Why More May Not Be Enough
If the goal is to quell an insurgency, the president's math simply doesn't add up
Can a surge of U.S. and Iraqi troops into Baghdad accomplish what last summer's Operation Forward Together failed to achieve? In announcing the imminent deployment of more U.S. soldiers to Iraq and additional Iraqi forces, the Bush administration aims to stabilize the capital city, quell a spiraling civil war, and thereby rescue its foundering policy. The plan also includes a new promise by the Iraqi government to implement key political steps and a new infusion of economic reconstruction funds and manpower to provide jobs and repair critical Iraqi infrastructure. Those same promises have gone unfulfilled before, however, and no timetable or penalty for noncompliance is included in this latest-and possibly final-attempt to salvage the war effort.
The architects of this new scheme are placing their bet on a military solution when a growing chorus of critics believes only a political solution has a chance of working. Sen. Carl Levin, the veteran Michigan Democrat who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee, is one of the critics. "An escalation of American troops is a flawed strategy," he says. "It implies that there is a military solution to the violence when what's needed is a political solution among the Iraqi leaders."
U.S. News interviewed a dozen counterinsurgency experts, who raised several concerns about the viability of the president's new plan. First, 21,500 more troops may be too few to make a difference. Second, how the troops are used is as important as their numbers. Third, if not accompanied by a political breakthrough that all Iraqis can rally around, military measures alone will fail to halt the slide into civil war. Yet the plan includes no new U.S. effort on the political front.
Military experts use several formulas to determine how many forces are required to fight conflicts in which the antagonists hide among the civilian populace. One formula developed by David Galula, a French counterinsurgency expert, calls for a ratio of between 10 and 20 counterinsurgents per insurgent. Lt. Col. John Nagl, who has written about Galula and is currently training U.S. adviser teams, says that "technology is no substitute for boots on the ground. Protecting or rebuilding a state is much harder than toppling its government."
Another approach. Since it is rarely possible to determine the size of the enemy with absolute accuracy, a population-based formula that is similarly manpower-intensive has gained favor. It calls for at least 20 counterinsurgents for every 1,000 inhabitants. A recent example of its success was in Northern Ireland, where British troops stayed in force for years, says James Quinlivan, a military analyst at Rand. The British also prevailed in their counterinsurgency in Malaya earlier last century with roughly the same force ratio. Applying this formula to Iraq's 25 million population results in a total force of 500,000 required to pacify the country.
Piecemeal strategy. Although there are 132,000 U.S. troops currently deployed to Iraq, most are engaged in logistics jobs or protecting bases or supply lines. Only some 50,000 are available for combat and counterinsurgency duties. And while 327,000 Iraqi soldiers and police exist on paper, the loyalty and competence of the police especially are suspect. By one source's estimate, only the 130,000 Iraqi Army troops should be counted as committed to the fight. That leaves the American and Iraqi government forces short by some 230,000 troops nationwide, if the counterinsurgency ratio were adopted.
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