Americans have killed and wounded innocent Afghan people ... the death and wounding of innocent Afghans at the hand of Americans is a stain on our honor."
Gen. James Conway, commandant of the Marine Corps, took issue with the statement, contending that Nicholson should have waited until the incident was fully investigated. Gen. Dan McNeill, commander of the International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan, tells U.S. News that "the Afghan people don't ask for a whole lot, and I can understand [Nicholson's] motivation" for issuing the apology. "He is one of the finest officers I know." McNeill added that he could also understand Conway's comments that for reasons of due process some of the comments "may have been ill-timed." Jawad says that Nicholson's use of the word "shame" was the "right word" for conveying his sorrow to the Afghan people. But the bottom line, says Jawad, is that in a country where citizens have prodigiously long memories, the military has to do "whatever it takes to reduce this number" of deaths.
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