Bombs and Ballots
As they vote on a new constitution, Iraqis face the consequences
BAGHDAD--Scarred by bombs and swept by dust storms, this beleaguered capital is once again getting dressed up for elections. Colorful posters promoting the new Iraqi constitution are plastered on the monochromatic walls of the city, most notably on the concrete blast barriers that now protect ministry buildings and hotels around the capital. Radios and televisions buzz with talk about the October 15 referendum, and western-style commercials preach the virtues of democracy. In one radio ad, a man gripes, "The constitution is for the politicians!" "No," an upbeat woman reassures him. "The constitution is for us."
If that constitution is ratified by a majority of Iraqi voters, it is sure to be hailed as a success by the Bush administration--architects of the process--and by the Shiite and Kurdish political leaders who drew up the document. Last week, President Bush said that a federalist Iraq set forth in the draft constitution is "the best hope for unifying a diverse population." But minority Sunnis fear that Shiites and Kurds, who dominate the oil-rich areas, will prosper because of their geographical superiority and leave Sunnis literally in the dust. "We didn't get what we deserved," says Basam Shimeri, 34, a Sunni who manages several appliance stores. "We got what was left over."
Shimeri's gripes reflect the sentiments of the Sunni Muslims, the political losers in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. Even after Sunnis failed to turn out for last January's election--because of a mix of violence and ambivalence toward the political process in Sunni communities--there was hope that the process of crafting a new constitution would bring members of the disparate Sunni leadership into a national political accord, an essential step in defeating the insurgency rooted in disaffected Sunni Arab communities. But it hasn't worked out that way. After a bruising negotiating process, Sunnis regard the constitution as providing little for them while benefiting the now ruling Shiites and Kurds.
Looking out for No.1. Iraqi politicians during the constitution-writing process clung to their national patchwork of tribal, regional, ethnic, and religious loyalties--and grievances--rather than embracing a national identity. U.S. and outside observers stressed the importance of gaining Sunni inclusion, but the dominant Shiite and Kurdish blocks did little to cede power. As a result, there are fears that a "successful" ratification of the constitution may actually mark an underlying political failure that will push the country in the direction of full civil war. "It will leave a lot of Sunnis with a feeling of impotence and an inability to effect change through a political mechanism," says one U.S. diplomat.
To add salt to the wound, the Shiite- and Kurdish-dominated National Assembly made a last-minute change to the referendum--since reversed under international pressure--to make it essentially impossible for it to fail. Initially, the election law set a difficult, but perhaps not impossible, threshold for rejection: a "No'" vote by two thirds of voters in three of Iraq's 18 provinces. As "No" voters began to mobilize in the four Sunni provinces, the National Assembly reinterpreted the rule to require two thirds of all registered voters. Though the assembly rescinded the change, the message to Sunnis was clear: Your concerns don't matter.
The drama playing out in Iraq's political theater is tinged with irony. While the Sunnis, the former leaders of this nation, have turned into political losers, Iraq's long-oppressed Shiites and ethnic Kurds, brutalized under Saddam's rule, can now exercise political freedoms for the first time since the creation of modern-day Iraq. And some, like Salam Qaisi, a 37-year-old Shiite, see Sunni rejection as basically a refusal to accept the ascendancy of the Shiite majority. "We can't find a perfect constitution because it's not something from heaven; it's written by men," he says. "But it's the best we have so far."
Iraq's top Shiite cleric, Ali Sistani, has issued edicts telling followers that they have a religious duty to vote in elections. His office denies reports that he has directed a "Yes" vote, although most Shiites are expected to vote that way anyway in support of a constitution that enshrines their new political dominance. Conversely, the Sunni street has been bombarded with mixed messages. Al Qaeda in Iraq has called on the Arab Sunnis--who account for at least 20 percent of Iraqi's 26 million people--to boycott the referendum, saying it goes against sharia law, but armed Sunni nationalists have urged them to turn out and vote "No" to reject the constitution.
The odds are against the Sunnis blocking ratification. In the three heavily Sunni provinces, only troubled Anbar province is certain to vote strongly against the constitution. Polls show that the other two, Salahaddin and Diyala, are simply too close to call, say U.S. diplomats. In the view of Pentagon analysts, Sunnis are still likely to reject the constitution in Anbar and Salahaddin provinces, but in Diyala, they may be outvoted by local Kurds and Shiites.
Back to start? If the Sunnis are able to galvanize enough voters to defeat the constitution, then the process of choosing a new government will start over and a new constitution will have to be written. This may not be a bad thing, some analysts say, as it could give Sunnis a sense of empowerment and participation in the democratic process. On the other hand, Sunnis are a minority group in Iraq and as such are bound to play a limited role as the new opposition. "If they show up to vote against it [the constitution], it doesn't mean that they are stakeholders in the new Iraq," says David Philips, a visiting scholar at the Harvard Center for Middle East Studies and a former State Department adviser on postwar Iraq. Typical Sunnis like Shimeri, the appliance store manager, agree. "They control everything, and we citizens only have our voices and our votes, and sometimes this voice is choked by them and no one hears us," said Shimeri, referring to the Iraqi government.
The Iraqi Islamic Party and some other Sunni groups are now waging campaigns to educate people about what they feel are the constitution's strengths and weaknesses and encourage them to vote. "Most of the Sunnis are determined and motivated to participate in the elections, but we are afraid [the government] will put blocks in the way of the political process," said Adnan Dulaimi, an influential Sunni leader who heads a group of Sunnis staunchly opposed to the constitution.
Sunni negotiators had some 18 points of contention with the constitution; those include whether to allow southern Iraq to become a semi-independent state (which Sunnis oppose) and how to describe the ethnic and religious identity of the country. But broader Sunni disapproval of the constitution stems not from opposition to specific provisions, since few people have even seen the document that has yet to be widely distributed, but rather a desire to issue a protest against a government they feel has ignored them. "The demands of the Kurds and Shiites are so high, and they won't accept changes the Sunnis wanted in the constitution," says Saleem al Jabouri, a member of the Iraqi Islamic Party and member of the constitution drafting committee. "They gave promises to change, but didn't."
Despite the efforts to mobilize opposition to the constitution, the Sunnis' sense of powerlessness has bred a raft of conspiracy theories that the referendum outcome is out of their hands. On September 29, American troops raided Dulaimi's home and arrested four of his bodyguards, saying they were members of the insurgency. "They did that to put blocks in our way, to make us not participate in the political process," says Dulaimi, 73, in a cavernous room in his home, where men wearing the gold trimmed robes of tribal leaders wait to meet with him.
Suspicions buzz around coffee shops, mosques, and homes wherever Sunnis gather, says Niaz Muwafaq, a Sunni from Baghdad's violent Dora neighborhood, where leaflets and graffiti from some insurgent groups vow to kill anyone who votes while other insurgent groups encourage Sunnis to vote "No." "In the places where Sunnis meet, there is a huge campaign for Sunnis to go and say 'No,' " says Muwafaq. "If you go and say 'No,' you have a voice. You can't do it alone, but hand in hand we can do it. We want them to hear our voice."
The Days Of The Bombers
U.S. troop fatalities were down in September, but the number of multiple-victim attacks involving roadside bombs, car bombs, and suicide bombers against civilian and military targets reached a new record.
[Chart labels]
U.S. troop fatalities
0, 20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120, 140
March '03, Jan. '04, Jan. '05, Sept.'05
Multiple-fatality bombings*
0, 5, 10, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40
May '03, Jan. '04, Jan. '05, Sept. '05
*Bombings that killed at least 3 people
Source: Brookings Institution, Iraqi Index
Graphic by USN&WR
With Julian E. Barnes, Ilana Ozernoy and Kevin Whitelaw
This story appears in the October 17, 2005 print edition of U.S. News & World Report.