A general's viewpoint on Iraq's status
Lt. Gen. John Vines, the commander of the Multinational Corps Iraq, oversees day-to-day military operations in the country. He spoke to U.S. News Senior Editor Julian E. Barnes in his headquarters at Camp Victory on June 23:
On the Iraqi security forces:
Ultimately we want them to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations, which is a longer-term proposition. Before that can happen, the ministries have to have the capacity to sustain forces in the field such as reliable pay, supplies, resupply, ammunition, personnel and promotion policies. The ministry currently does not have the capacity to do that. There are some battalions and some brigades that have the capability of taking the lead and being the primary action arm in the battle space. But that is a long way from being universal. They are not there yet as an army.
On giving the Iraqi army more responsibility:
The coalition commanders on the scene have the authority to assign more responsibility to [Iraqi Armed Forces] units, based on their assessment of IAF capability. I provide broad guidance on how much risk we can accept. The outcome won't always be as good as we would wish for, but that allows a more gradual turnover of responsibility. The effectiveness of the Iraqi formations correlates with the effectiveness of their leadership and their leadership varies enormously.
On rising violence in Fallujah:
Fallujah has symbolic value to the insurgents, but it also has geographic value to the insurgents because of its location between the provincial and the national capital. We believe there will be an effort by the insurgents to re-infiltrate to gain influence. As the number of residents and associated commerce increase, the opportunity for infiltration increases.
Our analysis was that the major urban areas, Baghdad, Mosul, Basra, needed to have a level of security before we committed more combat forces to Al Anbar. But if insurgents infiltrate from Syria, or use Al Anbar as a staging base to attack urban areas, we have to address Al Anbar as well. The solution to Al Anbar is an Iraqi solution and principally a political one. Insurgents can hide among a sympathetic Sunni population and pretend to be farmers or laborers, and wait until coalition forces leave the area and then they pick up their arms go back to planning and coordinating insurgencies.
On the enemy body counts:
Killing or capturing insurgents has a temporary effect only until more can be recruited. It doesn't take extensive training to put an improvised explosive device on the side of the road, or emplacing rockets to attack an operational base. We have detained personnel who have been paid to do those things, so the blue-collar end of the insurgency can be regenerated by money. The ability to plan and recruit requires leadership and our primary targets are the leaders who are using violence...Insurgent body count is not a good measure of effectiveness.
On rising numbers of suicide bombers:
There numbers have increased over the last several months. The fundamental tool of the insurgency is the terrorist act of mass murder. There are indiscriminate mass murders directed at the Iraqi population, the Iraqi security forces and the coalition. It is effective because when the perpetrator has no need to escape it allows them to be more lethal, and to not be concerned about an escape route. The indications are that the majority of suicide bombers are not Iraqis...Iraqis can be recruited to shoot a rifle or dig a hole and put an IED in. Foreign terrorists are expensive to recruit, move, sustain, hide and train. They are recruited for a specific reason. Often they have very little skill, but are necessary to do things Iraqis will not do to each other.
advertisement
