U.S. General: 'There's No Silver-Bullet Answer'
On more coalition troops to Baghdad and whether they undermine the legitimacy of the Iraqi government:
From my particular perspective, the more U.S. forces take responsibility for, let's take security in Baghdad–the national capital–it seems to me that we have to watch the balance point there. If we get too many in here and we're perceived as completely owning the problem, then it will retard the development of the legitimate security forces, No. 1. No. 2, what Iraqi security forces are probably most in need of in their developmental evolution–and it is evolution, not revolution–is logistics capability. And to the extent that we bring more U.S. forces in here that draw on our logistics expertise to help ourselves, the less that logistics expertise can be used to help the Iraqi security forces. So I tend to be of the school that what we really need is more Iraqi forces and an increasing capability on their part than it is about U.S. forces.
On the precariousness of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's office:
The contacts I've had with the prime minister indicate that he's very much in control of his government. But let me sharpen my language a bit there. There's no question in the way this government was formed–where cabinet ministries were negotiated as part of the outcome of the popular vote–that Prime Minister Maliki has had some challenges pulling together a government that could follow a single agenda. And I think those problems persist, but I think he's prevailing, and I think we owe him our support to help him do it.
On Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, who hails from Sadr City and leads a powerful militia known as the Mahdi Army:
Sadr is a very popular figure because he appeals to the goods-and-services aspects. And as a result of that, he's probably one of the most popular figures, at least in the southern part of the country. Therefore, he certainly has political influence.
There have been indicators that he is trying to distance himself from the more extreme elements of the Jaish al-Mahdi (or JAM, also known as the Mahdi Army). I would suggest to you that the JAM is not a monolithic, homogenous beast. It's probably some combination of unemployed young men who think they're doing a decent thing watching their neighborhood, criminal opportunists in the middle, and some Shia religious extremists on the other end. The ones we're worried about are Shia religious extremists who are not trying to reconcile with the Sunni side, just as on the Sunni side there are Sunni religious extremists, who we typically call al Qaeda. I think we should worry about the extremes. The middle will improve when the government is seen as progressing and the security forces are seen as capable.
On whether Iraq is in a civil war:
I've just enjoyed the hell out of the debate. As long as the legit security forces remain intact–and act in a coherent, responsible way for the betterment of all Iraqis, then I'm not prepared to declare that we've got a civil war on our hands. If the legitimate security forces fragment, polarize, and take sides, then I think we have a problem.
On a phased U.S. withdrawal:
I think that a phased withdrawal based on conditions–we've always said that our presence here is conditions based. It seems to me that one of the conditions, rightly so, is that the security forces are able to handle their internal security–they're not going to handle their external security for some time. But we should not abandon them until they're ready to handle their internal security. And then if you want to call that a conditions-based withdrawal, phased–find your own adjectives, but it should be when we've done what we've promised them we're going to do.
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