Is the Iraq war as disastrously unpopular as mainstream media assume? Not necessarily. Consider these results from the University of Cincinnati's most recent poll in Ohio. Ohio is a pretty good bellwether: It voted 51 to 49 percent Bush in 2004, while the country as a whole voted 51 to 48 percent. And if there is any Bush '04 state in which the Republicans are in trouble this year, it's Ohio. Republicans have controlled state government for 16 years–a long time in a state where since the 1840s control has switched between the parties at intervals of eight years or less. They've raised taxes and had corruption scandals. Gov. Bob Taft's job approval rating is under 20 percent (that's not a misprint). Democratic Rep. Ted Strickland has wide leads in the polls over Republican Secretary of State Ken Blackwell in the race for governor, and Republican Sen. Mike DeWine trails Democratic Rep. Sherrod Brown in the race for senator. The University of Cincinnati poll shows Strickland leading Blackwell 50 to 38 percent and Brown leading DeWine 51 to 47 percent. Here are the Iraq questions, with my comments:
Did the U.S. make the right decision or the wrong decision in going into Iraq? Right decision 47 percent, wrong decision 50 percent. This tracks the Senate numbers pretty closely, doesn't it? The point is, it's not an overwhelming number for wrong decision.
How well is the military effort in Iraq going? Very well, 11 percent. Fairly well, 37 percent. Not too well, 26 percent. Not at all well, 24 percent. Yes, the not-at-alls outnumber the very-wells by about 2 to 1: You can hear the netroots screaming. But overall, it's 48 percent very or fairly well, 50 percent not too well or not at all well: the same numbers, essentially, as the question above.
Will the U.S. succeed in establishing a stable democratic government in Iraq? Definitely succeed, 13 percent. Probably succeed, 41 percent. Probably fail, 32 percent. Definitely fail, 13 percent. Here the netroots are less numerous; Americans tend to be optimists. Definitely or probably succeed is 54 percent, definitely or probably fail is 45 percent. The dominant note is uncertainty.
Should the U.S. keep troops in Iraq until the situation has stabilized, or should it bring them home as soon as possible? Until the situation is stabilized, 61 percent. As soon as possible, 38 percent. This is the framing of the issue most favorable to George W. Bush and the Republicans. Majority support for as soon as possible comes from blacks (76 percent), Democrats (59 percent), liberals (56 percent), and supporters of Brown (52 percent). All other groups have majorities for waiting until the situation is stabilized. Interestingly, over-65s are the most lukewarm on this; only 51 percent take this view, as do 51 percent of non-high school graduates (a group with large numbers of the elderly and blacks). Those who have been to college and college graduates favor waiting until the situation is stabilized by nearly 2-to-1 margins. In most northern states, those at the highest education level, those with graduate degrees, tend to be heavily Democratic. That was not the case in Ohio in 2004 according to the NEP exit poll, and it doesn't seem to be the case today.
These are not particularly good numbers for Ohio Republicans. But they're not particularly bad either–and they show how Republicans can frame the Iraq issue in a way favorable to their cause.
Historical analogy
As regular readers of this blog know, I've been working on a book about the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89. Bill Clinton's outburst against Chris Wallace on Fox News Sunday has gotten me thinking about the similarities between Clinton and George W. Bush on the one hand and two English kings who played pivotal roles in the years that led up to and followed the Glorious Revolution. Bill Clinton resembles King Charles II (1630-85, reigned 1660-85). George W. Bush resembles King William III (1650-1702, reigned 1689-1702). Although not in one respect: Both kings died in their 50s, while Clinton and Bush both turned 60 this year.
The analogy occurred to me as I reflected on the seeming anomaly that Charles II inspired as left-wing a writer as Lady Antonia Fraser to write, back in the 1970s, a mostly admiring and wonderfully readable biography of the king. his, even though Charles persecuted dissenting Protestants; signed a secret treaty with Louis XIV promising in return for secret subsidies (i.e., bribes) to join Louis in war and turn Catholic; bullied and dismissed Parliaments, ruling without one for the last four years of his reign; and allowed the execution of clearly innocent men during the Popish Plot. He regularly lied to just about everybody, failed to keep his promises, conducted business in a disorderly manner, set aside apartments in Whitehall Palace for some of his many mistresses, and made some of their sons dukes (there are four dukes today who are direct descendants of Charles II, who had no legitimate children). Fraser, appropriately, in my view, does not judge Charles by the standards of our time; she places him in the context of the times in which he lived. But even in that context, there is plenty of room for a critical stance.
But Fraser clearly likes him. He was, she writes at the end of her book, "witty and kind, grateful, generous, tolerant and essentially lovable." You can see why. Charles was naturally affable, ready to talk and trade jests with his subjects high and low. He was utterly charming. Courtiers who were exasperated by his indecision and irregular working habits were inevitably charmed in his presence. He was an energetic man, who some mornings would walk the 12 miles from Whitehall Palace to Hampton Court for the fun of it. He loved horse racing, card playing, drinking till late at night, and, very much, wenching. He let his King Charles spaniels have the run of his palace and make messes on the rugs. He was also interested in the budding science of the day (he founded the Royal Society) and conducted his own experiments; he loved playgoing and reopened the theaters Oliver Cromwell's regime had closed; he was a patron of painters, though he was not as much a connoisseur as his late father King Charles I, and of architects, including the brilliant Christopher Wren; he loved the latest music. Sounds a lot like Bill Clinton, doesn't he?
He also in some ways was a successful king. At 30, he came back from exile and established himself firmly on the throne until his death at 54. (Bill Clinton was elected attorney general of Arkansas at 30 and governor at 32, and left the presidency at 54.) The economy surged during his reign; foreign trade vastly increased; new businesses were formed; new inventions were made. (Sounds a lot like the 1990s.) He presided pretty well over the emergencies of the plague of 1665 and the London fire of 1666. (Clinton is proud of the performance of FEMA in his administration and will undoubtedly be happy to tell you that it did better than it has under George W. Bush.) He did get involved in two wars with the Dutch, with not entirely happy results; but he extricated England without sustaining too much damage. (Bosnia, Kosovo.)
But Charles also left an unhappy legacy. His brother and successor, James II, was a Catholic–a big problem in Protestant England. Soon after he was crowned, there was an armed rebellion led by Charles's oldest bastard, the Duke of Monmouth, whose intrigues Charles had indulged and whom he failed to rein in. Charles could have avoided the problem by agreeing with the Whigs to change the succession, but he stayed true to his brother even while predicting (correctly) that he wouldn't last more than three years as king and, one suspects, supposing that James might provoke another civil war like the one that ravaged England in the 1640s. Après moi, le déluge. (Bill Clinton, meet Chris Wallace.)
Civil war was averted in 1688 but only because James lost his nerve, refused to fight, and fled England when faced with the invasion led by William of Orange, Stadholder of the Netherlands, the husband of James's daughter Mary and third in line for the throne himself (his mother was a sister of Charles II and James II). William called an irregular convention (only a king could summon Parliament) and forced it, through steely determination and clever maneuvering, to declare him king after several weeks of controversy. (Think Florida 2000.) William was a foreigner, a Dutchman, despite his English mother (Bush as a Texan is a kind of foreigner in Washington, even though his father was president). Unlike Charles, William disliked entertaining politicians and spent as little time as he could with them; he refused to deploy charm as a political weapon. (How often does Bush socialize with members of Congress?) He tried to work with both Tories and Whigs but distrusted all of them and was often distrusted in turn. He worked hard during long regular hours, made crisp decisions, attempted to control but did not always succeed in controlling subordinates. He became increasingly unpopular as his reign went on but continued to pursue his policies nonetheless.
William believed that Protestant England and the Netherlands faced an existential threat from the tyrannical and intolerant Catholic regime of Louis XIV, who had the largest army in Europe (just as Bush believes we face an existential threat from Islamic fascists if they get their hands on weapons of mass destruction). He maneuvered the Convention Parliament into authorizing war with France when it was well disposed to him (cf the Iraq war resolution of October 2002). He insisted on continuing the war despite setbacks and defeats year after year. In the process of fighting the war, he created, with Parliament's help, new institutions, notably the funded debt and the Bank of England, which enabled England to defeat a France that was four times its size and which stimulated the miraculous growth of the English economy. He instituted a regime of religious tolerance in England and Scotland (though not in Ireland) and acquiesced in Parliament's Bill of Rights. Parliament met only irregularly before his reign; it has met every year since he became king.
Charles II was an inconsequential king, in the sense that the regime he established did not last much longer than his own reign. He was happy to let France become the dominant power in Europe (especially if Louis sent him more subsidies), and he failed to confront squarely and settle the most pressing issue before him, his brother's Catholicism. He died popular, but his legacy was evanescent. William III, in contrast, was unpopular when he died, at 51. He left no direct heir but arranged for a Protestant succession that would outlast his successor, Queen Anne, all of whose children had died by 1700. He established financial institutions that would make London the financial capital of the world and that enabled the British government to defend the nation and defeat hegemonic tyrants for many years after. He established practices of religious tolerance and guaranteed liberties and representative government. Most important, he established the principle, never before followed, that England would oppose hegemonic tyrants and preserve the balance of power in Europe and the world–a principle followed by the Duke of Marlborough in Queen Anne's reign, by the elder William Pitt in the 18th century and Pitt the Younger against revolutionary and Napoleonic France at the end of the century and the beginning of the next, by Winston Churchill (a direct descendant of Marlborough, whom William made head of his army before he died), and Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman and their successors in the 20th century.
The analogy of Charles II/William III and Bill Clinton/George W. Bush obviously breaks down at some point, indeed at many points, as all historical analogies do. I will leave it to you to decide just where.
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