Ready or not, it's go for launch
DELTA JUNCTION, ALASKA--This is a town for hardy souls. Nestled between the snow-clad Alaska and Granite mountain ranges some 20 miles away, it's an area of magnificent beauty and harsh extremes--temperatures of 60 below zero in winter, swarms of mosquitoes in summer. But three years ago, when Fort Greely, the U.S. Army base 5 miles to the south, was shuttered, economics did what nature could not: It forced many residents to flee. "Those of us who stayed," jokes Viki Faber, a receptionist at Kelly's Country Inn, "were mainly sourdoughs: people who had soured on the place but didn't have the dough to leave."
Now prosperity and population have returned, on the coattails of the national missile defense system that is to be deployed by September 30, much of it at a resurrected Fort Greely. Today, military personnel, defense contractors, and construction workers fill the rejuvenated town's motel rooms and cram its restaurants. And Department of Defense community impact money-- $25 million for a town of 1,000--is paying for such goodies as a grade school, a library, three firetrucks, and an ambulance. Missile defense is mighty popular in Delta Junction.
But to a wide range of military experts, including the Pentagon's former head of weapons testing and dozens of retired generals and admirals, Delta Junction's boon is a costly and unnecessary boondoggle for the country. Defending against enemy missiles carrying nuclear or biological warheads is an admirable goal, they agree, but the government is rushing to deploy a system that hasn't been rigorously tested and is missing key components. Even the Pentagon's current head of weapons evaluation, Thomas Christie, told Congress he can't be sure the system deployed this fall will be able to shoot down an incoming missile. Critics say there's no imminent threat anyway, and what's driving the schedule is politics--President George W. Bush's desire to announce ahead of the November election that a rudimentary missile defense is in place.
Proponents admit that the system needs more testing and fine-tuning, but they say it's ready to offer a plausible initial defense against crude intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, fired from a "rogue nation," specifically North Korea. "It's a basic system to protect against a basic threat," says Col. Kevin R. Norgaard, director of site activation for ground-based missile defense. As of this fall, the shield will consist of 10 interceptor missiles--six at Fort Greely and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California--designed to shoot down enemy missiles at the apex of their flight over the Pacific.
Going for broke. The deployment follows an estimated $130 billion in missile defense spending since the 1980s, much of it on research and development for a ground-based system. And that's just a down payment. Missile defense planners envision a much larger network--also including sea-, air-, and space-based components--designed to create a more effective shield. It would take aim at enemy missiles right after launch and just before impact, as well as at midcourse. At Fort Greely, crews are already working on a second missile bed to house another 10 interceptors next year. There's room, ultimately, for dozens.
Although missile defense was a high priority of the Reagan White House, it seemed an orphaned concept after the Cold War ended. But in 1998, a commission headed by Donald Rumsfeld before he became defense secretary declared that within a few years, North Korea could build a missile capable of reaching the United States. Less than two months later, as if to underscore Rumsfeld's report, North Korea tested a ballistic missile that streaked over Japan. The third stage failed, and the missile barely had room to carry a warhead. No matter. Missile defense was revitalized. And after the 2000 election, proponents found a strong ally in the White House.
The concept for a ground-based system is elegantly simple, if technologically difficult. If an adversary launched an ICBM toward the United States, advanced satellite sensors would quickly alert the U.S. Northern Command at Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado. A three-stage interceptor rocket topped with a "kill vehicle" would be launched in response. A supersensitive, ship-based X-band radar system--assisted by a Cold War radar in the Aleutian Islands called Cobra Dane and by ship-based Aegis radars--would track the incoming missile, guiding the interceptor. More than 100 miles above the Pacific, the sensor-packed kill vehicle would home in on the warhead and destroy it in a 15,000-mph collision.
So far, the technology has been tested eight times, by launching an interceptor from Vandenberg toward a mock warhead fired from thousands of miles away in the Pacific. Five of the test interceptions succeeded, proving the concept, Norgaard says. "We believe we have demonstrated the capacity to hit to kill."
But many components needed for a working system either are not ready or haven't been fully tested.
Sensors needed for a new satellite system that would improve the military's ability to detect enemy missile launches won't be delivered before July, and possibly not until mid-2005.
The X-band radar is under construction in Texas and won't be in service until December 2005. Air Force Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, the head of the Missile Defense Agency, says he is "absolutely confident" that the Aegis radars and the recently upgraded Cobra Dane will suffice in the meantime. Some experts aren't convinced, however, that radars built for other purposes can track an ICBM with enough precision to guide an interceptor.
Delivery of a new three-stage booster rocket is behind schedule. So far, the rocket has not been tested against a mock warhead, though an intercept test is scheduled for this summer.
The sensors on the kill vehicle malfunctioned in the most recent intercept test, in December 2002. It's uncertain if the flaw has been fixed.
Critics also note that the tests so far have all been tightly choreographed. The pace is slower than a real engagement because current interceptors use a more plodding, two-stage booster. A global positioning system aboard the target guides the interceptor. And the sensors are told in advance how to identify the warhead. "It only works if you assume that the other side plays along," says Richard Garwin, a physicist and weapons expert who was a member of the Rumsfeld commission.
Kadish deflects such criticisms. "We have scripted tests to make sure the components work," he says. The results so far, together with computer modeling, "have convinced us it will work as intended." He pledges that more realistic testing will occur and argues that's why the system must first be deployed.
That's the reverse of the usual practice in the military, where new weapons systems are normally put through rigors of operational testing--tests done under battle conditions--before they are deployed. But Kadish says, "We can't do operational testing until we build it in the place where it will be operated." Fort Greely's missile field, he says, will be a "test bed" as well as an operational base.
That could prove costly, says Theodore Postol. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology physicist, who worked on the Trident missile program, says, "You want to test a system to the highest degree of confidence, because once it's deployed, it costs a fortune to modify it."
Not that Postol thinks further testing would ensure success. He and many other weapons experts believe a midcourse system is doomed to failure. "I can guarantee it won't work," Postol says. Simply enclosing the warhead in an aluminum-coated mylar balloon and releasing similar balloons as decoys would be enough to befuddle the most sophisticated radar and sensors, Postol says. "What the Missile Defense Agency wants us to believe is that the big trick is hitting the target. No, it isn't. The big trick is detecting the target." Although Kadish questions whether a crude missile launched by a rogue nation would include countermeasures, Philip Coyle, the former Pentagon testing boss, says: "If they're smart enough to build ICBMs, they're smart enough to build countermeasures."
In the face of such doubts, skeptics ask, why the rush? They note that since its failed test of six years ago, Pyongyang hasn't tested another long-range missile, so even if it's continuing to develop one, it can't be far along. And while North Korea may have built a handful of nuclear bombs, some experts insist it's at least a decade away from building one small and lightweight enough for a warhead. "There's plenty of time to continue testing the system to see if it works," says retired Army Lt. Gen. Robert Gard Jr., one of 49 retired generals and admirals who recently wrote to the president in opposition to the deployment.
Counterpunch. If and when the North Koreans readied an ICBM for launch, adds Coyle, the United States would know it. "We'd never wait until the thing was launched. We'd blow it up on the ground." And there's always the old Cold War standby, deterrence. American spy satellites would quickly detect an ICBM launch, pinpointing its origin and guaranteeing overwhelming retaliation, says Gard. "I've not noticed any suicidal tendencies on the part of [North Korean leader] Kim Jong Il."
Yet supporters say that delaying deployment in the face of a growing North Korean threat is risky. It's foolish to trust the sanity of foreign despots, says Sen. Wayne Allard, a Colorado Republican. "Some of these leaders . . . you worry what they're thinking."
To many doubters, it comes down to dollars. A complete missile defense system could cost hundreds of billions of dollars in the next 25 years. The administration is asking for an additional $10.2 billion just for next year--"As far as I know . . . the largest single-year funding request for any weapon system in history," according to Sen. Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat. The retired generals and admirals who wrote to Bush declared they'd rather see some of that money spent protecting "ports and borders against terrorists who may attempt to smuggle weapons of mass destruction into the United States."
But at Fort Greely, on the 700-acre, graveled missile field, the white clamshell tops of the interceptors' silos are already in place, cordoned off by two parallel high-tech, barbed fences. Soon, 110 soldiers and military police will take up stations here, joining the hundreds of engineers, construction workers, and contractors who will add silos and infrastructure over the next few years.
Edward Richards, who owns the Buffalo Center Diner in Delta Junction, smiles at the thought. Thanks to missile defense, he's gone from probable bankruptcy to brisk business. Yet he, like some other residents, questions whether the threat justifies the huge expense. "It's great for the town," he shrugs. "But I'm not sure it's logical."
MISSING PIECES IN MISSILE DEFENSE
An initial system to knock out crude missiles in midflight should go on alert by September 30--but may not be ready to meet a real threat. A later system may include boost-phase and terminal defenses.
[Drawing labels]
EARLY-WARNING SATELLITES can detect a missile launch, but sensors designed to enhance the system won't be delivered before July.
DECOYS released along with the warhead might fool an interceptor. So far, the system has not been tested with complex decoys--or, critics say, realistic ones.
KILL VEHICLE would home in on the warhead and destroy it. It has scored five intercepts in eight tests, but critics call the tests unrealistic.
COBRA DANE radar, built during the Cold War, has been upgraded to track a hostile missile and guide an interceptor.
AEGIS radar, based on ships, would assist in tracking a missile.
SEA-BASED X-BAND would give detailed guidance to the kill vehicle. It won't be ready before the end of 2005.
FORT GREELY, ALASKA, will be the site of six interceptors by this fall and will process targeting information.
U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND at Cheyenne Mountain, Colo., would be alerted to any hostile launch and decide whether to respond.
THREE-STAGE BOOSTER for the interceptor rockets has not been delivered or tested.
VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE in California will host four interceptors.
Early-Warning Satellite Missing or not fully tested
WARHEAD
DECOYS
BOOST Phase
Kill vehicle Missing or not fully tested
MIDCOURSE
Aegis radar In Place
TERMINAL Phase
Targeting Information
Hostile missile
COBRA DANE (on Shemya Island) In Place
Fort Greely Alaska interceptors In Place
X-Band Radar Missing or not fully tested
Three-stage interceptor Missing or not fully tested
U.S. Northern Command In Place
Vandenberg Air Force Base In Place
Source: Missile Defense Agency
Stephen Rountree--USN&WR
This story appears in the May 3, 2004 print edition of U.S. News & World Report.