Reading The Threat Matrix
Once again, the nation is on edge, amid warnings that terrorists may strike--somehow, sometime, somewhere. How real is the danger?
The sources are sketchy and often unreliable--interrogations of al Qaeda detainees, reports from CIA operatives overseas or FBI field agents, intercepted phone calls and E-mails, even menacing postings on the Web. Most of the threats are vague and uncorroborated. Some are little more than guesswork. A sudden spike in telephone calls to a known terrorist accomplice might signal a pending attack. Or a compelling tip outlining a sinister plot might turn out to be the rantings of someone with a history of mental health problems.
Deep inside the Central Intelligence Agency's sprawling headquarters in Langley, Va., a team of experts in the Counterterrorism Center sifts through this kind of raw material. Its task: to produce the "Threat Matrix," a daily top-secret compendium of the latest intelligence about potential terrorist plots and activities. Specialists from both the agency's analytic and covert branches work side by side, assembling clues from every corner of the U.S. government for what officials regard as the key early-warning system for possible terrorist attacks.
Throughout the day and into the night, the CIA team culls the reporting to focus on the most pressing, alarming, or credible threats. Slowly, the next day's matrix takes shape. Analysts assemble the spreadsheetlike document--ranging in length from several pages to two dozen--which describes each potential threat, the warning's source, and the government's reaction. The matrix evolves as the vast threat database is updated around the clock. By sunrise, the team makes its final changes. A CIA briefer, often accompanied by CIA Director George Tenet, carries a copy to the White House for a daily 8 a.m. meeting with President Bush and his top advisers. Copies also go out to every agency that works on homeland security.
Last week, Americans got a sense of the threat matrix--and what makes it so problematic for officials--as they were inundated with a series of ominous warnings, as vague as the original threats. Television news crews clogged the Brooklyn Bridge after information leaked out about a possible threat to that and other New York City landmarks. Officials in Orlando, Fla., reported a confusing threat against the water system. Other advisories were issued about possible subway system plots and terrorist scuba divers. The fresh case of jitters was reminiscent of the weeks following September 11, as the stock market hiccuped and nervous officials canceled events like a 119th-birthday party for the Brooklyn Bridge. This flood of warnings coincided with a spike in what intelligence officials call "chatter," or communications between suspected terrorists. But it also comes amid a burgeoning congressional inquiry into intelligence failures by the FBI and others before the September 11 attacks (box, Page 30).
The drumbeat intensified as senior officials offered a range of alarming predictions. Vice President Dick Cheney repeated his assertion that al Qaeda will certainly strike again. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said terrorists will inevitably obtain weapons of mass destruction. FBI Director Robert Mueller forecast the inevitability of suicide bombers. And Democratic Sen. Bob Graham of Florida, the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, reported that two dozen "extremists" may have entered the United States in recent weeks after hiding aboard containerships.
But how much of this is speculation on what terrorists might do, and how much is based on solid intelligence regarding operations and plans? Not everyone is convinced the alarms are warranted. "Right now, they are making this stuff up," asserts one intelligence source. In particular, this source points to the claim about suicide bombers. "There's no intelligence analysis about suicide bombers," he says. "Why would there be suicide bombers in this country when someone can walk into a subway and leave their luggage behind and blow up the place. It doesn't pass the first-make-sense test."
Eavesdropping. Even judging the flow of terrorist chatter can be misleading. The war in Afghanistan has produced a flood of new information of varying credibility about al Qaeda and its plans. Other leads are coming from the 1,600 suspected al Qaeda operatives who have been arrested in some 95 countries. "I don't think the level of chatter has really changed," says one intelligence official. "We're just a hell of a lot better at listening to it."
Most Americans, meanwhile, understandably are a little bewildered by the mixed signals. Publicly, officials are providing few details or instructions about how to react. Some of the warnings were directed to police forces, not the general public. Often, what it comes down to is that nobody wants to be accused of withholding threat information.
The relatively new Homeland Security Office in the White House spends much of its time these days trying to strike the right balance between offering sensible warnings and scaring people. It boils down to assessing the information's reliability, specificity, and gravity. Can it be corroborated? Are there specific preventive steps that can be taken? In the end, part of it is just a gut call. "It's not an exact science. It's sometimes an art. We always err on the side of caution and public safety," says one homeland security official. "It's very much a human process."
In New York City last week, police reactivated checkpoints at the bridges and tunnels after the FBI warned the New York Police Department about a possible plot against New York City landmarks. "This information was not meant for public consumption," says James Kallstrom, a former high-ranking FBI official who is acting as a homeland security consultant to New York State. The warning apparently emanated from a debriefing of Abu Zubaydah, the highest-level al Qaeda leader in U.S. custody. But the intelligence contained no specifics, and many officials were angry that the public was alerted at all. "This was historical information and had no reference at all to Memorial Day weekend or any other day," says one FBI official. "There was no threat warning and no alert."
Apartment bombs. Part of the problem is the difference between threat information and more general intelligence about a group's capabilities. It was the latter that prompted a recent FBI warning that terrorists might try to rent apartments in order to pack them with explosives. Intelligence officials received accounts from detainees in various locations that al Qaeda operatives had discussed using such a tactic. There was never any information about a specific plot, but the FBI issued a warning to apartment managers twice, in late April and again in early May. "Just because you have knowledge of what al Qaeda has done doesn't necessarily mean that there is a threat," says one intelligence official.
The threat information can, at times, become quite overwhelming. There is a seemingly endless number of ways that terrorists could theoretically stage attacks. One former FBI counterterrorism specialist admits to being partially relieved that he isn't sifting through the daily flood of data now. "I don't have nightmares anymore," he says.
Many experts think the public should not be inundated with speculative warnings, like some of those issued recently. But the White House is trapped in a frustrating Catch-22 where it gets criticized from both directions. "If you don't give them specific information, then you get accused of withholding information," says one intelligence source. "If you pass it on, then you get accused of being alarmist and covering your ass."
To be fair, there is never great intelligence about terrorists. The groups are terribly difficult to penetrate. And terrorist groups like al Qaeda have become sophisticated about concealing their plans and communicating secretly. Intelligence officials are left to read tea leaves--often in the dark. "You don't get the name," says Ted Price, who used to run the covert side of the CIA. "You don't get the date." Often, analysts know when something is up. They just don't know what it is.
Perils and politics. Despite the uncertainty, everybody agrees that the terrorist threat remains very real. "Al Qaeda needs to demonstrate to its adherents that it survives, and the way it demonstrates survival is to conduct terrorist operations," says U.S. State Department counterterrorism coordinator Francis Taylor.
Still, with congressional pressure heating up, there were also suggestions that the new flood of warnings was aimed at deflecting criticism that the Bush administration failed to heed pre-September 11 warnings. "It does help to divert attention," says one congressional source. "The FBI is under a serious, serious gun right now. The more scared they can make everyone, the more they can say we need the FBI to protect us." The administration, led by Cheney, angrily rejects such talk, calling it irresponsible.
But the intelligence committees on Capitol Hill spent much of last week listening to Phoenix FBI agent Kenneth Williams testify about his eerily prescient memo warning last July that al Qaeda operatives might be training in U.S. flight schools. Congress is promising more revelations when its hearings begin next week, despite the Bush administration's reservations. "We're just beginning," says Alabama Republican Sen. Richard Shelby, the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
As terrorism warnings continue to surface, one signal to watch is the color-coded alert system run by the Homeland Security Office. Despite last week's hubbub, the alert code never budged from yellow, which denotes an elevated threat--the same level it has been at since the system was created in March. Advises one intelligence official, "You have to live your life."
With Kit R. Roane and Mark Mazzetti
This story appears in the June 3, 2002 print edition of U.S. News & World Report.