Counterinsurgency Cookie Cutter Doesn't Fit Afghanistan

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Colonel Gentile,
Thank you for pointing out the common fallacy of interpreting counterinsurgency as a strategy. I think this pervasive thinking has prevented our leaders from thinking clearly about our position in Afghanistan.
I sincerely hope that our decision-makers believe, as you state, that "Good strategy demands the consideration of alternatives and the alignment of means with ends." Even I, a civilian with no military experience, can see that the ends much match the means available. Our means, our people, and our resources have a limit.
Thank you for your thought provoking words.
RWhite

Rebecca White of GA 8:10AM November 02, 2009

Both Gentile and Daly make their points. As one should expect in these exchanges, an underlying truth lies in between the extremes of both arguments.
Our strategy in Afghanistan is. or should be, offensive in nature: to rid the country of the direct and indirect influence of al-Queda and any/all organizations, tribes, clans, or gangs that support AQ either directly or indirectly. This is a subset of our global strategy which also is offensive: to rid the world of the direct and indirect influence of al-Queda and any/all organizations, tribes, clans or gangs that support AQ either directly or indirectly. Simple strategy; extremely difficult execution.
Both COIN and CT are tested and successful approaches to achieving the goals of these related strategies. They are not the full set of approaches, however. Therein lies the rub. We still require a full spectrum armed force, with the budgets and criticisms that entails, to be able to adapt/learn/initiate/respond to the challenges the AQ enemy represents whenever and wherever it may surface.
If this sounds a little like "whack-a-mole," well it is. At least sort of. We will know we are truly achieving our strategy when our indicators show that (a) numbers of AQ and related organizations are decreasing; (b) influence of same also is decreasing; (c) attractiveness of relevant populations to same is decreasing; (d) attractiveness of relevant populations to ideas/organizations/tribes/clans/gangs amenable to American interests are increasing; (e) numbers of same (d) are increasing; and influence of same (d) is increasing.
Only then will we be able to safely - somewhat - remove our feet from the pressure pedal now applied to AQ and associated organizations/tribes/clans/gangs.

Dr. Jonathan Czarnecki of CA 2:17AM October 28, 2009