• Comment (6)

Leaving Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac As Is Risks Another Housing Bubble

May 15, 2012 RSS Feed Print
Fannie Mae headquarters

Anthony Sanders is a senior scholar at the Mercatus Center and the distinguished professor of Real Estate Finance at George Mason University.

Last week Fannie Mae, one of the two mortgage giants in conservatorship with Freddie Mac, reported a $2.7 billion profit for the first time since the financial crisis. This seemingly good news may actually be a reason to finally do something about Fannie and Freddie rather than pretending that they will be just fine on their own.

Fannie and Freddie have cost U.S. taxpayers over $170 billion to date. As Congress struggles with the decision to perpetuate them in some form or pull the plug on them, losses will continue to mount.  Specifically, if the administration's recommendation for principal reduction for borrowers is adopted by the Federal Housing Finance Administration, Fannie and Freddie's regulator, losses to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be in the billions.

As we move through the process, it is important to remember the U.S. housing market was not the only one to have housing bubbles that burst, and Fannie and Freddie are not solely to blame. Spain, Portugal, France, Denmark, Greece, and other European nations had housing bubbles as well (and their housing prices continue to deflate). Japan has had a housing bubble that has been deflating for years. China has experienced a "double bubble" like Australia. Even Canada experienced a housing bubble.

[See a slide show of 6 ways to fix the housing market.]

However, Fannie and Freddie did make a huge contribution to the problem. They partnered with the Clinton administration's National Homeownership Strategy to push low-down payment mortgages to lower and middle income families to increase home ownership rates. And this same strategy asked Fannie and Freddie to streamline underwriting standards as well. Both of these recommendations were complicit in forming a housing bubble.

The Clinton strategy of increasing home ownership and building equity for underserved borrowers backfired. It recommended the abandonment of capital gains on housing, and it was "off to the races" for house prices and the home ownership rates, both of which have come down considerably in recent years with a cost of $7.4 trillion to American households in terms of equity in their dwellings.

Serious doubts have been raised about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's privatized gains and socialized losses model. When you look at how much the U.S. subsidizes housing, you can see that housing has mutated into a form of entitlement.

Not only does the government guarantee low-down payment loans, and provide the well-known mortgage-interest deduction for federal taxation, the mortgage government-sponsored enterprises (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Federal Housing Administration) have captured more than 90 percent of the residential mortgage market. Fannie and Freddie guarantee multifamily loans, while the Federal Housing Administration guarantees reverse mortgages for seniors.

[Check out a roundup of editorial cartoons on the economy.]

Regardless of what happens to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, we have to come to the realization that housing is heavily subsidized in the United States and that was the ultimate cause of our housing woes. If housing and mortgage subsidies remain the same, someone will offer them to households even if Fannie and Freddie go away. The future of the housing finance industry must include a discussion of how much we want to subsidize housing (and housing finance) and then we can decide how to deliver it.

One suggestion is to convert them to an ownership form where they become cooperatives owned by U.S. banks and lenders. Fannie and Freddie would no longer have retained portfolios where they purchase mortgages and hold as investments.

Alternatively, U.S. lenders could hold the mortgage equivalent of a taxi medallion where the lender can use the government mortgage guarantee. The taxi cab medallion is expensive and gives the cab owner the right to operate a taxi cab; a government mortgage medallion is currently held only by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Housing Administration.

Unfortunately, paring back or removing government guarantees and subsidies will be difficult for Congress. Any time cutting the subsidy to housing is mentioned, there is backlash from consumer and trade groups.

While a privatized housing finance system would be ideal, it is likely that we need a government medallion (or backstop) for mortgage lenders. The idea would be to scale down the guarantee over time and let the private market return. A cooperative structure for a national securitization operation would eliminate the "cookie jar" nature of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Tags:
Federal Housing Administration,
Freddie Mac,
economic depression,
housing market,
housing,
economy,
Fannie Mae

Reader Comments Read all comments (6)

Add Your Thoughts
Your comment will be posted immediately, unless it is spam or contains profanity. For more information, please see our Comments FAQ.

I used the reverse mortgage in order to free up the equity in my home and this has been one of the best decisions I have made (financially). At first I was skeptical as some said the bank would own my home, but all of those negatives things we hear are myths. The program is a government insured one it has allowed me to take out a credit line which now I can borrow against as needed - the best part is I only pay interest on the amount that I actually borrow. I have other savings and investments but you cannot go wrong borrowing at today's low rates and having a way to get cash as needed (no point of liquidatig my other assets). Anyways I usually dont leave comments but I thought I would let everyone know this program really works and it is recommened that you look into it. I used this company here since they compare lenders for me ( 877 700 0534 - reverse mortgage lenders direct )

benjohnson829 of NY 11:07AM June 10, 2012

No one opposes the idea of privatizing gains and socializing losses more than me.

But story in this article fails even a cursory examination of the facts. The "privatized housing finance system" the author yearns for is what drove the race to the bottom in loan quality to begin with. Back in 2005, anyone who was paying even the least bit of attention would remember that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were losing market share and loudly complaining that government regulations were *preventing* them from participating in the innovative new private-label mortgage securities market that included negative amortization and no-documentation loans. Conventional wisdom a the time was widely predicting that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae's outdated business model would lead to their demise because the private market innovative new mortgage products were managing risks so much more efficiently. http://housingdoom.com/2006/08/14/alt-a-surge/

Leo of OR 10:12PM May 18, 2012

Like other shills of the Koch Brothers' Mercatus Center, Sanders falsifies the past.

Like all shills for The Big Lie http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/24/opinion/nocera-the-big-lie.html,

Sanders refuses to compare loan performance at Fannie and Freddie with that of the rest of the mortgage market, because then his sham would be exposed. F&F's loan performance has always been exponentially superior to that of the rest of the mortgage market, which is why at all times, F&F have held the majority of all mortgages, but only a small minority of delinquent or non-performing mortgages. The FCIC also demolished sanders bogus claims.

Subprime CDOs, in which F&F had no involvement, incurred mor than twice the losses of F&F, which financed five times as many mortgages.

"Fannie and Freddie ...partnered with the Clinton administration's National Homeownership Strategy to push low-down payment mortgages to lower and middle income families to increase home ownership rates."

There is zero evidence that F&F materially increased its low-down payment mortgages during the 1990s, and an abundance of evidence that the opposite was true (see the Nocera/McLean book). and F&F by law, could never assume the credit risk on more than 80% of the property value. Mortgage insurers, which were unregulated by the federal government, not F&F, decided who got low-down payment loans.

David in NY of NY 11:11AM May 18, 2012

Economic Intelligence

Insights, perspectives, and commentary on the economy. Follow it on Twitter @EconomicIntel.

advertisement

Latest Videos

advertisement