Why More May Not Be Enough
If the goal is to quell an insurgency, the president's math simply doesn't add up
The administration's plan sets out a more limited approach, focusing on Baghdad, where some 6 million Iraqis live, and sending an additional 4,000 marines to restive Anbar province, which is a stronghold of Sunni insurgents. The U.S. plans to send one battalion to each Baghdad neighborhood, and double or triple the advisers embedded in Iraqi units, with additional quick-reaction forces ready to go in if needed. The United States is sending up to 17,500 troops to Baghdad, while the Iraqis are supposed to send an additional 8,000. Forces in Baghdad will then total 91,500 (41,500 Americans and 50,000 Iraqis), which is still some 30,000 short of the recommended counterinsurgency ratio (120,000).
This piecemeal strategy is the "oil spot" approach advanced by Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment-18 months ago. He now says: "U.S. troops will only succeed if they receive the support promised by the Iraqi government," including capable Iraqi forces. And, he adds, "this means confronting Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army." Yet it is unclear whether the Iraqi prime minister will honor his latest pledge to allow U.S. and Iraqi troops to go after the militia of his ally Sadr. Several times last year, the Iraqi government halted, impeded, and criticized raids by Iraqi and American special operations units on Sadr's militia leaders.
How the additional troops are used will be of utmost importance in determining the success of this gambit. If the U.S. troops do not remain in the neighborhoods alongside their Iraqi counterparts, they risk repeating the ephemeral gains of last summer, when violence returned as soon as U.S. troops departed neighborhoods such as Doura and Karrada. They will also have to prevent the insurgents from setting up new bases in nearby neighborhoods, notes Kalev Sepp, a retired Special Forces officer who has advised the U.S. commander in Iraq. He also worries that finding more combat soldiers and qualified advisers will be tough. "Gen. [David] Petraeus [the incoming commander in Iraq] will have to determine how they will double the number of advisers ... while still providing capable leadership in U.S. combat units."
The entire last-ditch effort turns on the issue of Iraqi political will. While President Bush did not set a deadline for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to implement oil revenue sharing among Iraq's ethnic groups, revised de-Baathification, or release of $10 billion from Iraq's coffers for economic reconstruction, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates told reporters that the gradual deployment of the 21,500 U.S. troops over the next four months will provide ample time to assess whether Maliki will deliver the goods. Gates professed optimism, telling reporters: "There is a broad commitment in the Iraqi government to make this work." He noted that Iraqi soldiers are now dying at a higher rate than Americans-a grim measurement of commitment in a war with precious few yardsticks to measure progress.
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