Under The Gun
The U.S. exit strategy hangs on whether Iraq's new government can, in fact, govern
The long, agonizing slog to form Iraq's first national unity government was always something of a gamble. But there were a few moments that convinced U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad that success was possible. He recalls one meeting in particular where leaders of the key Iraqi parties were going around in circles trying to agree on a detailed platform for the new government. Adnan al-Dulaimi, the white-haired elder statesman who leads the largest Sunni bloc in parliament, was exasperated over how long it was taking. Appealing for rapid compromises, he brandished a political cartoon from one of Iraq's daily papers that showed the country's leaders sitting around a table feasting, as a poor man sprawls nearby, bleeding profusely from knife wounds and with bombs protruding from his body. "His plea made a dramatic impact," Khalilzad says, and the leaders soon made a key breakthrough.
It took several additional weeks of talks, but new Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki finally presented the bulk of his cabinet (minus three key security posts) to his anxious nation and a skeptical world. For a beleaguered President Bush, the formation of Iraq's new government came not a moment too soon. Five months of Iraqi wrangling, ultimatums, and tantrums have been punctuated by a withering burst of sectarian violence and another spike in the death toll for U.S. soldiers, all of which have helped drive Bush's approval rating to new lows. Last week, Bush stood next to one of his few steadfast foreign allies, British Prime Minister Tony Blair (who is suffering from similar political ills at home), as they both clung to the potential of Iraq's new government like a lifeboat. "We believe the new government is going to make a big difference in the lives of the Iraqi people," Bush said in a joint press conference.
But his administration was left with little time to savor the long-awaited spark of good news from Iraq, which largely prompted renewed questions about how quickly U.S. troops will be able to come home. U.S. officials were left trying to deflect the pressure, pleading for patience. "It is very important for everyone to realize that one can stay too long, but one can also leave too soon," Khalilzad tells U.S. News. "Iraq has been put on the right path, but there are lots of tactical issues that need to be dealt with."
Maliki's government will enjoy one major advantage over its predecessors'--the presence of a significant number of elected Sunnis in parliament and the cabinet. But he did have to make several compromises to achieve unity. The most painful was a delay in announcing candidates for the three most important security posts--the interior minister, who runs the police; the defense minister, who runs the military; and the minister for national security, who coordinates security policy. He also had to create five new cabinet positions to placate his coalition partners. But in the end, the 39 ministers will represent some 85 percent of the parties in the Iraqi parliament. "He has done a very good job of picking competent people, many with an independent streak," says James Jeffrey, the State Department's senior coordinator for Iraq. "We have rising expectations about this particular government." This is a marked change from how U.S. officials described the outgoing government of former Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari.
No panacea. Still, it will be difficult for the new government to satisfy the hopes of both Iraqis and U.S. officials. Already, officials are trying to rein in those expectations. "This government is not a panacea for solving all problems of Iraq, but it is a beginning, I think," Hoshyar Zebari, Iraq's foreign minister, said after Iraq's parliament approved the cabinet. "The terrorists, the oppositionists, the Saddamists are escalating their campaign definitely to disrupt and derail the process."
Maliki will have to move fast. Not only does he need to fill the long-standing security vacuum, particularly in Baghdad; but he will also have to fill the political vacuum created by the long delay. However, the delay in filling the key security posts does not bode well for Maliki's pledge to take on Shiite militias, which remain one of the biggest obstacles to soothing sectarian strife. Additionally, he will have to deliver basic services like electricity as the country moves into the sweltering summer months.
In Washington, President Bush is trying to address the rising public doubts about the possibility of victory. Skeptics on both sides of the partisan divide in Washington are demanding a clearer exit strategy, and even traditional Bush allies are beginning to question what kind of victory, if any, is feasible. "I've gone back ... to examine the intensity of the bitterness between the Shiaand Sunni doctrine and religious roots," Republican Sen. John Warner, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, tells U.S. News. "I repeatedly asked myself this question; I hope others are asking the same question of themselves: Are these people governable by any structure? It's just a fundamental question." Privately, U.S. officials acknowledge the dilemma: "Our policy in Iraq has been a steady reassessment of what the definition of achievable objectives is in Iraq," says one U.S. official.
Even amid the increasing chatter about withdrawing U.S. troops, Bush has been steadfast in resisting calls for a timetable. While officials privately are eager to find a way to bring at least some of the 130,000 U.S. troops home, the reality is tough. The U.S. military is still finding itself undermanned, if not outgunned, in the Sunni insurgent hotbed of Ramadi, as well as other Sunni areas in and around Baghdad. The British are dealing with their own problems in the southern city of Basra, which has been plagued by street violence and an unreliable local government and police force. As the insurgents intensify their focus on squeezing Baghdad, that city, too, remains unremittingly violent. "The al Qaeda militants who want to provoke a civil war tried to prevent Sunnis from participating in the political process, but having failed at that, they are seeking through increased sectarian violence to derail it," says Khalilzad. A United Nations report issued last week noted that the Medico Legal Institute in Baghdad issued 2,449 death certificates during March and April, most as a result of gunshot wounds.
Self-reliance. Maliki pleased U.S. officials by planning for a new Baghdad security force and by an ambitious call for Iraqi forces to take responsibility for the entire country within 18 months. But they distanced themselves from the specifics. "We cannot help but applaud him for his goal of achieving self-reliance," says Khalilzad. "As to what will happen in what sequence and the timeline for implementation, those have to be conditions-based."
The U.S. military has been working feverishly to increase the numbers of Iraqi security forces, but the police remain beset by doubts about their loyalties. At the same time, the Iraqi Army is largely a force of "rifle battalions," in the words of one senior U.S. official. "What they're not capable of doing is the whole spectrum of military activities," says Jeffrey. The Iraqis have no heavy armor or artillery and remain dependent on the U.S. military for just about every function other than pulling a trigger--everything from transport and supplies to intelligence and medical services.
Even when Iraqi units take the lead, U.S. troops will most likely remain in place at least for a while to provide support. They are also expected to maintain rapid-reaction forces should the Iraqis run into trouble. "The departure, when it takes place, will be in stages," says Khalilzad. "We will be testing on the impact and what the conditions are." In other words, U.S. troops will probably stay in Iraq for at least several more years.
With Ben Gilbert in Baghdad and Linda Robinson
This story appears in the June 5, 2006 print edition of U.S. News & World Report.