Seeds of Chaos
The Baghdad Files: A trove of secret intelligence reports shows how Saddam Hussein planned the current insurgency in Iraq Long before the invasion that toppled his regime was even launched
Project 111. Thousands of pages of secret intelligence reports reviewed by U.S. News spell out some of Saddam's plans in vivid detail, along with the activities of other elements of the insurgency. Saddam, the reports say, reportedly established "new subversive organizations"--including Jaish Muhammad, known as the Army of Muhammad, and the Black Falcons--to carry out attacks against coalition forces. The reports say he also directed regime leaders and supporters to use Sunni mosques for clandestine meeting places, and several reports describe how mosques were used to store weapons. Saddam, the reports say, sought to create a secret communications network, code named Project 111, and also reportedly developed Plan 549, a scheme to attack water plants throughout Iraq.
In one of their most important discoveries, coalition forces uncovered a July 2003 Baath Party memo that provides rare insight into the insurgency being carried out by former Saddam operatives. A report distributed to the intelligence community by Intelink, the highly classified government website, describes the memo: "The document outlined the recommended structure for resistance groups fighting coalition forces. . . . The document dictates the need for secrecy and directs a transition to covert operations. . . . Memo highlights: Organization of cells was to be small and closed in order to prevent penetration by coalition forces (five members). . . . Members were encouraged to avoid written communication and common party language; days, numbers, and locations should be encoded. Emergency operations are listed for situations when member of cell or group is detained . . . . Party members should have their loyalties continuously tested and always have a cover story prepared for their activities."
According to the secret reports, insurgents linked to Saddam or his supporters carried out numerous attacks and bombings, sometimes at his direction. One military report linked the Oct. 26, 2003, rocket attack on the Rashid Hotel in Baghdad, where Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz was staying, to a relative of a Saddam crony, Ali Hassan al-Majid, better known as "Chemical Ali" for his purported role in the 1988 chemical attack on Kurdish villagers.
Numerous reports indicate that Saddam's forces were working with foreign terrorists, including al Qaeda, in carrying out some attacks on coalition forces and Iraqi citizens. "Many Iraqis," wrote a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst in November 2003, "believe foreign terrorist groups are collaborating with Saddam to conduct attacks." Another report, prepared by a military analyst, said al Qaeda was providing funds to some former Iraqi military personnel: "Al Qaeda is capitalizing on the current economic plight of former military members and local Iraqis by enticing them with monetary rewards." Uncorroborated reports from informers suggested that al Qaeda and former regime members also were behind a bombing that killed Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, a leading Shiite cleric, in August 2003. Others also were suspected in Hakim's murder, which remains unsolved.
Saddam's firepower came from what intelligence reports describe as "former regime elements," or FRE s. In a 10-page "special analysis" of the FRE s prepared Dec. 8, 2003, just days before Saddam's capture, the DIA's Joint Intelligence Task Force said that Saddam and his allies "appear to have planned for an insurgency before the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom." The report describes the FRE s as primarily Sunnis who once served under Saddam, including the paramilitary force, the Fedayeen Saddam, the Iraqi Intelligence Service, the Special Security Organization, the Special Republican Guard, and former Baath Party leaders.
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