Secrets behind the mask
The oversight lapses are striking. "These respirators are dangerous," wrote William Gribble, an inspector for the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, in a memo two decades ago. "The employee is lulled into a false sense of security. . . . many times, I have examined these respirators during and after employees have worn [them], to find nearly as much visible contaminant inside the mask as on the surface outside."
3M, which promoted its mask for a wide range of dangerous jobs, has not been found liable for the death or injury of a specific worker. But regulators and a federal appeals court have ruled that the mask could not be tested for fit--meaning that it could not be used safely. Only a handful of cases have made it to trial, as the company has settled thousands of claims at a cost that appears to reach hundreds of millions of dollars. New health claims--including a precedent-setting lawsuit by the state of West Virginia--are piling up by the tens of thousands. Those who advise companies and their workers on respiratory protection say there is little doubt that users have died or suffered crippling lung disease because they depended on the 3M mask, known as the 8710. And the toll will continue to grow, they say, because lung disease can develop years after exposure. "There is harm done," says John Hale, a former independent respirator consultant, "to untold numbers of people."
3M introduced the 8710 in 1972, and despite not having been tested for many expected uses, records and interviews show, company officials promoted it for use in conditions they did not fully comprehend. 3M also failed to tell users that the respirator did not meet government standards, or that it had other problems that could allow contaminants to harm workers, according to 3M documents and legal records.
3M said the 8710 offered workers absolute protection. It relied on shaky research in asserting the product's safety, according to the appeals court and OSHA. Despite specific government approval standards, 3M largely followed its own rules as it sought to develop the 8710 business, court records show. "This was their on-ramp," says Mike Martin, a Houston attorney who represents users of the 3M respirator. "If the 8710 was derailed, it would have undermined their entire market."
That's where lax oversight came into play. Regulators at the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health found repeated problems with the 8710. But senior officials took a go-slow approach, records and testimony show, eschewing a crackdown and giving 3M "favorable treatment" rather than yanking its stamp of approval. One NIOSH safety research engineer, in a memo written several years after the 8710's approval, said that the government's actions were "impossible to defend" and that irregularities in the approval process jeopardized worker safety. Current NIOSH officials don't agree. "I have not seen anything improper," says Richard Metzler, director of NIOSH's National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory.
The 8710 mask was withdrawn from the U.S. market in 1998, after tougher safety standards took effect. 3M attorneys defend the product, saying it was rigorously tested, gave reliable protection, and worked even better than designed. "If this product did not work, we would have taken it off the market," says John Allison, 3M's assistant general counsel. "That's just how we do business, and that's how we've been successful for 100 years."
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