Is Iraq Ready for the U.S. Military to Start Leaving?

Violence is down, yes, but a fragile Iraqi government faces major tests in the coming months.

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By SHARE

BAGHDAD—In late October, the U.S. military quietly returned control of the once deadly Wasit province to the Iraqi government. Lost in an avalanche of news about the U.S. presidential election, the small ceremony in the capital city of Kut marked an important step toward the conclusion of the war in Iraq. Wasit, which is south of Baghdad and shares a 125-mile border with neighboring Iran, was the 13th of Iraq's 18 provinces to be returned to Iraq's control. The handover comes amid a sharp decline in violence. No Americans have died in Wasit so far this year.

U.S. soldiers will likely remain in Wasit for a while, but their exact role is just one of the questions that Barack Obama will face after he takes office in January. The broader challenge is what to do with the 140,000 U.S. troops still on the ground in Iraq. While Obama says he stands by his campaign promise to withdraw troops within 16 months, the Iraqis are moving forward with a timetable of their own—the end of 2011. Meanwhile, a withdrawal is already underway in certain areas. Fallujah and Ramadi, for instance, once the deadliest cities in the world, are now nearly empty of U.S. forces, as Iraqis have taken responsibility for daily security.

"Less fragile." What's less clear, American commanders here say, is whether the gains in security are solid enough to weather the coming withdrawal of U.S. forces from more major cities, as well as the upcoming provincial elections and the integration of thousands of Sunni irregulars into the national security forces. "Things here are less fragile than they were six months ago, but there is still a concern that if you move too quickly, that trends can reverse," says Army Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, the No. 2 U.S. commander in Iraq. "As security gets better, we won't be in the cities, we won't be doing independent operations, but we will be working alongside Iraqi security forces."

One central component of the Iraqi security forces is the 100,000-strong so-called Sons of Iraq. Established as a paramilitary force to improve neighborhood security and to employ disenfranchised mainly Sunni Iraqis, the SOI is widely credited by the Americans with helping to reduce violence. Most of the Sons of Iraq are paid about $300 per month by the U.S. military to man local checkpoints. But the Shiite-led government regards many of them as criminals or terrorists and has only grudgingly accepted the idea that keeping them on the payroll is easier than fighting them in the streets. Baghdad has agreed to try to find some kind of work for most SOI members and to formally integrate 20 percent of them into the police or national army.

But incorporating these irregular forces into the official security apparatus won't be easy. First, the government must show it is serious about keeping its SOI allies. General Austin says he's optimistic. "The Maliki government understands that it's important for people to have respectable jobs and to be able to feed their families," he says. "So far, so good."

A second concern is how sincere SOI members are about assisting in security. Critics of the program worry that a regular paycheck won't be enough. They argue that the SOI are simply Sunni militias lying low and biding their time for a later battle with the ruling Shiite government. But merely ending the program and turning the men back out on the streets—where the insurgents could pay their salaries—isn't an option either. "If we don't deal with the Sons of Iraq, then they will deal with us with IEDs or otherwise," says one senior U.S. combat commander.

This month in Baghdad, tens of thousands of SOI members stopped receiving paychecks from the Americans and began to receive them from Baghdad instead. It's a process being watched closely by the SOI in other areas. Diyala province is next in line to transition to SOI funding. "Many of these men have very serious criminal pasts, but we are trying to send the message that the government in Baghdad is open to everyone who renounces violence," says Hazim Muhammad Salman, the central government's representative in Diyala, who spends much of his time these days on issues dealing with the SOI. Aside from violence, he says there is concern about the SOI beginning to organize themselves politically for the coming elections. "These men have guns and stand around neighborhoods. That's power, and it's not surprising that they will try to maintain that power after the elections."