A general's viewpoint on Iraq's status
Lt. Gen. John Vines, the commander of the Multinational Corps Iraq, oversees day-to-day military operations in the country. He spoke to U.S. News Senior Editor Julian E. Barnes in his headquarters at Camp Victory on June 23:
On the Iraqi security forces:
Ultimately we want them to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations, which is a longer-term proposition. Before that can happen, the ministries have to have the capacity to sustain forces in the field such as reliable pay, supplies, resupply, ammunition, personnel and promotion policies. The ministry currently does not have the capacity to do that. There are some battalions and some brigades that have the capability of taking the lead and being the primary action arm in the battle space. But that is a long way from being universal. They are not there yet as an army.
On giving the Iraqi army more responsibility:
The coalition commanders on the scene have the authority to assign more responsibility to [Iraqi Armed Forces] units, based on their assessment of IAF capability. I provide broad guidance on how much risk we can accept. The outcome won't always be as good as we would wish for, but that allows a more gradual turnover of responsibility. The effectiveness of the Iraqi formations correlates with the effectiveness of their leadership and their leadership varies enormously.
On rising violence in Fallujah:
Fallujah has symbolic value to the insurgents, but it also has geographic value to the insurgents because of its location between the provincial and the national capital. We believe there will be an effort by the insurgents to re-infiltrate to gain influence. As the number of residents and associated commerce increase, the opportunity for infiltration increases.
Our analysis was that the major urban areas, Baghdad, Mosul, Basra, needed to have a level of security before we committed more combat forces to Al Anbar. But if insurgents infiltrate from Syria, or use Al Anbar as a staging base to attack urban areas, we have to address Al Anbar as well. The solution to Al Anbar is an Iraqi solution and principally a political one. Insurgents can hide among a sympathetic Sunni population and pretend to be farmers or laborers, and wait until coalition forces leave the area and then they pick up their arms go back to planning and coordinating insurgencies.
On the enemy body counts:
Killing or capturing insurgents has a temporary effect only until more can be recruited. It doesn't take extensive training to put an improvised explosive device on the side of the road, or emplacing rockets to attack an operational base. We have detained personnel who have been paid to do those things, so the blue-collar end of the insurgency can be regenerated by money. The ability to plan and recruit requires leadership and our primary targets are the leaders who are using violence...Insurgent body count is not a good measure of effectiveness.
On rising numbers of suicide bombers:
There numbers have increased over the last several months. The fundamental tool of the insurgency is the terrorist act of mass murder. There are indiscriminate mass murders directed at the Iraqi population, the Iraqi security forces and the coalition. It is effective because when the perpetrator has no need to escape it allows them to be more lethal, and to not be concerned about an escape route. The indications are that the majority of suicide bombers are not Iraqis...Iraqis can be recruited to shoot a rifle or dig a hole and put an IED in. Foreign terrorists are expensive to recruit, move, sustain, hide and train. They are recruited for a specific reason. Often they have very little skill, but are necessary to do things Iraqis will not do to each other.
On foreign suicide bombers:
There are websites that advocate jihad, that advocate attacks against coalition forces. There are also some recruiters spreading word through mosques who say, "If you want to go to jihad I know how to get you there." Foreign jihadists typically are not given the larger picture; they are told go to this airport or this mosque...We have indicators that many don't come here intent on killing Iraqi civilians or themselves. They come here to participate in a jihad. Only late in the process are they made aware they are expected to kill themselves. Some flee, some are coerced, some may embrace it. The extremists who use these unfortunate people want to make sure they do not live to tell about it so they can't compromise them, or tell about coercion and threats to compel them.
On suicide bombers passing through the Damascus airport on way to Iraq:
Border security is an issue of course but borders tend to be porous. We believe the Syrian government could be encouraged to do things that would make it difficult to go through Damascus to go to Iraq. Currently there are no visas required for military-aged Muslim males. So consequently they can come from any point of the globe and go through Damascus en route to Iraq.
On the strategy to stop suicide bombers:
There are several components. The best way is to stop them before they reach Iraq- to pressure the government in Damascus to restrict the flow of people with visas who have no clear purpose in Syria. Iraq of course must gain control of the borders. It's not just putting forces on the border, it's putting forces throughout a province so that as people are being moved there is the potential that they will be questioned by security forces...Another part of the strategy is to sensitize the Iraqi population through government publications and newscasts that in fact they are being slaughtered by foreign terrorists. So that when they are aware of suspicious persons they report them to police.
On the goal of the suicide bomb campaign:
It is an attempt to destroy this government before this government can oversee the drafting of a constitution and the ratification of a constitution through national elections. It is an attempt to destroy the government because the jihadist that believes man has no right to write his own laws one of the most terrible outcomes you can imagine is a constitution written by [a country's] own citizens.
On Muslim extremism in Iraq:
There is a jihadist component to [the insurgency] that has a very extreme view of Islam that does not view all Muslims as true Muslims...That is a quite small element of the insurgency, but it is extraordinarily violent, and is willing to murder innocents of any nationality to achieve its objective. They want to create anarchy, which presents them an opportunity to seize power and ideally they want a civil war. We see them attacking both Kurds and Shia. They have used Al Anbar as an area to stage, to infiltrate, to pass through, to train to indoctrinate, but many of their actions do not take place in Al Anbar. They direct their activities in Mosul or Baghdad.
On the tactics of the Baathist insurgency:
We see no indication the former regime elements are willing to kill themselves in order to achieve their objectives, although they are certainly willing to kill any number of other people. ...For a specific purpose they can get access to a foreign element who will murder themselves. But keep in mind it is not an inexpensive proposition to get someone to come from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, to move them, house them, and indoctrinate them.
On the goals of former regime elements:
They would like to disable the government enough so that it becomes a power grab because they believe they have some military capacity ... The former regime elements have three broad lines of operation. They know they will never be acceptable as former high-level Baathists, so they want to generate violence to force access to the governmental process... [Second,] they present themselves as having a political wing, and they do present a moderate faction. We see [this in] organizations such as Sinn Fein... But they also [have] a third line of operation. They will attempt to infiltrate the security forces of Iraq, the police, the special commandoes, the intelligence service and the army, gain influence, intimidate, use patronage and compromise operations. It's a classic Baathist strategy.
On the insurgency's base of operations:
Around Baghdad the insurgents are seeking to create a crescent of insurgency. Any security organization apparatus has zones, districts or boundaries. Police districts have streets that delineate [precincts.] Insurgents are adept at finding where those are and move back and forth to avoid capture. We have indicators that the major leadership of the insurgency do not live next door to the locations they attack. They bring in suicide murders to conduct their attack. They may live in a place like Fallujah, or Abu Ghraib, Iskandaryah and infiltrate into Baghdad, conduct their attack, and leave.
On the size of the insurgency:
The number of people who pick up weapons, fire a rocket, place an IED, is relatively small. But there is an ample supply of replacements who will perform as mercenaries–for the money. If one is detained, another one can be recruited... It does not take many insurgents to make life difficult for a government, to attack unprotected civilian populace and to murder wantonly.
On the failure of Iraqis to directly fight the insurgency:
It is about intimidation and a lack of confidence the security forces can protect them because the insurgents are so ruthless. There [is a] corollary in the United States, in areas where gangs operate; they can intimidate witnesses, operate in plain view on the street, because they have intimidated residents who fear for their safety. There is an element of that now in Iraq.
On progress in Iraq:
There are those ;who say things are no better today than they were last year and they have lost sight of what has transpired. A higher percentage of Iraqis voted than the citizens of most nations of the coalition. They did that despite threats and intimidation. Debates are taking place in houses of government. A constitution is being drafted – a national assembly has been seated, a cabinet has been formed, police and military are being trained. To state that there is no improvement is a fundamental misunderstanding of what is happening.
On the significance of the fight for Iraq:
There is a lot at stake here. There are people who, if given the opportunity...will use Iraq as a platform to conduct attacks against the United States. They have done it in the past–they have attacked the World Trade Center twice, bombed American embassies, taken diplomats hostage. If we walk away before Iraq has the [ability to] keep terrorism from being fomented, trained, and exported, we put our future at risk.