A Balance of Terror
North Korea's nuclear ambitions could trigger an arms race in Asia
It is a scenario that some U.S. officials find too sensitive to discuss in detail: A defiant North Korea chooses to build and keep a nuclear arsenal, not bargain it away for rewards, as many suppose. Faced with a nuclear breakout by a hostile regime, Japan reconsiders its antinuclear taboos, fields a larger missile force of its own, and plunges into developing a shield against incoming missiles with the United States. South Korea, with one eye on the North and the other on Japan, follows suit. China reacts with more nukes and missiles of its own. Taiwan, outgunned, opts for more missiles and, perhaps, nuclear bombs. A nervous Russia shifts nuclear and conventional forces for defense against its old rivals, China and Japan. India, a foe of China, expands its nuclear forces, a step that causes Pakistan to do likewise. An Asian arms race snaps into high gear. No wonder that one former U.S. official who helped guide North Korea policy warns of a new "domino effect" in Asia.
Such possibilities--even if only partially realized--are driving some U.S. officials and Asia specialists to conclude that Pyongyang's nuclear gambit could be the most serious threat to global stability today. In just over three months, North Korea has admitted running a covert program to enrich uranium for bombs, vowed to keep it going, and bustled through measures to prepare for extracting weapons-grade plutonium at another site. What's more, it became the first nation to abandon the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty--and declared that it would cast off a moratorium on test-firing ballistic missiles.
That may not be an idle threat. A senior State Department official predicted last week that the North may soon test-fire a long-range missile over Japan, as it did in 1998. The dizzying pace of North Korea's brinkmanship is deepening suspicions that its leader, Kim Jong Il, has made the strategic choice to build a nuclear arsenal in order to deter any potential U.S. attack. Says Victor Cha, a North Korea expert at Georgetown University, "If you're simply trying to create a crisis, you don't need to do all these things."
Options. Kim's actions, note U.S. officials, seem designed to expand his options. He could build up a nuclear arsenal in a bid to win greater concessions through security guarantees, aid, and diplomatic recognition. Or he could keep it as a deterrent force. He might try to do both by hiding a portion of any newly produced fissile material. And having seen India and Pakistan ride out sanctions after their 1998 nuclear tests, Kim may be calculating that he can do likewise.
In a few weeks, the North could begin lifting some of the 8,000 plutonium fuel rods from a cooling pool at the Yongbyon reactor complex for reprocessing. That could yield enough weapons-grade plutonium for five to seven bombs by this summer--on top of the one or two nuclear devices the North may have already. By then, the North would be in a position to consider a dramatic act of brinkmanship: a nuclear test blast. Says a high-ranking State Department official, "If they test and reprocess furiously, it's a monumental change. Everyone in the region has to reassess their defenses."
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