Afghan Forces: Rooting Out the Corruption
KABUL, Afghanistan—When Maj. Gen. Robert Durbin, head of the Combined Security Transition Command, arrived in Afghanistan 18 months ago, he spent nearly three weeks meeting with his staff and with Afghan National Army and police forces. He was taking over the job of training Afghan security forces, and at the end of that time, he says, he had reached a conclusion.
"It has only taken you a little over two weeks to convince me that the Afghan National Army and police are not worth a hoot," he told his staff. "From this point on, you believe in them. If we don't believe in them, there's no way they can believe in themselves."
Now, a year and a half later, "there's no doubt in my mind that our adventure here will be a success," says Durbin.That's because, he adds, "they want this more than we do."
In the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan, the country's police force received far less attention from U.S. officials than its army. Today, the U.S. military is redoubling its efforts to build the Afghan national police. "In a counterinsurgency environment, police are much more important than the Army," says Durbin.
But it's a force that remains riddled with sizable problems.
"There was corruption and there still is corruption," Durbin says. "Corruption in many cases comes from a culture of survival. To help your family, you'll do whatever it takes."
Baksheesh, or bribes, paid out to police and other ministry officials are a daily fact of life for millions of poor Afghans who are caught up in traffic accidents or who are simply trying to get electricity routed to their homes.
And police remain underpaid. "We must achieve pay equity," says Durbin. "That's something that has to happen." Otherwise, "if you don't properly compensate them, you set the conditions for them to compensate themselves."
Durbin says that within the next month, he expects the pay of Afghan police to increase from $70 to $100 a month, the pay of Afghan Army officers. In the interim, "there are transaction costs that ended up becoming expected" by the police. Their attitude, says Durbin, is "if I'm helping a third party. then I deserve to get my cut."
Last April, the Afghan Army instituted its first uniform code of military justice. In that time, over 60 general officers have been court-martialed and convicted for cases involving physical and sexual abuse, as well as bribery and abuse of positions of power.
The police have since instituted their own system for investigating corrupt officers. "It's not just a cursory, check the block," says Durbin. They are following the lead of the Afghan National Army, which has created its own office of the inspector general—similar to that of the United States, he adds, "but Afghanized." A toll-free number that the ministry of defense installed three months ago has seen some 60 calls, with complaints that include issues of pay distribution and mistreatment in the ranks.
"Are the police really good yet?" Durbin asks. "No," but their accomplishments to date are enduring. "If we left tomorrow—and we're not going to—they have the basics." What's more, he adds, "they're not going to walk away from it."
The Afghan Army is "only half as big as it needs to be." At 30,000, it needs to grow to 70,000.
In the meantime, U.S. officials, along with the Afghan Ministry of Interior, have created national auxiliary police units too, to supplement local security forces—and in many cases, to keep unemployed young men from trying to earn money elsewhere, either through the drug trade, the Taliban, or criminal gangs. "If we didn't have the Afghan National Auxiliary Police, we'd have local militia—or they would be hired by someone else who'd be shooting at us."
As the police force grows, the U.S. military is watching the clocks.
"Our biggest threat is time," says Durbin. "Do [the people of Afghanistan] really believe that this new government will make their days better?" The other question on their minds, says Durbin, is if they stand up to the Taliban and narco-traffickers, will their government support them? "I wouldn't stand up to the Taliban if I didn't think I could have my government back me up," he says.
But building a quality force takes time, adds Durbin. The question, he adds, "is will Afghans wait" for that to happen? "That's our dilemma."
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