Marine Offensive Will Test New Strategy in Afghanistan

Some 4,000 marines flooded the fiercely contested drug-growing epicenter of Afghanistan last week in what amounts to the force's largest operation inside the country to date.

In the early morning hours, the marines, backed by helicopters and accompanied by armored convoys, made their way into Helmand province.

NATO troops have wrestled with the Taliban for control of the region for years—fighting tough battles, losing fellow soldiers, then watching towns fall back under Taliban control once they leave. British soldiers there wistfully call it "mowing the lawn." Until now, U.S. military officials say, NATO forces simply lacked the troop strength to rout the Taliban there for any extended time. In a number of towns that dot the high-desert plains of what was once a place of exile, there has never been any NATO presence at all.

In the weeks to come, Operation Khanjar, or Strike of the Sword, will test the Pentagon's new counterinsurgency strategy. As troops push forward in midday temperatures that their commanders describe as "hot as fire," however, senior officials are well aware that past operations may provide cautionary tales. Indeed, the U.S. military has tried to gain control of key towns in Helmand province before—and quite recently at that.

In May 2008, a Marine battalion was sent into the violent town of Garmsir, a key transit point for weapons, drug smugglers, and Islamist fighters coming over the border with Pakistan, some 75 miles south. Upon their arrival, marines were greeted with fierce opposition, including hourlong firefights and what they described as sophisticated maneuvering among well-trained Taliban troops.

After clearing out Garmsir, U.S. troops built relationships with local Afghans and reopened markets. But in October, the marines left; the Pentagon simply didn't have the force levels to allow them to stay. They were replaced by a relatively small British force and an undermanned Afghan National Army kanda k, a battalion that often includes far fewer troops than the roughly 600 soldiers it is meant to have. "The long-term strategy for holding the area was problematic because the hold force wasn't really well thought out," says Seth Jones, a Rand Corp. analyst and author of In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan. The key question for the marines now, Jones says, is "What is their presence going to look like a year from now and two years from now? How long are they going to be able to stay? This is something I don't think anyone has their finger on."

Now the marines are back, and the commander spearheading the current operation, Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson, told reporters this week that he was short of forces. What makes this offensive "so very different," he explained, is that "where we go, we stay; and where we stay, we hold; and where we hold, we build; and where we build, we work with an eye towards transition." To do that, he said, he needs more troops. "I mean, I'm not going to sugarcoat it. The fact of the matter is I—we—don't have enough Afghan forces, and I'd like more." Right now, he has 4,000 marines in Helmand with about 650 Afghan forces, he said.

A brigade of some 4,000 soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division in Fort Bragg, N.C., will be arriving next month to take on the tough work of training more Afghan security forces. Many of them will go to the south. Nicholson said he would also love to see more U.S. government representatives from other agencies. Indeed, senior defense officials often point out that the widely heralded "civilian surge" announced by President Obama earlier this year amounts to only 300 people. Having more civilians in the south "will empower us. It will make us more capable as they arrive. Department of Agriculture [representatives]," Nicholson said somewhat longingly. "I mean, how important is that? You know, we're looking for those guys."

It is unclear, U.S. military officials say, what marines will encounter in the weeks ahead as they move into towns and set up outposts in an effort to improve security and convince the people that they are there to stay for a while. They are bracing for more asymmetric attacks. In the meantime, Nicholson says, the focus of the operation "from the very beginning has been the people, not the enemy." Indeed, Marine public affairs officers made a point of noting in multiple press releases in the wake of the offensive that "no bombs have been dropped from aircraft" during the operation—a nod to the strict orders they are under to avoid civilian casualties. Marine commanders asked the governor of the province for a list of elders "that young lieutenants and captains could contact as soon as they got in," explained Nicholson. For the marines, such people-centric operations "may sound very strange, and I got some raised eyebrows even with talking to marines, but our focus is to get to the people," he said, adding: "On the way, we'll take care of the Taliban." Century-old British forts bear witness to what a difficult prospect that may be.