Transcript: China Chat
Utley: Let's turn to Professor Lu at Columbia for your take on this because you're studying political change and social change in China. Is this as large or perhaps a larger challenge to stability and growth as compared to raw materials?
Lu: It is because as we all know that China's approach to reforms has been one that, at least, economic reform first, and then political reform is supposed to follow. But so far, especially since 1989, on the political front, the leadership has been very cautious and timid in the sense of launching any broad scope of political reform, so I think the main problems are several: One is that as the economic reform depends as people benefits from the economic reforms–the obviously the social change is inevitable. You have already growing demands from different interest groups, previous speakers' mention about the disparity between the rich and the poor, and between the rural area and the city, and so you have already different kind of demands that are being faced by the regime and also you have a wide-spread problem of corruption. And so far, I think since late 1970s basically, the regime, which is basically still an authoritarian one, maintains the legitimacy by performance. And that is they ask the same question as, you know, Republicans in this country once asked, and that is, "It's the economy, stupid" are you better off than say 20 years ago. Obviously that kind of questions can be asked for a short time. In the long run, I think they cannot sustain it.
Utley: Professor Sigurdson, what are your concerns, or what are the questions you ask yourself about the sustain-ability and stability of the growth.
Sigurdson: As a couple of the colleagues have already pointed out, that there are political problems and structure problems in the rural and urban areas. Another thing is can China modernize rapidly before it becomes an aging population, and here repeat, and that is investment in the higher education system which means that China over the next 15 years will produce a very, very sizable number of highly educated people. They're formerly highly educated and they are also creative and are able to make the major contribution to the kind of structural changes for China necessary to do, this is still an open question.
Utley: And when does this age factor–when does China become an aging population?
Sigurdson: According to the United Nation's projection, it would start shortly after 2020. So, around 2020 China is definitely becoming an aging country.
Utley: Denis Simon?
Simon: Let me carry Jon's theme a little bit further and say that it's not only the question of education but it's also the question of the innovation system. And I think if China's going to restructure and change the basis of its growth it really does have to make its transition to a much more innovative society and that innovative society is going to have to based on a number of different norms. One is increasing pluralism, in terms of the discussion of public policy debates; and two is, much more attention to issues that are of concern to the foreign business community, in particular, such as intellectual property where China has not had a very good track record and I think it clearly is going to have to improve itself in terms of providing a much more coherent, stable regime for managing intellectual property concerns.
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