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The Weidenbush Report
Editor's Note: Army Major General Antonio Taguba sharply criticized the 800th Military Police Brigade in his examinaton of the Abu Ghraib prison-abuse scandal. What follows are major excerpts from a rebuttal prepared by Captain Lisa Weidenbush, the operations officer for the 800th MP Brigade. Her analysis was sent to members of the Senate Armed Services Committee:
May 28, 2004
The Honorable John Warner
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee
United States Senate
228 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Chairman,
I am the operations officer of the 800th Military Police Brigade (MP Bde) and was deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom from January 2003-February 2004. I am writing this letter to make you aware of erroneous allegations in Major General (MG) Taguba's report regarding the 15-6 investigation that was used to disgrace the leaders, soldiers and reputation of the 800th MP Bde. I request your assistance in reclaiming the 800th MP Bde's reputation by denouncing MG Taguba's report. Many members of the Senate Armed Service Committee praised MG Taguba for his report and used it as a means of drawing a conclusion about the facts. Therefore, I have conducted my own analysis of his report and intend to show you that it lacked critical information that is relevant and, if investigated, the conclusions would not have been the same. Some factual information was provided to MG Taguba's team by the 800th MP Bde staff during the interviews; other information was available but failed to be investigated. Furthermore, MG Taguba did not interview 4 Battalion Commanders who were under the 800th MP Bde command who previously redeployed. I submit that the report was a conclusion in search of an investigation and not an investigation seeking truth.
In the enclosed report, I detail the information that was either not investigated or not included in MG Taguda's report, or was reported but lacked detailed or accurate information.
My intent is not to disrespect any military or civilian officials but to state the facts and provide you with a clear picture of the events that occurred during my deployment.
Sincerely,
CPT Lisa A. Weidenbush
cc: Honorable Hillary Clinton
Honorable Charles Schumer
THE
WEIDENBUSH
REPORT
June 2004
. . . Upon review of MG Taguba's report, it is clear that there were several allegations made which were used to mislead military and civilian officials and to discredit the 800th MP Bde and its leaders. The evidence noted in the report does not support the findings. At times, the findings contradict other detainee operations assessments or are simply not factual. . . .
1. Background
. . . January 03: The 800th MP Bde deployed to Kuwait in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. . . .
March 03: The 800th MP Bde conducted Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) operations in Umm Qasr, Iraq (Camp Bucca)
June 03: Repatriation of approximately 8,000 EPW complete, CFLCC {Combined Forces Land Component Command} tasked the Bde a second mission to reconstruct the Iraqi correctional system and relocate to Baghdad.
June 03: The 800th MP Bde senior leadership meets with Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) and informs them that the Bde is not structured or equipped to conduct correctional type missions in a hostile environment. Additionally, soldiers are not trained nor equipped to handle the monumental mission. BG Karpinski assumes command of 800th MP Bde.
July 03: The 800th MP Bde arrives in Baghdad and assumes operational control of 8 Battalions and 21 Companies. Reconstruction of Iraqi corrections system begins.
Jan-Feb 04: The 800th MP Bde transfers authority to the 89th MP Bde and 16th MP Bde and redeploys to the U.S.
2. Missions
The 800th MP Bde's mission in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom was to detain Enemy Prisoners of War until cessation of hostilities and repatriation. The 800th MP Bde is trained on this doctrinal mission and coincides with its wartime mission essential task list (METL). However, the 800th MP Bde was tasked to perform additional non-doctrinal missions in order to reconstruct the Iraqi correctional system. The following missions conducted by the 800th MP Bde are listed below:
Secure High Value Detainees
Secure Iraqi criminals and security detainees (crimes against coalition forces) at Camp Cropper
Secure Mojahedin el Khalq (MEK) (State Dept listed terrorist organization)
Operate a trans- shipment point (Talil)
Secure Iraqi criminals and security detainees (Abu Ghraib prison)
Secure Iraq criminals and security detainees at Camp Bucca
Provide general support to MND CS and secure criminal detainees in southern Iraq. (Al Hillal, Ad Diwanynia and Karbala)
Assist the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to monitor, provide oversight and contract requirements to facilitate the restoration of Iraqi jails and prisons
Assist 101st AAB with detention operations in Northern Iraq
3. Specified and Implies Tasks
In addition to the basic missions listed above, the 800th MP Bde had numerous specified and implied tasks that exceed the ones listed below. I have highlighted only those that were critical to the mission and those that were non-doctrinal and not trained on.
Recruit and train Iraqi correctional guards (non-doctrinal)
Transport thousands of detainees throughout Iraq
Construct 3 internment facilities
Provide security of detainees at medical facilities
Provide command and control MEK compound (non-doctrinal)
Close down MEK offices, escort MEK 5x day to Baghdad for logistical needs (non-doctrinal)
Tactically close down MEK radio station (non-doctrinal)
Escort detainees to court and provide security at the courthouse
Movement of ammunition and equipment from MEK compound (non-doctrinal). . .
Provide personal security for CPA officials (non-doctrinal mission)
Assisted in obtaining vendors for food, water and fuel contracts (non-doctrinal)
Brief and escort dozens of congressional members or high-level senior diplomats and officials throughout detention facilities
Conduct training of Iraqi corrections operations (non-doctrinal)
Account for over 30,000 detainees using databases created by the 800th MP Bde.
Provide force protection for all facilities within the Brigade's area of operation
4. Accomplishments
. . . .
Reconstructed approx 16 prisons for detention of Iraqi criminals (CPA responsibility)
Constructed 3 internment facilities
Housed and secured over 30,000 detainees with only 34 escapes
Transported over 14,000 detainees over thousands of miles using organic assets with only 2 escapes. . .
Managed a $96 million dollar contract for Camp Bucca
Installed radio system in southern Iraq to facilitate convoy movements
Contracted for the feeding, shelter and reconstruction for over 30,000 detainees
Trained over 2,500 Iraqi correctional officers (CPA responsibility)
The 800th MP Bde staffed the CPA prisons department and. . . at one point. . . ran the office as a result of every civilian except being on leave or having quit
Secured approximately 4,000 members of a state department listed terrorist organization (MEK)
Assisted FBI in the processing of MEK members in order to gain vital terrorist information
Reviewed detainee files and released thousands of criminal detainees that committed minor offenses for which no evidence existed
Avoided any soldier from being seriously wounded or killed during detainee operations. . .
5. Capabilities and Structure
The below information provides doctrinal capabilities of an Internment Resettlement Brigade, limitations and resources authorized for this type unit.
The 800th MP Bde is one of only 2 Bde's in the Army whose mission is Internment and Resettlement. According to FM 3-19.40, and FM 3-19.1, an I/R Brigade conducts operations in rear area located in the COMMZ (communications zone), away from the combat zone. MG Taguba's report supported this by stating "The 800th MP Bde experienced challenges adapting its task organizational structure, training, and equipment resources from a unit designed to conduct standard EPW operations in the COMMZ. Further, the doctrinally trained MP soldier to detainee population ratio and facility layout templates are predicated on a compliant, self-disciplining EPW population, and not criminals or high-security internees." I conducted a further analysis in comparing a Combat Support MP Brigade vs. an MP I/R Bde's structure, capabilities and personnel authorizations. There is a striking difference in how the organizations are structured with regard to its capabilities and personnel authorizations. This is important to note because the 18th MP Bde, a Regular Army Combat Support Bde, was originally tasked to perform this mission but was overwhelmed. Therefore, CJTF-7 tasked the 800th MP Bde to assume the corrections mission and support CPA while retaining its other on-going EPW missions. In effect, the 800th MP Bde's mission grew from 2 facilities to over 15 within the entire country and had the added responsibility of providing support to CPA. As explained within, CPA prisons department was poorly staffed and non-functional. MG Taguba failed to state that the 800th MP Bde senior leaders expressed concern to the 377th Theater Support Command and CJTF-7 Commander that the Brigade was not structured to handle such a monumental mission nor trained in correctional type missions. Despite these concerns, CJTF-7 knowingly took risk and assigned the 800th MP Bde its mission. . . .
6. Personnel Strength
The 800th MP Bde suffered greatly from personnel shortages throughout its command. . . Outlined below identifies specific shortfalls, operational impacts and presents a clear picture of how severely short the 800th MP Bde was in personnel.
MG Tabuba's report suggests that "The guard force was undermanned and under resourced and makes mention that the units that remain are generally under strength, as a Reserve Component units do not have an individual personnel replacement system." What the report fails to mention even after telling investigators is that the 800th MP Bde staff was severely undermanned to command and control the sheer size of the mission encompassing the entire country of Iraq. Investigators were informed of the losses of senior staff officers and NCOs and felt it was not relevant to the investigation. Everyone from the Pentagon to the US Army Reserve was aware of the lack of personnel. However, as news reports indicate today, the Pentagon was reluctant to commit more troops to the region at that time.
In addition, due to prior deployments, soldiers and entire units were required to leave theater prior to their one-year boots on the ground. This requirement to redeploy soldiers and units caused a large turnover in personnel and a shifting of unit responsibilities to cover the losses. During November and December 2003, the Bde lost 4 Battalion Headquarters and 9 Companies due to redeployment (50% of the Bde's force). The Bde objected to the redeployment of these units to CJTF-7, CFLCC, Forces Command (FORSCOM), and the Department of the Army (DA). Despite knowing of the loss of soldiers and with detainee population increasing, the Army components did not provide replacements. The mission remained the same and the 800th MP Bde was required to analyze and execute the mission to ensure it worked.
Below I have highlighted some of the critical losses.
Command Section/Senior leadership:
The 800th MP Deputy Brigade Commander redeployed in September 03 and the Executive Officer redeployed in June 03. These positions were critical in command and control of the Brigade staff. In September 03, the Brigade Command Sergeant Major was relieved of his duties for reasons stated in MG Taguba's report.
Between April-September 03, the EPW Operations Officer, Brigade Operations Sergeant Major and the HHC Company First Sergeant all redeployed for various legitimate reasons. Additionally, 5 primary or special staff officers filled their position one rank lower than required. Although the staff was capable and performed admirably, the scope of the mission was a challenge and would have been for any unit whose staff was at full strength. (Attachment 2)
BG Karpinski requested assistance from the 377th TSC Commander (MG Kratzer) and CJTF-7 Deputy Commander (MG Wojdakowski) for assistance in filling the Deputy Commander and Command Sergeant Major position. No support was ever provided. . . .
Operations Section (S3):
A Combat Support MP BDE S3 section is authorized 25 personnel (including a long range planning cell). An Internment Resettlement Brigade (800th MP BDE) S3 section was authorized 12 personnel (no long range planning cell). Of these 12, the S3 section functioned with only 3 officers and 5 NCOs for 6 out of the 12-month deployment. Based on the new mission in Iraq, clearly an increase of manpower was needed. Each staff officer and NCO performed the job equivalent to at least 2-3 soldiers and many in a rank lower than the position required. The soldiers of the 800th MP Bde should be commended on their performance not considered "ineffective. . . .''
Battalion (Bn) and Company Strengths:
In October and November 03, Battalion and Company personnel strengths significantly started to decrease as a result of prior mobilizations. Some unit strengths were reduced to 50%. Due to the size of the mission, all Battalions continuously requested additional forces. . .
The 372nd MP Co (unit currently under investigation for detainee abuse). . . suffered from significant personnel shortages. In October 03, while the company relocated to Abu Ghraib, CJTF-7 tasked the Brigade to provide one platoon (approx 30 soldiers) to personal security for CPA civilian officials. CPA specifically requested the 372nd MP Company as they were assisting them prior to relocation. The 800th MP Bde fought this by stating that they were needed to assist their company at Abu Ghraib. This platoon was tasked for over 3 months leaving the 372nd MP Co without a platoon. . .
The 320th MP Bn S3 (Major Dinenna) briefed MG Wojdakowski (CJTF-7 Deputy Commander) on the status of detention operations at Abu Ghraib. MG Wojdakowski told him that "he needed to be the honest broker" and tell him when he his soldiers were at risk due to the shortage of MP's. MAJ Dinenna stated, "Sir, I have cooks sitting in the towers" and proceeded to tell him that he was at that point where he needed help. MG Wojdakowski then stated "everyone is short personnel" and "overcrowding is not an excuse" and quickly changed the subject. I was present at this briefing and witnessed this discussion.
The Mojahedin el Khalq (MEK) compound consisted of members of a State Dept listed terrorist organization that clearly outnumbered the MP's on the ground guarding them. The ratio of MP's per detainees was approximately 1 to 13. . . .
Additionally, after repeated requests for forces for the MEK compound, none was provided. . . The 800th MP Bde was always expected to conduct tasks but never received any additional forces to complete them. The MEK mission was at times volatile and often risked soldier safety. CJTF-7 was well aware of the challenges the Bde faced but did not make any of these concerns their priority. The missions discussed above are classified; therefore I speak in general terms. . . .
7. Force Protection Support
Force protection was a serious concern while attempting to provide a safe and secure environment for soldiers and detainees. . . . Majority of detainees at Abu Ghraib were housed in outdoor facilities with only concertina wire surrounding them. The shortage of MPs and constant mortars that plagued the facility only magnified these challenges. The attacks created not only fear in soldiers, but risked total mayhem if the mortars hit detainees or soldiers. Needless to say, Abu Ghraib had serious force protection issues that needed to be rectified immediately. . . .
Background Abu Ghraib:
June 03: The 400th MP Bn initially fell under the 18th MP Bde who commanded and controlled Abu Ghraib. According to LTC Dale Burtyk (400th MP Bn Commander), while briefing LTG Sanchez on detainee operations LTG Sanchez asked him what he needed. LTC Burtyk stated force protection, logistical support, and body armor. LTG Sanchez verbally admonished him for lack of force protection. LTC Burtyk also requested support from the 18th MP Bde who disapproved all his requests.
July 03: 7 mortar attacks over fourteen days, 4x small arms fire, 2x RPG
August 03: 4 mortar attacks over seven days, 4x small arms fire, RPG, IED, 6 detainees killed/59 WIA
September 03: 8 mortar attacks over eight days, 6x small arms fire, 2 U.S. soldiers Killed/12 WIA
October 03: LTG Sanchez visits Abu Ghraib and pledged to support the 800th MP Bde with Force protections assets
November 03: 205th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade assumes command and control of Abu Ghraib
Prior to the initial attacks, the 800th MP Bde requested assistance from CJTF-7 to provide force protection assets on the external perimeter of the facility. The Bde was told to use internal assets (MPs), and was continually criticized for not having an adequate force protection plan. The Battalions did not have enough MP's or proper tactical equipment to conduct infantry type tactics required to prevent the attacks. Immediately upon mortars killing 6 detainees, BG Karpinski persisted and fiercely requested assistance from CJTF-7. She spoke to the CJTF-7 Deputy Commander (MG Wojdakowski) and according to a conversation with her; MG Wojdakowski stated "Janis, they are only detainees." Once the media announced the killings, 3-5 Bradleys arrived at the facility. Within a week, the Bradleys left, leaving Abu Ghraib again vulnerable. It was not until mortars came in and killed 2 Military Intelligence soldiers and wounded at least 10 soldiers did CJTF-7 Commander (LTG Sanchez) visit Abu Ghraib and pledged to support the Battalion. . . .
CJFT-7 did eventually provide force protection with 1 Infantry platoon but this was still not enough to manage the sheer size of Abu Ghraib; mortars and small arms fire beleaguered the prison. The Brigade was forced to pull an MP platoon from a different mission to assist in patrolling the area. . . .CJTF-7 continually criticized the 800th MP Bde for not providing adequate force protection. However, CJTF-7 continued to have troubles securing Abu Ghraib even after the 800th MP Bde redeployed. In fact, on 21 April 04, 18 mortars fell on Abu Ghraib killing 21 detainees.
8. Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Responsibilities
The below information identifies CPAs responsibilities and critical shortfalls that led to the 800th MP Bde having to assume major roles in reconstructing the Iraqi corrections system.
The CPA Ministry of Justice prisons department was established to reconstruct Iraq's corrections system and provide subject matter experts on correction facilities. Unfortunately, this department was never fully or even marginally functional. As a result, CPA's goals became the 800th MP Bde's mission. The 800th MP Bde was required to provide soldiers to cover CPAs personnel shortages. This created an enormous burden on the Bde that had no prior experience in reconstructing prisons. The 800th MP Bde was tasked to assist CPA, not become CPA. As a result, CJTF-7 continuously held the Bde accountable for the reconstruction of prisons. The 800th MP Bde was relying on CPA to provide subject matter experts to provide guidance and support but very few were available.
According to the drafted CPA document "Management of Detention and Prison Facilities" written in June 02, CPA prisons department was originally designated to have a functioning staff of approximately 80 civilians by June/July 03. Instead they had approximately 4 personnel from June to August 03, and at one point 3 of them left (either quit or took leave) reducing their personnel to one. It was not until October03 when 4 more were hired. . . .BG Karpinski quickly identified the shortage of CPA prison experts. . . {but}. . . additional hires did not arrive in country until the middle of January 04. . . .
Despite CPA's challenges, the 800th MP Bde did the best it could to carry on their responsibilities. Establishing the correctional system to include refurbishing facilities, recruiting and training correctional officers is a non-doctrinal mission for the Bde. With minimal support and lack of expertise, the Bde performed admirably in this area and still performed various other missions it was tasked. By having to assume the responsibilities of the understaffed and non-functional CPA prisons department, the 800th MP Bde diverted numerous resources to resurrecting the Iraqi correctional system. . . .
9. Erroneous Findings in MG Taguba's Report
A detailed list of erroneous findings from MG Taguba's report is listed below. From his report, I have extracted some of his findings and provided factual data to refute it. Some of his findings contradicted recommendations made in MG {Donald} Ryder's report during his assessment of detainee operations.
Background
In February 03. . . MG Taguba's team started interviewing the 800th MP Bde staff. . . .The Bde was aware that an investigative team would be interviewing the staff for what they believed to be an investigation into the specific acts of detainee abuse. At no time did the staff know the specifics of the investigation other than detainee abuse. . . From discussions with several interviewees after the investigation was complete, most concluded that the investigation was directed more at BG Karpinski's leadership and less about the detainee abuse. . .
After reviewing in detail MG Taguba's report, several findings were not factual, or were misleading and did not reflect an accurate account of events. Below are excerpts from MG Taguba's report and my own factual findings.
Page 10, paragraph 3 is an excerpt from MG Ryder's report which states, "The 800th MP Bde has experienced challenges adapting its organizational structure, training and equipment resources from a unit designed to conduct standard EPW operations in the COMMZ, to its current mission-set and the characteristics of the Iraqi and third country national detainee population. Further, the doctrinal soldier to detainee population ratio and facility layout templates are predicated on a compliant, self-disciplining EPW population, and not criminals or high-risk security internees." While extracting this directly from MG Ryder's report, MG Taguba left one sentence out of his report that was in the middle of the paragraph and states, "Specifically, the 800th MP (I/R) Bde and its subordinate units are not well equipped to defend its I/R facilities (e.g., few crew-served weapons) or escort prisoners in a high threat environment (e.g., no M1114 HMMWVs, and few M1025/6 HMMWVs and organic cargo vehicles." With force protection being a critical issue and a highly publicized concern at Abu Ghraib, this sentence should not have been excluded from his report. This omission is perceived to be deceptive in fact finding evidence.
Page 20, paragraph 13 references "Another obvious example of the Brigade Leadership not communicating with its soldiers or ensuring their tactical proficiency concerns the incident of detainee abuse occurring at Camp Bucca." This statement is misleading, as the 800th MP Bde contacted Criminal Investigative Division to investigate the incident. In contrast, the Bde should be commended for taking immediate action not criticized.
Page 24, paragraph 21 references "soldiers were poorly trained and untrained to conduct I/R operations prior to deployment, at the mobilization site, upon arrival in theater, and throughout their mission." It is important to note that after September 11, 2001, several if not most Army Reserve MP units were called to active duty for weeks or months at a time performing security at government and military facilities throughout the U.S. An Army Reserve soldier only has 54 days of annual training and weekend drills per year. This call to duty depleted these days, leading to lack of or no training during FY 02. The Army Reserve Command should have identified this lack of training and objected to the use of reserve units or allocated additional funds so training dollars were not used. With a shortage of MP's already in the Army inventory, better planning could have avoided this lack of MP training. There is a misperception that only MP's can provide security or guard duty. Guard duty is a basic soldier skill and should be able to be performed by any soldier. Clearly the Army must have known that using MP soldiers to guard airports, military facilities and other key sites would degrade training and soldier readiness. In fact, the 800th MP Bde, prior to deployment had a major detainee exercise planned for the summer of 2002. However, due to the unit and soldier activations following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, the exercise was cancelled due to having very few units left that could participate. The lack of training was not a result of the 800th MP Bde but the Army's misuse of military police units and individual soldiers. It was not the 800th MP Bde's responsibility to provide ready and trained MP units, it was the responsibility of the Army Reserve Command and U.S. Army Forces Command. The Army knew or should have known that correction operations would be required during the reconstruction phase of the war, yet no plan was ever in place to ensure soldiers were trained. The system failed the soldiers and did not properly prepare them for the mission at hand.
Page 24, paragraph 22 references "LTC McGlone, Commander of the 744th MP Bn, detailed the escape of one detainee at the High Value Detainee (HVD) facility." The escape occurred during Apr 03, and involved a criminal detainee, not a high value detainee. This incident was reported to CFLCC at the time it occurred. No high value detainee ever escaped from any 800th MP Bde facility. This paragraph is misleading and gives the impression that the 800th MP Bde or its subordinate units covered up detainee escapes.
Page 26, paragraph 29 references the questionable work ethics and loyalties of the Iraqi guards. CPA was required to screen the guards prior to hiring them. Work ethic and loyalty is still a problem for many Iraqis in all ministries. Recent news articles report problems with the Iraqi Army, Iraqi protective service and Iraqi border guards. The 800th MP Bde should not be cited for the questionable work ethics and loyalty of Iraqi corrections officers. Again, this was a CPA responsibility but the 800th MP Bde was forced to assume the mission. It should also be noted that on several occasions for weeks or months at a time, Iraqi guards went unpaid. This lack of payment was the result of the failures of CPA ministry of finance. The 800th MP Bde made numerous complaints to CPA about this lack of payment. It is not realistic to think that Iraqi guards already accustomed to a corrupt society would be completely loyal if they were not being paid.
Page 26, paragraph 33 references "various facilities operated by the 800th MP Bde have routinely held persons brought to them by Other Government Agencies (OGA) without accounting for them, knowing their identities, or even reason for their detention. On one occasion, the 320th MP Bn at Abu Ghraib held a handful of 'ghost detainees' (6-8) for OGAs that they moved around within the facility to hide them from a visiting International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) survey team. This maneuver was deceptive, contrary to Army Doctrine, and in violation of international law." I HIGHLY recommend the Senate Armed Services Committee obtain a copy of CJTF-7 Fragmentary order #1099. (Attachment not included for classification reasons.)
The 800th MP Bde did not sanction the moving of detainees to hide them from ICRC. Only on one occasion did the 800th MP Bde know of this happening, which was a result of a direct fragmentary order by LTG Sanchez. The Bde immediately objected to the implementation of the order and contacted the CJTF-7 Staff Judge advocate to question it. The Brigade was told to implement the order.
Page 27 and 28, paragraph 34 references a number of riots, escapes, and shootings documented as having occurred at detention facilities in Iraq. By including these in the report, it gives the appearance that the incidents occurred under the command of the 800th MP Bde and leadership of BG Karpinski. In fact, the incidents listed below occurred under a different command. The 800th MP Bde did not assume command of Abu Ghraib until late June and did not fully relocate its headquarters to Baghdad until July 03. If you remove these from the report, the first incident involving the 800th MP Bde does not occur until Nov 03!
34a. 4 June 03: Escape from Camp Vigilant (320th MP Bn). This finding is false. It was the 400th MP Bn under the command of the 18th MP Bde who commanded and controlled Camp Vigilant, not the 320th MP Bn or 800th MP Bde.
34b. 9 June 03: Riot and shootings of five detainees at Camp Cropper (115th MP Bn). This finding is misleading as it was the 18th MP Bde who commanded and controlled the 115th MP Bn during this time not the 800th MP Bde.
34c. 12 June 03: Escape and recapture of detainee #8399, escape and shooting of detainee #7166, and attempted escape of an unidentified detainee at Camp Cropper (115th MP Bn). This statement is misleading, as it was the 18th MP Bde who commanded and controlled the 115th MP Bn during this time not the 800th MP Bde.
34d. 13 June 03: Escape and recapture of detainee #8968 and the shooting of eight detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) (320th MP Bn). This statement is false as the 400th MP Bn was located at Abu Ghraib during this time, not the 320th MP Bn. It was also the 18th MP Bde who commanded and controlled the 400th MP Bn not the 800th MP Bde.
Page 31, paragraph 34n and 34o references 2 escapes that occurred under the 320th MP Bn. These escapes occurred under the command of the 724th MP Bn, not the 320th MP Bn.
MG Taguba's report (pg. 24) also questioned BG Karpinski's integrity by stating, "The documentation provided to this investigation identified 27 escapes or attempted escapes from the detention facilities throughout the 800th MP Brigade's AOR. Based on my assessment and detailed analysis of the substandard accountability process maintained by the 800th MP Bde, it is highly likely that there were several more unreported cases of escape that were probably "written off" as administrative errors or otherwise undocumented." "BG Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Bde, stated that there were more than 32 escapes from her holding facilities, which does not match the number derived from the investigation materials." The above inaccuracies in MG Taguba's report explain why the information provided by BG Karpinski and the report differs. The remaining escapes or attempted escapes stated in the report occurred in Nov-Dec 03. It is important to note that Iraqi detainees like all prisoners in the U.S. attempt to escape from capture. It is a natural response to capture. They cause riots, attempt to escape and cause havoc in the facility. Unlike EPWs who know they will be repatriated after cessation of hostilities, criminal and security detainees are indoctrinated to the Iraqi system of torture and death. It would be unrealistic to think that no detainees would escape from a makeshift detention facility surrounded only by concertina wire. Majority of the escapes occurred while detained in these type facilities. With inadequate light sets and shortage of MP's, it is inevitable that some will succeed in escaping. The 800th MP Bde should be commended for such a low escape ratio considering the detainee population was over 30,000. In contrast, MG Taguba views the escapes in a negative light. Furthermore, during the majority of escapes between Nov-Jan, combat forces were conducting extensive raids throughout Iraq making November the highest month for detainee captures. With a slow release rate and a high influx of detainees, Abu Ghraib was severely overcrowded and undermanned. Also during Nov-Jan 03, the 205th MI Bde had command and control of Abu Ghraib. It is suspected they put more priority on interrogation gathering rather than security of detainees. . .
Page 37, paragraph 4 references the 800th MP Bde not requesting specific corrections training from various resources. This comment is disturbing. Soldiers were sent into a combat zone and the CJTF-7 Combatant Commander {Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez} knew that that they were not trained on corrections. I would suspect that training would be force fed rather than having to be requested. If MG Ryder, the top military police officer in the Army felt a dire need for additional Military Police or training, he should have provided the resources. The Combatant commander knowingly put soldiers at risk by not providing training despite concerns expressed to him by the 800th MP Bde senior leaders upon accepting the mission. Furthermore, the Bde asked for additional soldiers, equipment, assistance when dealing with the MEK, and force protection to safeguard soldiers and detainees. They did not receive any of this, which leads me to believe that the Bde would not have received any training either.
In November - December 03, the 800th MP did in fact submit a request to CJTF-7 for 16 correctional experts to provide subject matter expertise for each of the Bde's facilities. In January 04, this request was submitted to CENTCOM, which led to their presence there today. Additionally, a non commissioned officer on MG Ryder's team conducted corrections training at Abu Ghraib on 28 October 03. In fact, this same soldier was on MG Taguba's investigative team. . .
Page 37, paragraph 6 references "BG Karpinski and her staff did a poor job allocating resources throughout the Army JOA. Abu Ghraib normally housed between 6000 and 7000 detainees, yet only one battalion operated it." In contrast, the HVD facility maintains only about 100 detainees, and is also run by an entire battalion. This statement is misleading to the reader and is false. What the report fails to mention is that the Battalion that commanded and controlled the HVD facility was also responsible for the operation and manning of (6) criminal detention facilities throughout Baghdad holding approximately 2,000 detainees. At each of these facilities, the Battalion was responsible for training Iraqi corrections officers, and providing medical and logistic support. Additionally, the Battalion was also tasked to provide detainee security at two U.S. medical facilities for those being treated.
Furthermore, the Army knowingly took risk allocating a limited number of MPs to Iraq. I ask you to inquire as the Army's sourcing of MPs to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. They sourced 1 MP Bde to Cuba that had only 600 detainees. The ratio of MP's per detainee is 1 to 1, yet they sourced 1 MP Bde to run all detainee operations for an entire country without a criminal justice system in place or functional prisons. Detainees in Cuba are reported to be Al Queda but the detainees in Iraq consisted of criminals, Baa'th Party members, Feydayeen, foreign fighters and members of International terrorist organizations.
Page 41, paragraph 18d references "Saluting of officers was sporadic and not enforced." This statement is also misleading. Abu Ghraib was located in a combat zone and constantly under siege. The facilities were located in an open environment allowing detainees visual contact with soldiers of all ranks. It was the commander of the facility who established "no salute" zone out of concern that the hostile environment posed a threat.
Page 43, paragraph 19 references BG Karpinski not regularly visiting detention facilities. With the largest operation of any other separate Brigade it was extremely difficult for BG Karpinski to visit each facility. However, she did. As for Abu Ghraib, she was there on numerous occasions and often escorted dignitaries to include top military and civilian officials. Her deputy commander, COL Alan Ecke was present at the facility on an almost daily basis from July through August until he redeployed. . . .
Page 44, paragraph 22 references that "on 17 Jan 04, BG Karpinski was formally admonished in writing by LTG Sanchez regarding serious deficiencies in her Brigade. LTG Sanchez found that the performance of the 800th MP Bde had not met the standards set by the Army or by CJTF-7. He found that incidents in the preceding six months had occurred that reflected a lack of clear standards, proficiency and leadership with the Brigade." It seems a little coincidental that he felt this way only after the detainee allegations surfaced. Within 3 weeks after it surfaced, the Bde was scheduled to redeploy. If he felt that her performance did not meet the standards, it would be expected that he would have counseled her during her 6 months in command. Had these allegations not surfaced and he felt this way, he would have allowed a Bde Commander to redeploy without actions taken against her.
10. Miscellaneous
The Secretary of Defense {Donald Rumsfeld} visited Abu Ghraib on 6 Sep 03. On 7 Sept 03, MG Miller arrived at Abu Ghraib and recommended changes to the interrogation practices. When MG Miller recommended these changes, CIA, Military Intelligence, and Department of Defense knew of this, yet no one informed BG Karpinski or her staff. She was responsible for the overall operation of Abu Ghraib when the changes occurred. She could not adequately prepare her soldiers for a change in policy when she did not know about it. Had she known that sleep deprivation and dogs were authorized in the interrogation process, she would have better prepared her soldiers for that type of work environment. She may also have questioned this change and objected to it as being contrary to the Geneva Convention. I suspect that the latter was the reason she was not informed. Since BG Karpinski was responsible for the MPs at the time of the change, why wasn't she included in the meetings with MG Miller and the 205th MI Bde, or at least provided a list of the new rules of interrogation?
. . . CJTF-7 requested MG Ryder's team and the Inspector General to conduct a thorough review of detainee operations. The 800th MP Bde made corrections to the deficiencies that were under its control and responded in writing to both reports. Many of the deficiencies identified were directed to the CPA Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Health, CJTF-7 Staff Judge Advocate and other organizations. . . .(Response to MG Ryder's report not included for classification reasons)
The Bde welcomed anyone who attempted to assist in its operations even if the assistance resulted in negative findings or required additional work. The Bde staff was so overwhelmed with daily operations that at times it was difficult to see the source of some of the problems. . . .
With an increase of captured detainees, medical support was critical to the detention operations. Abu Ghraib received detainees with serious battle wounds, heart disease, diabetes, and other serious medical conditions. In response, CJTF-7 wrote a fragmentary order tasking the 30th Medical Bde to provide medical assets. The Medical Brigade disregarded the order and on 13 Aug 03, an 800th MP Bde operations officer and Bde Surgeon met with MG Wojdakowski and inquired about the order. Per conversation with soldiers at the meeting and through written accounts, MG Wojdakowski stated "Prisoners are not priority right now and I will not take away doctors from U.S. facilities to accommodate prisoners." The officers at the meeting expressed to him that according to the Geneva Convention we had to provide the same level of care to detainees as we do U.S. soldiers. MG Wojdakowski stated "No we don't." As a result, it was through the efforts of the 800th MP Brigade Surgeon who was eventually able to coordinate Iraqi doctors to provide some support.
One of the findings used in MG Taguba's report recommending BG Karpinski be relieved from duty is "Failing to take appropriate action regarding the ineffectiveness of numerous members of her Brigade staff". These allegations are not substantiated and unequivocally fictitious. A staff cannot be ineffective and have so many accomplishments. If it were not for the dedication and untiring work ethics of several members of her staff, the mission would not have been achievable. The Bde staff was severely understaffed, not ineffective!
11. Recommendations
In an effort to avoid the many problems that not only the 800th MP Bde experienced but the Army as a whole, the following recommendations are made for future combat operations. . . .
Add to the War College curriculum "The proper roles of and employment of Military Police on the battlefield."
Provide additional training for Army war planners on contingency operations and the resource requirements necessary for reconstructing a country's infrastructure.
Better define Operational Control (OPCON) vs. Tactical Control (TACON) at all military professional development schools.
Change the Internment Resettlement Brigade and Battalion modified table of allowance (MTOE) by increasing personnel and equipment authorizations.
Create 2-3 MP Battalions dedicated for Detention Operations.
Revise MP Doctrine to reflect current and future national security interests.
Separate Military Intelligence activities from Military Police operations.
Allocate a detainee operations cell of at least 5 soldiers to Occupation Forces Commander (CJTF-7). CJTF-7 only had one officer filling this position. This created additional staff work for the 800th MP Bde trying to command and control 8 battalions and 20 companies.
Allow ICRC unlimited access to all detention facilities for all detainees. This is the commander's eyes and ears from an outside source. Their visits and recommendations should be taken serious.
Task Inspector Generals on all staffs with conducting unannounced visits to detention facilities with an interpreter to randomly interview selected detainees.
Increase the training opportunities for Army Reserve soldiers. Participating in community events (i.e.) parades are important, but when funds are not available for additional duty days, these soldiers substitute training days in order to accomplish the tasking. Soldiers should only be committed if there are additional funds and only when it doesn't take them away from IDT (weekend drills) or annual training time.
Require all soldiers (Army Reserve and Active duty) to have training on not only the Geneva Convention but also interrogation procedures. If the MP's alleged in the detainee abuse knew exactly what procedures were authorized, they may have used better judgment.
Require specific training prior to any unit assuming a change of mission not previously trained on.
12. Conclusion
The 800th MP Bde conducted a mission that no other Brigade Command would want. Mistakes are made in all military operations and the 800th MP Bde is not without exception. However, these mistakes are by no means the magnitude indicated in MG Taguba's report. With having personal experience in the planning and involvement of most missions, it is amazing how the 800th MP Bde accomplished so much with so little. Listed below are personal observations and system failures that have urged me to write this report.
While analyzing the inaccurate statements in MG Taguba's report, it does not seem that he and his team had a clear understanding of the 800th MP Bde's responsibilities. Some of his findings referred to the responsibilities of other organizations or were simply incorrect. Due to other organizational and systematic failures throughout the Army and reconstruction of Iraq, the Bde took the initiative to complete missions for which they were not responsible. This initiative resulted in criticism when the mission did not result in perfection and are cited in MG Taguba's report. There are several questionable findings that are easily debatable, but I do not want to speculate or do not have factual evidence at this time to refute them. My supporting attachments are few as the Bde is waiting for hundreds of records to arrive from Theater. At that time further information will be available to better refute additional findings and add to those already stated.
I applaud MG Taguba and his team for attempting to capture the facts in a timely manner on such a sensitive issue. However, his report does not accurately depict the facts and lacks critical information pertinent for a fair and just conclusion. While investigating the 800th MP Bde, MG Taguba's team should have looked at all aspects of the Bde's mission, capabilities, challenges, structure and accomplishments. Minimal to no findings were a result of any interviews from the 800th MP Bde, subordinate commanders or staff. Four Battalion commanders who redeployed prior to the 15-6 interview were never called for questioning. As a result, they and others have provided letters of support to LTG McKiernan during his review of MG Taguba's report and BG Karpinski's rebuttal. . .
While the actions of individuals directly involved in the detainee abuse are inconceivable, I feel that we need to hold only those directly responsible for the acts and those who directed them. While testifying in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee, MG Taguba stated, "there was a failure of leadership from the Brigade on down". I have identified several leadership failures throughout the chain of command above the Brigade level. If we are going to indict the Brigade and Battalion commanders, I strongly suggest that their commander's also be held accountable.
Upon completion of the MG Taguba's findings, his report was submitted to the Combined Forces Land Component Command (Lieutenant General McKiernan). After reviewing the findings and BG Karpinski's rebuttal, LTG McKiernan took no actions against her and allowed her to continue to command her Brigade. Her rebuttal was obviously worthy of his decision. Since the media announced the abuse, and as a result of MG Taguba's report, BG Karpinski was suspended from command. The 800th MP Bde soldiers stand behind their commander.
How can a report with so many inaccuracies as stated within have been submitted to the United States Senate and Congress? The report itself states that LTG Mckiernan was briefed on 3 Mar 2004. However, no action or investigation was initiated against the military intelligence until after the media exposed the abuse, despite the report indicating that military intelligence soldiers were "directly or indirectly" responsible for the detainee abuse.
I request MG Taguba publicly apologize to the 800th MP Bde leaders and soldiers for attempting to degrade their reputation and diminish their accomplishments by his unfounded report. I also request that the Senate Armed Services Committee do everything in their power to assist in reclaiming the 800th MP Bde's reputation by denouncing MG Taguba's report. These soldiers should be formally recognized for making an impossible mission possible. Moreover, due to the degrading of the 800th MP Bde and subordinate units, hundreds of soldiers under the 800th MP Bde command did not receive proper recognition after spending a year in a combat zone reconstructing a country's infrastructure. American soldiers are a precious resource and should be treated as such. Without them, we would not be the "free" nation we are today.
Lastly, I strongly suspect several of my colleagues in the 800th MP Bde feel the same as I but do not speak out in fear of reprisal. However, since I risked my life for our country, I could do no less than risk my career for the soldier's reputation that fought next to me.
I sincerely appreciate your attention in this matter and request a reply upon review. . . .
Sincerely,
LISA A. WEIDENBUSH
CPT, MP
Operations Officer
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