Can Iraq be Fixed?
Politicians dance around this question, but here's the reality: It will take U.S. troops years of work, and success is hardly a sure bet
Police face all kinds of shortfalls. During a daily meeting in their office at the main police station in Fallujah, marines run down complaints from Iraqi police officers: "We try to get them to patrol," says one trainer. "They'll say, 'Well, we can't patrol because we don't have gas.' We want them to go out and fight insurgents. They'll say, 'Well, we can't fight because we don't have bullets.'"
The American military trainers worry, too, about the Iraqis' dependence on them. Lt. Gen Martin Dempsey, in charge of training Iraqi security forces, uses the analogy of the teeter-totter. "On the one side is the ability of our Iraqi counterparts to absorb what they need to, and on the other side is the danger that they will become dependent on us," he tells U.S. News. "My job is to look at every aspect of this mission of training and determine when is the right time to transition control over to the Iraqi side. If I do it too soon, it tips, and if I do it too late, they become so comfortable and dependent--it's literally too difficult to encourage their capacity for them."
CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. Another barrier standing between Washington and withdrawal is the ability--or lack thereof--of Iraq's civilian bureaucracy to function on its own. U.S. advisers serve in all key Iraqi ministries, which also rely on American logistics, support, and guidance to deliver basic services. "It appears here that the ability of the government of Iraq to support any of the functions normally associated with a national government ranges from extremely limited to nonexistent," says a western diplomat in Baghdad. "The key ministries--finance, oil, electricity, justice, water resources, etc.--show no signs of being self-sustaining." His candid rundown: the Ministry of Trade is hobbled by corruption "at all levels," and the Housing Ministry shows no signs of independent activity.
Just as in the military logistics area, U.S. officials have stepped in frequently over the past three years and supplied Iraq's critical needs directly, rather than build up the government's ability to operate. In several recent reports, the U.S. Special Inspector General for Iraq has warned that U.S. efforts to build up Iraqi capabilities to run their own programs, including the state-of-the-art infrastructure projects funded by Washington, have been lacking.
U.S. officials say that they are now more focused on building Iraqi capacity. But SIGIR and others remain concerned that the U.S. effort is still falling short, in part because the civilian effort is understaffed. "They need the same degree of hands-on training and help for their civilian bureaucracy as they need for their military to be stood up," says Senator Biden. "But they don't have anybody to do that."
POLITICS. There is one saving grace. U.S. officials believe that a majority of Iraqis still want to make their new government work. These days, the White House strategy is centered around a basic premise--harnessing oil revenues as the strongest (and perhaps the only) force holding the country together. In public, Bush has hinted as much: "My advice to them is to use their energy assets as a way to unite the country." Iraqi political leaders, however, have yet to resolve how, exactly, the revenues will be distributed.
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