U.S. General: 'There's No Silver-Bullet Answer'
U.S. News Pentagon correspondent Anna Mulrine recently spoke from Baghdad with Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, the senior American commander in Iraq responsible for training and equipping Iraqi security forces. Here are excerpts from their discussion:
On the Iraq Study Group findings due out this week:
I've been here three years, and there has been a pretty steady stream of assessments. And in almost every case, these assessments, studies, groups provide some aspect that is useful to us–and some things we've already thought about and just didn't decide to do. There's no silver-bullet answer here, and I think you'll find that in the study group and in the other studies ongoing by General Pace's staff.
So it seems to me the question is how important is Iraq to us right now. And I think Iraq is extraordinarily important. I spent the two years before I came here in Saudi Arabia, and it seems to me that Iraq has the best chance in the region of becoming a country that's built and operated on democratic principles, human rights, rule of law, and so forth.
That doesn't mean we're going to pull it off, but it means it's got the best chance. And as long as Iraq doesn't give up on itself–and I don't feel that it has yet–then I don't think we should give up on Iraq. If Iraq gives up on itself–the government disbands, the military fragments–then I think we're in a different situation.
On militia infiltration within the Ministry of the Interior:
The degree of infiltration is not a concern. And what I mean by that is, there is absolutely no reason why a former member of the militia, or the insurgency for that matter, couldn't lay down his weapons, walk into a recruiting station, pass all the qualifications, and end up in the Army, or the police for that matter.
It seems to me that the issue we're all concerned about is the degree of militia influence on serving members of the Army and police. And there's at least two kinds of influence. There's what I would describe as passive influence–which is to say, turning a blind eye to the activities of militia–allowing them to go through checkpoints, things like that. Then there's active participation–where they might let them use uniforms, let them use vehicles, or participate themselves.
The answer to all that is probably a few things. No. 1, it's leaders. Obedience is an extraordinarily important value in their value system, far more important than ours. So we've got to get at the leaders. Secondly, militias exist when in the eyes of the people the standing government isn't providing something–and in this case that something would be security. So we've got to continue to demonstrate to the people by accelerated transition to legitimate Iraqi security force control–because the more the Iraqi government can be seen as being in charge, the more the people will gain confidence in them, and the better off we'll be in terms of dealing with the militias.
On more coalition troops to Baghdad and whether they undermine the legitimacy of the Iraqi government:
From my particular perspective, the more U.S. forces take responsibility for, let's take security in Baghdad–the national capital–it seems to me that we have to watch the balance point there. If we get too many in here and we're perceived as completely owning the problem, then it will retard the development of the legitimate security forces, No. 1. No. 2, what Iraqi security forces are probably most in need of in their developmental evolution–and it is evolution, not revolution–is logistics capability. And to the extent that we bring more U.S. forces in here that draw on our logistics expertise to help ourselves, the less that logistics expertise can be used to help the Iraqi security forces. So I tend to be of the school that what we really need is more Iraqi forces and an increasing capability on their part than it is about U.S. forces.
On the precariousness of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's office:
The contacts I've had with the prime minister indicate that he's very much in control of his government. But let me sharpen my language a bit there. There's no question in the way this government was formed–where cabinet ministries were negotiated as part of the outcome of the popular vote–that Prime Minister Maliki has had some challenges pulling together a government that could follow a single agenda. And I think those problems persist, but I think he's prevailing, and I think we owe him our support to help him do it.
On Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, who hails from Sadr City and leads a powerful militia known as the Mahdi Army:
Sadr is a very popular figure because he appeals to the goods-and-services aspects. And as a result of that, he's probably one of the most popular figures, at least in the southern part of the country. Therefore, he certainly has political influence.
There have been indicators that he is trying to distance himself from the more extreme elements of the Jaish al-Mahdi (or JAM, also known as the Mahdi Army). I would suggest to you that the JAM is not a monolithic, homogenous beast. It's probably some combination of unemployed young men who think they're doing a decent thing watching their neighborhood, criminal opportunists in the middle, and some Shia religious extremists on the other end. The ones we're worried about are Shia religious extremists who are not trying to reconcile with the Sunni side, just as on the Sunni side there are Sunni religious extremists, who we typically call al Qaeda. I think we should worry about the extremes. The middle will improve when the government is seen as progressing and the security forces are seen as capable.
On whether Iraq is in a civil war:
I've just enjoyed the hell out of the debate. As long as the legit security forces remain intact–and act in a coherent, responsible way for the betterment of all Iraqis, then I'm not prepared to declare that we've got a civil war on our hands. If the legitimate security forces fragment, polarize, and take sides, then I think we have a problem.
On a phased U.S. withdrawal:
I think that a phased withdrawal based on conditions–we've always said that our presence here is conditions based. It seems to me that one of the conditions, rightly so, is that the security forces are able to handle their internal security–they're not going to handle their external security for some time. But we should not abandon them until they're ready to handle their internal security. And then if you want to call that a conditions-based withdrawal, phased–find your own adjectives, but it should be when we've done what we've promised them we're going to do.