Voters and experts alike were surprised by Mitt Romney's 2012 prediction that Mali would become the next Afghanistan, dismissing it as a random and unfounded reference.
Four months later, the situation in Mali grows more complicated almost daily as French and African troops engage hostile Islamic militants on their own ground. This takes places in a region more practically valuable than Afghanistan, near neighboring Algeria's rich natural gas and oil fields, and nearby Nigeria, the fourth largest supplier of U.S. imported petroleum.
Officials agree that those who would hope to restore order to the sprawling country in northwest Africa now face a critical moment to avoid yet another protracted war against an amorphous adversary. Defeating Islamic militants in Africa comes down to isolating the real enemy, and attempting to resurrect a broken and fragile government, they say.
"All of this is dependent on one thing: good government, the restoration of democracy in Bamako," says Johnnie Carson, assistant secretary of State for Africa, referring to the coup last March that overthrew the democratically elected government. "You can have short-term military success, but you cannot have it for long unless you have, in fact, the return of democracy."
French forces and African troops from the Economic Community of West African States—largely from Chad—have successfully pushed back Islamic fighters since the operation began in mid-January. Opposition forces are cobbled from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, with close ties to other international al Qaeda affiliates, as well as indigenous Tuareg fighters.
These organizations, fighting together, have a different enemy. Al Qaeda has declared its desire to dismantle the West and establish Sharia law, while Tuareg fighters have quarreled with the French and local governments over legitimate disputes since the 1800s.
Unlike the nomadic Tuaregs, "everyone should be very clear that AQIM does not have its origins in Mali," said Carson, while speaking at a breakfast meeting with reporters on Friday. "The important thing is not to allow the jihadist Islamic agenda of AQIM to become effectively linked with the historical and legitimate grievances of the Tuareg."
"There is no question that AQIM has not been totally defeated, but they have been significantly degraded," he says. The militant group will likely continue to conduct "asymmetrical" attacks via suicide bombers and car bombs, he added, and they will continue to fight in the mountainous region that divides Mali from Algeria to the north.
Now, France and its allies face a critical juncture.
"The real issue now is the fact that we're at a tipping point that could metastasize into a full-blown insurgency," says J. Peter Pham, an advisor to U.S. Africa Command and a think-tank director at the Atlantic Council.
Defeating an insurgency cannot be achieved through blunt military force, he says, but rather through a tactic born from the war in Afghanistan of turning locals against militant movements. That starts with propping up the Malian government.
The United States has offered a deadline of July 31 to conduct open and fair elections in Mali, which Carson says is achievable. Helping to establish elections is one of the only areas in which the United States may legally offer non-emergency aid to a junta government.
So far the United States has limited its role to support and logistics. It has delivered 1.4 million pounds of jet fuel between Jan. 27 and Feb. 21 as a part of its efforts to refuel French fighters, according to the Department of Defense. It has also airlifted into Mali 1,200 tons of supplies and equipment, as well as 975 French and ECOWAS troops and support personnel via 47 C-17 flights.