Face-Off
America and Iran are locked in a test of wills over Tehran's nuclear ambitions. Is there a way out short of war?
It's not the sort of letter an American president usually receives from a foreign leader. The missive last week from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to "your excellency" George W. Bush--the highest-level communication between Tehran and Washington in 27 years of official enmity--meanders over 18 pages of religious and philosophical terrain. But to western eyes it never got to the heart of the matter: Iran's nuclear ambitions. Iranian officials still called it a diplomatic "opening"; Bush dismissed it as so much piffle.
Yet the timing was no happenstance--arriving just hours before foreign ministers convened at the United Nations to consider steps toward imposing sanctions on Iran. Whether or not the letter was a factor, the Bush administration didn't get the tough Security Council resolution it sought, and instead acceded to a proposal by Europe to craft a package of incentives in energy and trade for Iran if it stops cooking up uranium, along with a battery of sanctions if it does not. Some U.S. officials couldn't help but admire the zest for the diplomatic game shown by Iran, a nation of chess players. "They've been exceptionally good at turning isolation around," concedes one, "and putting the spotlight on the U.S."
That's a sobering thought, for to dissuade Iran from enriching uranium--the key process in producing nuclear fuel for either electricity generation or for atomic bombs--Washington will need to be on top of its diplomatic game. It will have to galvanize a broad coalition of countries to squeeze the Islamic republic hard if it persists, but with opposition from Russia and China and wariness elsewhere, success may be out of reach.
Meanwhile, signs of a showdown are gathering. In defiance of the Security Council, Iran has enriched uranium in an experimental "cascade" of 164 centrifuges to a 4.8 percent concentration--suitable for power plants but still far below the 90 percent enrichment level needed for a bomb. With staged fanfare, Ahmadinejad declared that Iran has joined the nuclear club. Iran is now readying additional cascades, and Ahmadinejad has disclosed that research on a more sophisticated type of centrifuge that would speed enrichment is already underway. Iran's goal is to place 54,000 high-speed centrifuges in two underground halls at Natanz, in central Iran. In Isfahan, it has overcome production problems to manufacture 121 tons of uranium hexafluoride gas--enough of the feedstock for centrifuges for at least 10 bombs.
Point of no return? Iran claims it is only honing the technology for civilian nuclear power, but its actions--including 18 years of hiding nuclear activities from required international inspections--suggest otherwise. And Iran continues to hinder the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is probing military links to the nuclear program and documents related to warhead construction. "The Iranians," asserts the State Department's top official for proliferation matters, Robert Joseph, "have put both feet on the accelerator." In terms of mastering the running of centrifuges, he says, "we are very close to that point of no return."
Not everyone buys that, and all judgments are plagued by intelligence gaps. "The sense of urgency is being pumped up for demagogic reasons," contends Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter. "It's being made by the same people who pushed us into war with Iraq." Reports of accelerated Pentagon planning for possible airstrikes on Iranian nuclear sites--though called "wild speculation" by Bush--are jangling nerves in the Mideast and Europe. Iran, for its part, is brandishing a full menu of reprisals: attacking Israel, dispatching suicide bombers, spreading nuclear technology, abandoning the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, concealing all of its atomic efforts, and withholding oil from stressed world markets.
U.S. News has also learned from U.S. and western officials and analysts of these other developments:
-- Iran has stepped up deliveries of short-range rockets and other military supplies to its terrorist ally in Lebanon, Hezbollah, showing its capability to retaliate against Israel. Officers from Iran's Revolutionary Guards are said to be present and in command of the rockets.
-- The number of flights between Iran and Syria, an ally, has jumped in recent months, reflecting increased movements of military and intelligence personnel. Iranian officials are seen as wanting to send a signal that Iran can project its power.
-- Air defenses are being increased at nuclear facilities. Also, U.S. intelligence is studying whether Iran's radical Revolutionary Guards are exerting greater influence over the nuclear program at the expense of the country's civilian energy establishment.
-- Iranian officials have been moving billions of dollars from Europe into banks in Dubai and East Asia. This comes as some European banks have been advised by regulators to prepare for sanctions that include the freezing of Iranian accounts.
-- Some Bush administration officials are unhappy with the consensus intelligence community assessment that Iran could attain a weapons capability sometime between 2010 and 2015, based on assumptions about its ability to overcome technical problems. More-hawkish officials view the CIA, scorched by criticism over its exaggerated reports on Iraqi nuclear efforts, as timid on Iran, and Vice President Dick Cheney is said to have recently criticized the intelligence assessment in private as "too cautious."
-- Experts at the International Atomic Energy Agency suspect that Iran's nuclear scientists used its negotiating period with the Europeans--during which enrichment was suspended--to overcome centrifuge-related problems so that Iran is now able to speed up enrichment work.
-- With Bush emphasizing diplomacy, tensions have emerged between the White House staff and more-hawkish members of Cheney's office. The two camps "are not talking to each other too much" on Iran, says a knowledgeable official.
-- Senior Bush administration officials are increasingly skeptical that diplomacy can stop the Iranian nuclear drive. That is fueling a new commitment of money and attention to promote democracy inside Iran--a strategy they hope will foster "regime change."
The stakes in this dispute are enormous, and the risks of miscalculation are growing, too. The dawn of a nuclear-capable Iran could be a walk on the wild side--the Bomb in the hands of the very state rated the top sponsor of terrorism and where some leaders aim to rekindle the fervor of its Islamic revolution. In addition to raising the threat to Israel, a nuclear Iran could inspire rivals in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey to go nuclear.
Trying to avert such a scenario is imperative, but the problem is how. On Iran, it seems, even the more attractive policy options will need a lot of luck to succeed (read, an Iranian change of heart, or regime), while the other options are rife with danger. Policymakers privately bemoan their choices as "lousy."
Along with Europe, the administration envisions a step-by-step ratcheting up of pressure on Iran. Russia and China, with commercial and energy interests there, oppose sanctions, and they wield veto power on the U.N. Security Council. Both also fear a replay of Bush's march to war in Iraq. One former administration official calls it "the barnacles of Iraq."
There is also a deeper question about the U.S. strategy: Every other major player on the Iran issue favors direct U.S.-Iranian talks. On that point, Washington stands alone. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says direct talks would achieve nothing, and others argue that Iran is untrustworthy and that general talks would only strengthen and legitimize its regime. The lone exception to the ban is a narrowly structured discussion with Iran about its conduct in Iraq, expected to begin soon in Baghdad. But the overall approach is coming under fire, including from Republicans like Sen. Richard Lugar. "Here is an example of how not to conduct diplomacy," says Lawrence Wilkerson, the State Department's chief of staff in Bush's first term. "You don't talk to evil in Dick Cheney's book."
Secret agent. Not surprisingly, Iran wants to talk. In 2003, with the administration briefly riding high from its quick toppling of Saddam Hussein, Iran secretly proposed talks that would cover terrorism, its nuclear program, and Iraq. It had the OK of Iran's supreme spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But Washington rebuffed the offer. Last month, an Iranian national security official with a U.S. green card slipped into Washington, apparently seeking contact with U.S. officials. He seems to have met with none.
"Bargain." Recent American visitors to Iran also say that some officials want a dialogue over a "grand bargain"--a deal that would include security guarantees, the end of U.S. sanctions, renewed trade, and diplomatic recognition in return for Iranian concessions on the nuclear front, terrorism, and so forth. Many analysts doubt a comprehensive package would pass muster, given hard-line opposition in Tehran and the U.S. demand that Iran back down on enrichment, a program that enjoys fervent popular support. But they believe it should be tried, if only to show that diplomacy was given every chance.
Still, there is good reason to be skeptical of Iran's sincerity. In a speech meant for regime insiders, the former head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Hassan Rowhani, refuted claims by hard-liners that he was too pliable in negotiations with the Europeans: "In reality, by creating a tame situation, we could finish Isfahan."
That revelation has further deepened the distrust of Iran throughout the Bush administration, fueled by Iran's harboring of al Qaeda operatives, its alleged involvement in terrorist attacks on U.S. personnel in Saudi Arabia, and its support for anti-U.S. militias in Iraq. And then there's the legacy of the American hostages held for 444 agonizing days. "That created an image of Iran that really has never changed," says Gary Sick, the primary aide for Iran policy during the 1979-81 crisis, now at Columbia University. "We never made up with Iran like we did with North Vietnam."
The sanctions being prepared are intended to rattle the regime. For the United States, there is little left to ban, save for imported Iranian rugs and pistachios. European and U.S. officials, however, are looking at "targeted" sanctions--outside of the U.N. if the Security Council cannot act. They include banning the sale of dual-use technologies to Iran, barring overseas travel by its leaders, freezing bank accounts, canceling trade credits, and closing down possibly illicit financial dealings. The idea is to hurt Iran's leaders, not ordinary people.
The one area that could bite the Iranian government hard is an embargo on its oil and natural gas, which bring in more than 40 percent of its revenue. But with painfully high oil prices, few countries are willing to contemplate measures that could drive oil above $100 a barrel.
Still, the confrontation is already inflicting pain. Iran's stock market has fallen 40 percent since Ahmadinejad took office last year. Tens of billions of dollars in private capital have flown out of Iran--much of it to Dubai across the Persian Gulf. As a sign of hedging, an estimated 10,000 Iranian businesses have been set up in Dubai, according to Abbas Milani, an Iran specialist at Stanford University. Some within Iran's elite have begun to criticize Ahmadinejad's blunt handling of the nuclear issue.
If diplomacy and sanctions don't work, what about force? Pentagon planners are believed to have mapped out airstrikes with bombers and cruise missiles. Such strikes would be nothing like the Israeli raid on Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981 by a half-dozen planes. Iran's numerous nuclear sites are spread out over a large country and protected by extensive air defenses that will get stronger when Russia delivers advanced Tor antiaircraft missiles purchased by Iran. Moreover, secret facilities may remain undiscovered. Others contain multiple buildings and tunnels.
Hundreds of targets. Nor would bombing mean permanent destruction of the program. Rather, the plans would prescribe a target set and the likely effect--for example, an 80 percent chance that the program would be set back for, say, five years. The plant at Isfahan and the centrifuge complex at Natanz could be rebuilt in one or two years. The growing know-how of Iran's nuclear personnel would remain. To eradicate most of the nuclear infrastructure, an air campaign might need weeks. "You can quickly get up to hundreds of targets," cautions Kenneth Pollack, once an Iran expert at the National Security Council and author of The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America. Patrick Lang, a former top defense intelligence analyst, posits an operation of 1,000 sorties.
There are other risks, too: downed American pilots or captured special forces. Attacks on U.S. or allied troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Attempts to block the Straits of Hormuz, the strategic gulf waterway. Terrorist attacks as far afield as Europe and America. Anti-Americanism spiking across the Islamic world. An attack might prompt an all-out national drive for nukes. No less a personality than the dissident Nobel Peace Prize-winner Shirin Ebadi warns that Iranians would unite against an attacker. Says Pollack, "When you look at the costs and benefits, it doesn't look like a great trade-off."
Actually, most of the options don't look terribly good. The mullahs may well have concluded that the Bomb is their ticket to regime survival. For now, Ahmadinejad is thriving on the pressure. He may not be the man who would have his finger on the Iranian trigger, but he has parlayed the standoff into political gains for himself and other hard-liners. The dispute serves to distract Iranians angered by 30 percent unemployment, housing shortages, and rigid religious strictures. The Iranian president, meanwhile, seems buoyed by Bush's political weakness and American distress in Iraq.
Bush says that an Iranian nuke is "intolerable." If that's right, he'll have to find a solution that is tolerable.
This story appears in the May 22, 2006 print edition of U.S. News & World Report.