A general's viewpoint on Iraq's status
On the tactics of the Baathist insurgency:
We see no indication the former regime elements are willing to kill themselves in order to achieve their objectives, although they are certainly willing to kill any number of other people. ...For a specific purpose they can get access to a foreign element who will murder themselves. But keep in mind it is not an inexpensive proposition to get someone to come from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, to move them, house them, and indoctrinate them.
On the goals of former regime elements:
They would like to disable the government enough so that it becomes a power grab because they believe they have some military capacity ... The former regime elements have three broad lines of operation. They know they will never be acceptable as former high-level Baathists, so they want to generate violence to force access to the governmental process... [Second,] they present themselves as having a political wing, and they do present a moderate faction. We see [this in] organizations such as Sinn Fein... But they also [have] a third line of operation. They will attempt to infiltrate the security forces of Iraq, the police, the special commandoes, the intelligence service and the army, gain influence, intimidate, use patronage and compromise operations. It's a classic Baathist strategy.
On the insurgency's base of operations:
Around Baghdad the insurgents are seeking to create a crescent of insurgency. Any security organization apparatus has zones, districts or boundaries. Police districts have streets that delineate [precincts.] Insurgents are adept at finding where those are and move back and forth to avoid capture. We have indicators that the major leadership of the insurgency do not live next door to the locations they attack. They bring in suicide murders to conduct their attack. They may live in a place like Fallujah, or Abu Ghraib, Iskandaryah and infiltrate into Baghdad, conduct their attack, and leave.
On the size of the insurgency:
The number of people who pick up weapons, fire a rocket, place an IED, is relatively small. But there is an ample supply of replacements who will perform as mercenaries–for the money. If one is detained, another one can be recruited... It does not take many insurgents to make life difficult for a government, to attack unprotected civilian populace and to murder wantonly.
On the failure of Iraqis to directly fight the insurgency:
It is about intimidation and a lack of confidence the security forces can protect them because the insurgents are so ruthless. There [is a] corollary in the United States, in areas where gangs operate; they can intimidate witnesses, operate in plain view on the street, because they have intimidated residents who fear for their safety. There is an element of that now in Iraq.
On progress in Iraq:
There are those ;who say things are no better today than they were last year and they have lost sight of what has transpired. A higher percentage of Iraqis voted than the citizens of most nations of the coalition. They did that despite threats and intimidation. Debates are taking place in houses of government. A constitution is being drafted – a national assembly has been seated, a cabinet has been formed, police and military are being trained. To state that there is no improvement is a fundamental misunderstanding of what is happening.
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