Terror on an isle of dreams
Shock waves from the murderous blast in Bali prompt ominous new CIA warnings
Since the bombing, investigators from a half dozen nations have been sifting through the grisly wreckage of broken glass, vehicle parts, and human remains. By analyzing bomb residue and tracing the vehicle, authorities hope to find evidence leading to those responsible. The chief suspect, terror experts say, is a group they call al Qaeda's "branch office" in Southeast Asia: Jemaah Islamiyah, or JI. A radical underground group with visions of a pan-Islamic state, JI has tentacles across the region. "There is no other group that has the intention, knowledge, and capability of a terrorist attack of this magnitude" in Indonesia, says Rohan Gunaratna, author of Inside al Qaeda. Not everyone agrees, but U.S. officials appear convinced. Sources say the evidence includes conversations intercepted by Australian intelligence of JI operatives plotting to attack Australians in the region.
Until this year, JI was something of a mystery. Begun in the early 1990s by veterans of the anti-Soviet Afghan War, the group was thought to be closely allied with al Qaeda, with several hundred followers. The big break came early last month, when a 31-year-old Kuwaiti named Omar al-Farouq finally started talking, after three months of interrogation by U.S. officials. Farouq "connected all the dots," says one official. He claimed to be al Qaeda's top man in Southeast Asia, sent to unite local Islamists and strike at U.S. targets across the region. He admitted to masterminding a wave of bombings in Indonesia and plotting to assassinate President Megawati. He also tied his work directly to Abu Bakar Bashir, a fiery Indonesian cleric thought to be the spiritual head of Jemaah Islamiyah. Bashir angrily denies the charges, says his hands are clean, and asserts that the Bali blast was "masterminded by the Jews."
Farouq's confession confirmed what Singaporean and Malaysian authorities had already gleaned from over 60 alleged JI militants detained over the past year. JI followers, they say, allegedly hosted the plotters of the USS Cole bombing, as well as two of the 9/11 hijackers. In Singapore, officials add, the group planned its own version of 9/11 last year, scheming to bomb Singapore's Defense Ministry, water pipelines, and western embassies in the hopes of sparking a holy war with nearby Malaysia. The weapons? Seven trucks stuffed with ANFO, the explosive used in Bali. Ominously, 4 tons of ANFO, along with a dozen JI members, vanished before authorities could grab them.
Alarmed by what they were finding, U.S. officials repeatedly pressed the Indonesians to crack down. Even as its neighbors--Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines--launched raids and foiled attacks, Jakarta resisted. U.S. officials issued warnings and closed the embassy during the 9/11 anniversary last month. After a grenade exploded September 23 near the home of a U.S. diplomat in Jakarta, the embassy urged Americans and other westerners to avoid "locations known to cater primarily to a western clientele such as certain bars, restaurants, and tourist areas." That was two weeks before the Bali attack.
Limited leverage. Megawati's failure to act stems in part from concern that a crackdown might prompt a backlash by conservative Islamists, who form a vocal minority within a mostly moderate strain of Islam. Indeed, U.S. Embassy officials worry that if the Indonesians arrest Bashir, as seems likely, it may set off anti-western rioting in the cities. But Megawati has also frustrated U.S. officials. "She is not a very decisive leader," says a senior State Department official. "She moves very slowly." Washington, moreover, has relatively little leverage over Indonesia, despite its strategic importance. Human-rights concerns, particularly over East Timor, have strained diplomatic ties in recent years and now bar the Pentagon from forging close ties to the Indonesian military.
The attack in Bali may finally force change on Jakarta. "Enough is enough," proclaimed Security Minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono after the blast. "The government will take very firm action, and there will be no more doubts in combating terrorism." Such pledges, unfortunately, arrive too late for the victims of Kuta Beach.
Major terrorist attacks
Fear Factor
Killed
September 2001 World Trade Center, New York 2,801
June 1985 Air India 182, Atlantic Ocean 329
August 1988 U.S. embassies, East Africa 301
October 1983 U.S. and French barracks, Beirut 300
December 1988 Pan Am 103, Scotland 259
September 2001 Pentagon, Arlington, Va. 184
October 2002 Kuta Beach, Bali, Indonesia 181
April 1995 Oklahoma City federal building 168
SOURCE: U.S. State Department; New York Times
With Mark Mazzetti, Thomas Omestad, Paul Dillon and Laurie Lande
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