The Art of the Deal
The U.S. wants to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons. Don't bet on it
The North Korean negotiator was determined to show his outrage to the Americans across the table. He slammed down his briefing book and stood up to leave. Trouble was, there was nowhere to go. The talks were in North Korea's own mission in Geneva.
That episode from the annals of North Korean negotiating tactics took on near-comic form. But those who have gone toe to toe with representatives of the isolated communist state concur that their skill at provocation and brinkmanship is usually first rate. This week, North Korea will have a fresh chance to try more "guerrilla negotiating" at long-awaited talks in Beijing over its nuclear weapons programs. The United States--along with China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea--will begin trying to sketch out a deal to end a nuclear nightmare: a North Korea brandishing half a dozen or so bombs.
Bush administration officials, divided over how to reverse the North's atomic breakout, last week were hashing out their opening offer. They were also pondering troubling new U.S. intelligence assessments of the North's nuclear capabilities and intentions. U.S. News has learned that the CIA in August moved up its projected date for when Pyongyang could produce the first highly enriched, bomb-ready uranium from an enrichment facility (whose location is unknown to the CIA). Previous estimates suggested 2005 or 2006; now the CIA says mid- to late 2004. In addition, after months of debate, the CIA has concluded that North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il will sell fissile material to rogue states or terrorists if the reprocessing of plutonium at a plant in Yongbyon succeeds. So far, says one U.S. official, such reprocessing apparently has been slowed by technical glitches.
"Bloodsucker." If the Iraq war has highlighted the shortcomings--and possible misuse--of intelligence, an assessment of secretive and hostile North Korea may be even more problematic. The revised CIA analyses are being regarded warily by some officials; they worry that the shifting intelligence is part of an effort by hawks to undermine the Beijing talks. Those efforts, said one official, include lobbying to make the U.S. delegation's formal statement "demeaning" to the North Koreans and to require the North's upfront acceptance of deeply intrusive verification inspections. The tactics could prompt a North Korean walkout. Add to that an in-your-face speech in Seoul by prominent hawk John Bolton, the under secretary of state for arms control, who denounced Kim as a"tyrannical dictator." The North Koreans countered by calling Bolton--who is not in the U.S. delegation to Beijing--"human scum and bloodsucker."
Administration hawks say the CIA reassessments reflect additional spying assets trained on the North's purchases of specialized equipment, like parts for gas centrifuges. The hawks doubt that full disarmament is possible as long as Kim rules and suspect that he has already decided to keep some nukes. Says one player in the policy fights, "If the talks fail, the U.S. will have greater credibility to tighten the noose around the regime."
By that, he means a U.S.-led drive to slap international sanctions on Pyongyang and, perhaps, to step up military pressure. Elements of a squeeze play are already in place: The administration's Proliferation Security Initiative, involving 11 countries, is working on ways to interdict fissile material and missiles moving into or out of North Korea, highlighted by naval exercises next month off Australia. Washington has also drawn several countries into a crackdown on North Korea's lucrative drug-trafficking, counterfeiting, and money-laundering activities.
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