A Balance of Terror
North Korea's nuclear ambitions could trigger an arms race in Asia
It is a scenario that some U.S. officials find too sensitive to discuss in detail: A defiant North Korea chooses to build and keep a nuclear arsenal, not bargain it away for rewards, as many suppose. Faced with a nuclear breakout by a hostile regime, Japan reconsiders its antinuclear taboos, fields a larger missile force of its own, and plunges into developing a shield against incoming missiles with the United States. South Korea, with one eye on the North and the other on Japan, follows suit. China reacts with more nukes and missiles of its own. Taiwan, outgunned, opts for more missiles and, perhaps, nuclear bombs. A nervous Russia shifts nuclear and conventional forces for defense against its old rivals, China and Japan. India, a foe of China, expands its nuclear forces, a step that causes Pakistan to do likewise. An Asian arms race snaps into high gear. No wonder that one former U.S. official who helped guide North Korea policy warns of a new "domino effect" in Asia.
Such possibilities--even if only partially realized--are driving some U.S. officials and Asia specialists to conclude that Pyongyang's nuclear gambit could be the most serious threat to global stability today. In just over three months, North Korea has admitted running a covert program to enrich uranium for bombs, vowed to keep it going, and bustled through measures to prepare for extracting weapons-grade plutonium at another site. What's more, it became the first nation to abandon the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty--and declared that it would cast off a moratorium on test-firing ballistic missiles.
That may not be an idle threat. A senior State Department official predicted last week that the North may soon test-fire a long-range missile over Japan, as it did in 1998. The dizzying pace of North Korea's brinkmanship is deepening suspicions that its leader, Kim Jong Il, has made the strategic choice to build a nuclear arsenal in order to deter any potential U.S. attack. Says Victor Cha, a North Korea expert at Georgetown University, "If you're simply trying to create a crisis, you don't need to do all these things."
Options. Kim's actions, note U.S. officials, seem designed to expand his options. He could build up a nuclear arsenal in a bid to win greater concessions through security guarantees, aid, and diplomatic recognition. Or he could keep it as a deterrent force. He might try to do both by hiding a portion of any newly produced fissile material. And having seen India and Pakistan ride out sanctions after their 1998 nuclear tests, Kim may be calculating that he can do likewise.
In a few weeks, the North could begin lifting some of the 8,000 plutonium fuel rods from a cooling pool at the Yongbyon reactor complex for reprocessing. That could yield enough weapons-grade plutonium for five to seven bombs by this summer--on top of the one or two nuclear devices the North may have already. By then, the North would be in a position to consider a dramatic act of brinkmanship: a nuclear test blast. Says a high-ranking State Department official, "If they test and reprocess furiously, it's a monumental change. Everyone in the region has to reassess their defenses."
Some Russian and Chinese military analysts doubt that the North Koreans have been able to make workable weapons. U.S. proliferation specialists, however, believe that the North has conducted dozens of test explosions of the sort that can touch off a chain reaction in plutonium.
Selling nukes. A half-dozen nukes would make Asia a different place. "It's a much more threatening capability," says Robert Einhorn, a former top U.S. nonproliferation official. The weapons could be dispersed--and hidden in underground bunkers. And North Korea's track record of selling missiles to countries such as Pakistan and Yemen raises an even more chilling prospect: the world's first department store for nukes, with terrorists and rogue states as potential hard-currency customers. One senior U.S. official doubts Kim would go that far: "I think he knows we would cause him to disappear."
The Bush administration has been trying to orchestrate international pressure on the North to disarm--with limited success. In a shift last week, the president softened his rhetoric, hinting that impoverished North Korea might receive aid, energy supplies, and even agreements on security and diplomatic recognition if it verifiably quits its nuclear projects. South Korea's incoming president, Roh Moo Hyun, has frustrated administration hawks by portraying himself as a possible mediator between Pyongyang and Washington, and Seoul opposes sanctions or other efforts to isolate the North. Russia, which has friendly ties with the North, remains stuck in a "denial phase" on Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions, says Alexander Vershbow, the U.S. ambassador to Moscow.
China may be the key: North Korea depends on China for food and fuel, but Beijing has been reluctant to squeeze Pyongyang, fearing chaos, mass refugee flows, and a U.S. presence on its border if the North collapses. U.S. officials welcomed China's offer last week to host U.S.-North Korean talks, but they hope for more. Envoys are reminding the Chinese that Washington has opposed a nuclear-armed Japan or South Korea. "We say, `We've carried your water on nuclear issues for 50 years. Now it's your turn to do it for us,' " says a senior U.S. diplomat.
Japan has edged closer to the U.S. approach than has South Korea. The Japanese public was enraged by revelations last fall of North Korean abductions of Japanese. Normalization talks have stalled. After the nuclear crisis emerged, officials in Tokyo approached the Bush administration about increasing Japan's role in theater missile defenses. The revulsion at atomic weapons is deep in Japan, the only country to have suffered a nuclear attack. But the idea that Japan someday might have to abandon its non-nuclear stance has also gained currency in conservative circles. If Pyongyang brandishes atomic weapons, says Ryukichi Imai, a former diplomat and government adviser on atomic energy, "there would be a lot of voices in Japan saying this country should do it too." But, he predicts, "Japan will never have the bomb. We know too much about nuclear weapons." Still, U.S. officials note that Japan has plenty of plutonium and technical know-how. "Japan in six to 12 months could be missiled and weaponed up," says a senior U.S. official.
Banned the bomb. South Korea has also shunned the bomb, though it conducted covert nuclear weapons research in the 1970s until the United States leaned on Seoul to shut it down. "They were close," says the U.S. official. "The plans are on the shelf." (Washington also demanded that Taiwan halt its nuclear research around the same time.) Though analysts believe the South might react to a prolonged nuclear crisis by acquiring antimissile systems and perhaps offensive missiles, the Seoul government insists the nuclear question is closed. "South Korea knows it can be safely protected behind the U.S. military. The U.S. [nuclear] umbrella is sufficient," says a senior official in Seoul.
South Korea is also defended by a "tripwire" 37,000-member U.S. military force. Yet even before the current tensions, U.S. News has learned, the Pentagon was studying a possible reduction in the ground force, which has been a magnet for anti-American protests in the South, coupled with other changes including greater emphasis on Navy and Air Force precision-strike weapons. Those moves, however, could be complicated by the nuclear crisis if U.S. officials believe that North Korea would interpret them as a weakening of the U.S. commitment to defending the South.
But in Seoul, some people already believe that American nuclear protection isn't enough. "If South Korea has nuclear weapons, then South Korea will never fear North Korea, because it will know that if North Korea bombs South Korea, it will be bombed by us," reasons Kim Young Tak, a 43-year-old middle school teacher. Nuclear deterrence, it's been said, has an undeniable logic.
The North Korean threat
U.S. intelligence agencies believe that North Korea has "one, possibly two" nuclear weapons. It agreed to freeze its nuclear-weapons program in a 1994 deal with the United States but is now preparing to resume those activities. If unchecked, experts say, North Korea could produce five to seven nuclear bombs this year--and eight to 10 by the end of 2005--enough to alter the strategic balance in East Asia. North Korea is probably capable of deploying nuclear or chemical warheads on ballistic missiles able to strike South Korea and Japan, and it has worked on the Taepo Dong-2 missile, which has an estimated range that could include part of Alaska.
THE TWO KOREAS
NORTH
POPULATION: 22.2 million
GDP: $21.8 billion*
GDP per capita: $1,000*
SOUTH
48.3 million
GDP: $865 billion*
GDP per capita $18,000*
Figures are estimates
*Adjusted for purchasing-power differences
[Map is not available]
[Map labels]
CHINA
RUSSIA
NORTH KOREA
SOUTH KOREA
Sea of Japan
Korea Bay
Nuclear-reactor site
Nuclear-related facility
Missile-production facility
Pyongyang
Yongbyon
Seoul
Demilitarized zone
TAEPO DONG-2
In development.
The estimated 2,500 to 3,700-mile range could enable it to strike Alaska.
UNDER THE GUN
North Korea's current midrange ballistic missiles, No Dong and Taepo Dong-1, could carry chemical or nuclear warheads against South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China.
[Map is not available.]
[Map labels]
RUSSIA
CHINA
N. KOREA
JAPAN
S. KOREA
Pacific Ocean
Alaska
Taepo Dong-2: Estimated range 2,500 miles - 3,700 miles
Taepo Dong-1: 900 miles
No Dong missile: 600 miles
Military Might
CHINA
Nuclear warheads 410
Military forces 2.3 million
RUSSIA
Nuclear warheads 20,000
Military forces 1 million
JAPAN
Nuclear warheads 0
Military forces 239,800
U.S. troops in Japan 38,330
NORTH KOREA
Nuclear warheads 1 or 2
Military forces 1.08 million
SOUTH KOREA
Nuclear warheads 0
Military forces 683,000
U.S. troops in S. Korea 37,000
UNITED STATES
Nuclear warheads 10,700
Military forces 1.4 million
Sources: CIA World Factbook, 2002; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace;, Globalsecurity.org; Center for Nonproliferation Studies; Monterey Institute for International Studies; Korea image from MODIS Land Rapid Response Team at NASA/GSFC
Graphic by Stephen Rountree--USN&WR
With Mark Mazzetti, Hanawald, Jennifer, Du Mars, Roger, Jennifer Hanawald and Roger du Mars
This story appears in the January 27, 2003 print edition of U.S. News & World Report.