In the Land of the Poppy
Can grapes and honeybees trump opium?
SHINDAND DISTRICT—As poppy crop production has soared to record levels throughout Afghanistan, the U.S. military has found itself increasingly nudged by the State Department to add drug eradication to its expanding portfolio. But mixing counterinsurgency and counternarcotics efforts is tricky; one can become an obstacle to the other. And wiping out poppy fields can turn unhappy growers into Taliban supporters.
Poppy eradication is easy to measure and implement, and many U.S. administration officials—as well as those in Congress—like it for that reason. But it is generally not the big players in the drug trade who suffer under such policies. "Eradication disproportionately affects the small farmer—the same farmer that is the target of our counterinsurgency efforts," says Col. John Nicholson, commander of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 10th Mountain Division, who returned from Afghanistan in June. What's more, "most of the guys who point out the fields to be cut and sprayed own half of the area anyway" and guide eradication forces away from their land, adds a U.S. military official. For those farmers whose lands are targeted for eradication, the Taliban gets the chance to step in and serve as protector—not an ideal scenario for coalition forces here.
So the U.S. military is experimenting with its own crop substitution plans here in the Shindand district of western Afghanistan—a hearty drug-producing area that is a gateway between the province's unstable south and the more stable north. U.S. Capt. Ryan Babcock, a civil affairs officer, has designed an agricultural training center, the first of its kind in the country, that will be home to orchards, warm-water fish hatcheries, and honeybee hives. It will also serve as a laboratory for crops like saffron, pomegranates, and pistachios. "One crop won't be the end-all cure," says Babcock. "But as we integrate other crops, it will become a portfolio."
Shindand is an important area to target for other reasons as well. In April, less than 10 miles away, some 136 Taliban were killed in coalition operations—along with some 30 civilians. Villagers poured into the streets to protest the civilian deaths. Soldiers are anxious to earn back goodwill.
Alternatives. So while U.S. soldiers currently do not go out and physically eradicate poppies—and have little interest in doing so in the future—military commanders are eyeing the Shindand center as a model program. "In a country where a significant portion of the population is doing subsistence agriculture for their living, we could use help on the agricultural side, absolutely," says Nicholson. Some of the provincial reconstruction teams, charged with rebuilding here, "have U.S. Department of Agriculture representatives," he adds, "but not many."
The Shindand center will also offer classes for local villagers in pond construction and how to build a trellis—the latter in the hopes of reviving once thriving vineyards, destroyed under the Taliban. Today, says Babcock, "all of the grapes are grown on the ground," yielding less fruit.
These are important developments, says Chulam Nabi Wahidi as he tends to the vineyards that have just begun to yield sweet grapes. The project has employed an entire village, and, what's more, farmers are anxious to give up poppy crops, he says. "They would rather have more legitimate sources of income." Another motivation, he adds, is that "the kids in the village are starting to use the opium."
Babcock was deployed to Iraq from 2004 to 2005 and was interested in launching a similar center but, he says, the security conditions didn't permit it. He has volunteered to stay here an additional year—a year in which he hopes he can help the effort reach a tipping point. "We either do something here or we're going to lose it," he says. "It's a once-in-a-lifetime thing."
This story appears in the July 16, 2007 print edition of U.S. News & World Report.
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