Men in Black
Why Iraq's Shiite militias are so brutally effective. What can be done to stop them?
Lately, calls have also been coming in from within the Ministry of Defense to more junior members of the 6th Iraqi Army Division as ministry officials bypass senior commanders to make requests of what they believe to be more pliable subordinates, according to U.S. and Iraqi military sources. An Iraqi brigade commander Duke advises was livid that one of his soldiers was called to remove an Iraqi Army checkpoint last week in the Mansour neighborhood of Baghdad. "Now why would you ask someone to do that?" asks Duke, who suspects the call came directly from government officials as a courtesy to Mahdi Army members conducting operations in the neighborhood. The area has seen an influx of Sunnis from Fallujah and Ramadi-which in turn has attracted Shiite militias trying to drive them out. Every day, there are six to 12 Iraqi bodies found in the brigade's operating area. "All of the intimidation happens at night," says Brady. "We find notes on the doors of Sunni houses saying, 'You need to leave.' Then Shia families move in. They tell us, 'They gave us this house.'"
The Ministry of the Interior had drawn particular scrutiny over militia infiltration and concerns about death squads operating within its forces. In October, the 2nd Battalion of the 8th Iraqi National Police Brigade was implicated in a raid on a meat-packing plant in which more than 20 Sunnis were kidnapped and seven killed by gunmen in police commando uniforms. At the time, says Duke, the National Police Brigade was composed of 93 percent Shiite, and 7 percent Sunni, cops. In the wake of the raid, the battalion commander was arrested, and the entire brigade was pulled off the streets.
"A blind eye." Today, retraining for the 8th Brigade is taking place at Numaniyah, southeast of Baghdad, where police take classes in human rights, learn the dangers of authoritarian rule, and perform drills designed to teach them basic policing skills. They also discuss, for example, "how psychological stress may affect the performances of cadets," says Gen. Ali Ibrahim, the new 8th Brigade commander. And they participate in role-playing scenarios-some of which were changed to "make them more Iraqi-like," explains one trainer. "Instead of entering a room with a bunch of drunk individuals, we changed it to a Ramadan festival that's more enthusiastic than it should have been."
The training is particularly important for a 25,000-strong paramilitary police force designed to be a bridge between the Iraqi Army and beat cops-the latter of whom are outnumbered and outgunned on the streets. Many of these National Police have had lots of battle experience but little to no police training, says Maj. Gen. Kenneth Hunzeker, the new commander of the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team in Iraq. Such training, adds a senior military official, is vital for forces vying for the trust of the people in areas where, "to a large extent, the militias filled the vacuum that occurred in between the ground war and us trying to re-establish a government and a police force."
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