The U.N.'s Dirty Laundry
Should Kofi Annan shoulder all the blame, or do the problems go deeper?
There is no time like the present. Last November, auditors reported that the number of serious allegations leveled against peacekeepers was rising at a fast clip and seemed only to abate when no one was there to answer the phone and take a report. This January, auditors again complained, noting that the sexual exploitation of young refugee girls by peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo continued even as they walked about the camp investigating those crimes. Investigators, who say the victims were often paid with food, reported that they continued to stumble over condoms and fresh allegations until the last days of their visit. The trip was marred by interference from troop commanders and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations' insistence that auditors not embarrass the countries whose troops were involved by actually naming them.
Why aren't wrongdoers fired? Blame the system, one no secretary general has yet been able to tame. A management review conducted in October found that it took, on average, two to three years to fire an employee for whatever reason. "Meanwhile, you still have to pay them; they just don't do any work," says one longtime U.N. staffer. "So normally you just keep them on and the standards go down in your office." And what if the employee actually commits a crime? "If you want to fire, it still takes years," he adds.
The system seems designed for failure. U.N. staff members say there is virtually no training for new employees and no clear career path. Promotions are based on seniority, not performance. And those in charge of complex issues may be chosen for whom they know, not what they know. "They throw people from this mass of incompetence into posts where they have no experience," complains a former U.N. worker, recalling a large peacekeeping operation in Africa where the chief procurement officer "was a former air conditioner repairman who just happened to be related to the right person." Sometimes it's even worse. In Kosovo, Jo Hans Dieter Trutschler was hired to a senior-level position requiring knowledge of public works engineering. A 2003 audit reveals that he was hired without any background check because he was a friend of the program manager. His resume turned out to be a lie. Trutschler was later convicted in a German court of diverting $4.3 million into an offshore account.
Deadwood. Simmering frustration has driven many good people from the U.N., particularly motivated young recruits. Although a September 2004 U.N. report saw fewer departures, "neither the quality of candidates nor career prospects for junior staff have improved." U.N. officials are considering buyouts to speed retirements. But clearing out the deadwood will end with just another lost opportunity, staffers say, unless there is a focus on recruitment, accountability, and a newly defined mission.
Such facts are arrows in the quiver for Annan's conservative American critics. They are bolstered by this week's anticipated confirmation of outspoken U.N. critic John Bolton as U.S. ambassador to the world body.
In the end, Annan may be the easiest target, not the right one. The secretary general has only as much power as he is given by the countries that make up the United Nations. "Half the member states don't want reform, don't want democracy," says Nancy Soderberg, who represented the United States in the U.N. Security Council during President Clinton's second term. Sweeping reforms, particularly of the type now being proposed by Annan, would require member nations, particularly powerful ones like the United States, to agree on what sort of United Nations they really want and allow its leader to accomplish the mission. Even critics acknowledge that the secretary general can't clean up the institution alone.
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