With Bush's 'Surge' Finally in Place, a Clamor for Results
Now, can Iraq weather the bombing of a key mosque?
For months, U.S. officials have been worried that it might take just one catastrophic event, perhaps a particularly deadly bombing or sectarian massacre, to obliterate any tenuous glimmers of progress in reducing violence in Baghdad. So when the news came in last week about explosions toppling the minarets of Samarra's Askariya shrine—the same holy Shiite site whose bombing in February 2006 plunged Iraq into a frenzy of sectarian violence—the Bush administration was understandably worried. Iraqi and U.S. authorities immediately imposed curfews across the country and a ban on vehicles in Baghdad to prevent a spate of retaliatory attacks.
The following day was relatively quiet, despite reports that some families fled their homes fearing sectarian violence. But the strict measures are a reminder of how tenuous the security situation is five months after President Bush announced his so-called surge strategy. Just this month, the full complement of some 28,000 additional U.S. troops finally arrived in Iraq. As those reinforcements continue to fan out around Baghdad to establish new security posts, the Bush administration says that it will take at least two months before the Pentagon can evaluate what effect the new security plan is having.
Moving around. Early indications are far from encouraging. While sectarian killings appear to have declined at least temporarily in the capital, the Pentagon reports that overall violence levels nationwide remain as high as ever. Indeed, even as U.S. troops boost their presence in some Baghdad neighborhoods, many insurgents appear to have simply moved to outlying provinces that now have a much thinner security presence. Even worse, insurgents continue to successfully attack U.S. forces. Monthly death tolls for American soldiers are near record levels, in part because the new strategy leaves them more exposed on the streets of Baghdad. For its part, the Iraqi government has been unable to find any new breathing room on making long-overdue political reforms, and politicians in Washington are becoming increasingly impatient.
The one spot of good news—a serious drop in al Qaeda activity in the troubled western province of Anbar—appears to have little to do with the surge strategy. A report issued by the Pentagon last week trumpeted a 34 percent decline in the number of attacks in Anbar since December 2006, with violence levels in Ramadi at a two-year low. U.S. commanders report that more Iraqis are joining the security forces there and civilians are providing better tips about terrorist activity. But the most important factor is a decision by many Sunni tribesmen to band together against al Qaeda in Iraq and other jihadist groups.
Suspicion. U.S. officials are quietly supplying those Sunni tribes with weapons and ammunition. That strategy could backfire, given the tribes' history of fast-shifting alliances. "If al Qaeda is ever run out of town, the next agenda item for most Sunni Arabs is an end to the occupation," says Wayne White, a former top Iraq analyst for the State Department's intelligence office who is now an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute. "They could well turn on us." Fueling that concern is a persistent suspicion among Iraqis that the United States has far-reaching designs on their country and its oil resources. "There is nothing that offends Iraqis more or stirs up anti-foreign sentiment in Iraq more than talking about foreign bases," says White. "As long as we reject calls to renounce permanent bases, Iraqis will remain very skeptical of our long-term intentions."
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