Why More May Not Be Enough
If the goal is to quell an insurgency, the president's math simply doesn't add up
Can a surge of U.S. and Iraqi troops into Baghdad accomplish what last summer's Operation Forward Together failed to achieve? In announcing the imminent deployment of more U.S. soldiers to Iraq and additional Iraqi forces, the Bush administration aims to stabilize the capital city, quell a spiraling civil war, and thereby rescue its foundering policy. The plan also includes a new promise by the Iraqi government to implement key political steps and a new infusion of economic reconstruction funds and manpower to provide jobs and repair critical Iraqi infrastructure. Those same promises have gone unfulfilled before, however, and no timetable or penalty for noncompliance is included in this latest-and possibly final-attempt to salvage the war effort.
The architects of this new scheme are placing their bet on a military solution when a growing chorus of critics believes only a political solution has a chance of working. Sen. Carl Levin, the veteran Michigan Democrat who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee, is one of the critics. "An escalation of American troops is a flawed strategy," he says. "It implies that there is a military solution to the violence when what's needed is a political solution among the Iraqi leaders."
U.S. News interviewed a dozen counterinsurgency experts, who raised several concerns about the viability of the president's new plan. First, 21,500 more troops may be too few to make a difference. Second, how the troops are used is as important as their numbers. Third, if not accompanied by a political breakthrough that all Iraqis can rally around, military measures alone will fail to halt the slide into civil war. Yet the plan includes no new U.S. effort on the political front.
Military experts use several formulas to determine how many forces are required to fight conflicts in which the antagonists hide among the civilian populace. One formula developed by David Galula, a French counterinsurgency expert, calls for a ratio of between 10 and 20 counterinsurgents per insurgent. Lt. Col. John Nagl, who has written about Galula and is currently training U.S. adviser teams, says that "technology is no substitute for boots on the ground. Protecting or rebuilding a state is much harder than toppling its government."
Another approach. Since it is rarely possible to determine the size of the enemy with absolute accuracy, a population-based formula that is similarly manpower-intensive has gained favor. It calls for at least 20 counterinsurgents for every 1,000 inhabitants. A recent example of its success was in Northern Ireland, where British troops stayed in force for years, says James Quinlivan, a military analyst at Rand. The British also prevailed in their counterinsurgency in Malaya earlier last century with roughly the same force ratio. Applying this formula to Iraq's 25 million population results in a total force of 500,000 required to pacify the country.
Piecemeal strategy. Although there are 132,000 U.S. troops currently deployed to Iraq, most are engaged in logistics jobs or protecting bases or supply lines. Only some 50,000 are available for combat and counterinsurgency duties. And while 327,000 Iraqi soldiers and police exist on paper, the loyalty and competence of the police especially are suspect. By one source's estimate, only the 130,000 Iraqi Army troops should be counted as committed to the fight. That leaves the American and Iraqi government forces short by some 230,000 troops nationwide, if the counterinsurgency ratio were adopted.
The administration's plan sets out a more limited approach, focusing on Baghdad, where some 6 million Iraqis live, and sending an additional 4,000 marines to restive Anbar province, which is a stronghold of Sunni insurgents. The U.S. plans to send one battalion to each Baghdad neighborhood, and double or triple the advisers embedded in Iraqi units, with additional quick-reaction forces ready to go in if needed. The United States is sending up to 17,500 troops to Baghdad, while the Iraqis are supposed to send an additional 8,000. Forces in Baghdad will then total 91,500 (41,500 Americans and 50,000 Iraqis), which is still some 30,000 short of the recommended counterinsurgency ratio (120,000).
This piecemeal strategy is the "oil spot" approach advanced by Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment-18 months ago. He now says: "U.S. troops will only succeed if they receive the support promised by the Iraqi government," including capable Iraqi forces. And, he adds, "this means confronting Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army." Yet it is unclear whether the Iraqi prime minister will honor his latest pledge to allow U.S. and Iraqi troops to go after the militia of his ally Sadr. Several times last year, the Iraqi government halted, impeded, and criticized raids by Iraqi and American special operations units on Sadr's militia leaders.
How the additional troops are used will be of utmost importance in determining the success of this gambit. If the U.S. troops do not remain in the neighborhoods alongside their Iraqi counterparts, they risk repeating the ephemeral gains of last summer, when violence returned as soon as U.S. troops departed neighborhoods such as Doura and Karrada. They will also have to prevent the insurgents from setting up new bases in nearby neighborhoods, notes Kalev Sepp, a retired Special Forces officer who has advised the U.S. commander in Iraq. He also worries that finding more combat soldiers and qualified advisers will be tough. "Gen. [David] Petraeus [the incoming commander in Iraq] will have to determine how they will double the number of advisers ... while still providing capable leadership in U.S. combat units."
The entire last-ditch effort turns on the issue of Iraqi political will. While President Bush did not set a deadline for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to implement oil revenue sharing among Iraq's ethnic groups, revised de-Baathification, or release of $10 billion from Iraq's coffers for economic reconstruction, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates told reporters that the gradual deployment of the 21,500 U.S. troops over the next four months will provide ample time to assess whether Maliki will deliver the goods. Gates professed optimism, telling reporters: "There is a broad commitment in the Iraqi government to make this work." He noted that Iraqi soldiers are now dying at a higher rate than Americans-a grim measurement of commitment in a war with precious few yardsticks to measure progress.
This story appears in the January 22, 2007 print edition of U.S. News & World Report.