Bombs and Ballots
As they vote on a new constitution, Iraqis face the consequences
BAGHDAD--Scarred by bombs and swept by dust storms, this beleaguered capital is once again getting dressed up for elections. Colorful posters promoting the new Iraqi constitution are plastered on the monochromatic walls of the city, most notably on the concrete blast barriers that now protect ministry buildings and hotels around the capital. Radios and televisions buzz with talk about the October 15 referendum, and western-style commercials preach the virtues of democracy. In one radio ad, a man gripes, "The constitution is for the politicians!" "No," an upbeat woman reassures him. "The constitution is for us."
If that constitution is ratified by a majority of Iraqi voters, it is sure to be hailed as a success by the Bush administration--architects of the process--and by the Shiite and Kurdish political leaders who drew up the document. Last week, President Bush said that a federalist Iraq set forth in the draft constitution is "the best hope for unifying a diverse population." But minority Sunnis fear that Shiites and Kurds, who dominate the oil-rich areas, will prosper because of their geographical superiority and leave Sunnis literally in the dust. "We didn't get what we deserved," says Basam Shimeri, 34, a Sunni who manages several appliance stores. "We got what was left over."
Shimeri's gripes reflect the sentiments of the Sunni Muslims, the political losers in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. Even after Sunnis failed to turn out for last January's election--because of a mix of violence and ambivalence toward the political process in Sunni communities--there was hope that the process of crafting a new constitution would bring members of the disparate Sunni leadership into a national political accord, an essential step in defeating the insurgency rooted in disaffected Sunni Arab communities. But it hasn't worked out that way. After a bruising negotiating process, Sunnis regard the constitution as providing little for them while benefiting the now ruling Shiites and Kurds.
Looking out for No.1. Iraqi politicians during the constitution-writing process clung to their national patchwork of tribal, regional, ethnic, and religious loyalties--and grievances--rather than embracing a national identity. U.S. and outside observers stressed the importance of gaining Sunni inclusion, but the dominant Shiite and Kurdish blocks did little to cede power. As a result, there are fears that a "successful" ratification of the constitution may actually mark an underlying political failure that will push the country in the direction of full civil war. "It will leave a lot of Sunnis with a feeling of impotence and an inability to effect change through a political mechanism," says one U.S. diplomat.
To add salt to the wound, the Shiite- and Kurdish-dominated National Assembly made a last-minute change to the referendum--since reversed under international pressure--to make it essentially impossible for it to fail. Initially, the election law set a difficult, but perhaps not impossible, threshold for rejection: a "No'" vote by two thirds of voters in three of Iraq's 18 provinces. As "No" voters began to mobilize in the four Sunni provinces, the National Assembly reinterpreted the rule to require two thirds of all registered voters. Though the assembly rescinded the change, the message to Sunnis was clear: Your concerns don't matter.
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