Did the U.S. Withdraw from Iraq Too Soon? >
Obama Traded Stability in Iraq for Votes
The president, in his own words, wanted to fulfill a campaign promise
January 23, 2012
About Danielle Pletka:
Danielle Pletka is the vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute.
Here's what success in Iraq looks like: democratic elections, sectarian comity, independence in foreign policy, al Qaeda stymied, cooperating with the United States, and self-sufficiency. Iraq didn't look completely like that in early 2011, but it was headed in the right direction.
Here's what Iraq looks like now: en route to Shia autocracy, sectarian fighting, substantial and rising Iranian influence, al Qaeda resurgent, and an almost certain economic downturn rooted in instability.
What happened in the interim? Barack Obama decided to "end the war, responsibly," and, against the advice of his own appointed commanders, withdraw all American troops from Iraq. Was there a military imperative to bring the troops home? Not according to the military; nor did the commander in chief intend to deploy those troops to Afghanistan. Rather, the president, in his own words, wanted to fulfill a campaign promise as he geared up for the real must-win battle: election 2012.
[Mort Zuckerman: Barack Obama's Middle East Miscalculation.]
Opponents of the war rationalize the president's decision in several ways: 1) We never should have invaded Iraq. This is an honest position. It is, however, irrelevant, as we did invade Iraq, and once elected, Barack Obama chose to keep troops there. 2) Iraq didn't want us, refused to grant troops immunity, wouldn't make a parliamentary decision to invite us to stay. This is a dishonest argument, as the administration made no serious effort to negotiate keeping remaining troops in Iraq. 3) We can't afford it. This is a lie (U.S. GDP is more than $15 trillion), but worthy of deconstruction.
The FY 2011 cost of the Iraq war (military operations alone) was close to $50 billion. In FY 2012, the number allocated to the Department of Defense for Iraq will be substantially lower, but the incremental rise in costs borne by the State Department (almost $4 billion for the embassy alone), foreign military financing, training, military cooperation, and the like will take costs back up again.
Consider the costs of operations that may have been unnecessary had the United States retained military access to Iraq: In recent months, the United States has deployed three carrier battle groups to the Persian Gulf, largely in response to concerns from Arab allies that the region has been abandoned to Iran. The operational cost of a carrier battle group tops $1 billion per year. Iranian threats, escalated after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, have also increased the price of oil, which will directly affect the U.S. economy.
[Iran Could Strike US in Afghanistan, Iraq.]
Then there are the hard-to-quantify costs—regional fears of a declining America, a growing Arab arms race, the increased likelihood of an Israeli strike on Iran as confidence in the U.S. security umbrella fades. And the spiraling disaster in Iraq, giving the lie to any notion that the president was preoccupied with a "responsible" end to the war. Regional leaders underscore the reverberating costs of the U.S. flight from the Middle East, and their fears about Iraqi instability and Iranian opportunism.
Finally, human cost. In 2011, there were 54 military fatalities in Iraq, a toll far lower than previous years and, had we remained, likely to decline. Keeping troops in Iraq was never about more combat operations; it was always about stability.
In 2011, the president's options were clear: stay in Iraq with 10,000 troops and maintain the peace at reasonable cost, or get out and trust to the good will of Iran, agitators like Moqtada al-Sadr, and al Qaeda. We know what he chose; we know why. The coming year will reveal the price.
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- Other Arguments
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#15527
Yes — The U.S. must pressure Iraq to avoid a new sectarian civil war
ROBERT ZARATE, Policy Director of the Foreign Policy Initiative
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#29068
No — The war should never have been launched--so it can't be ended soon enough
PHYLLIS BENNIS, Director of the New Internationalism Project at the Institute for Policy Studies
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#33928
No — The United States should never have invaded in the first place
CHRISTOPHER PREBLE, Vice President for Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute
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#42518
No — Mission to promote "democracy" in Iraq was an unobtainable objective
DANIEL J. GALLINGTON, Senior Policy and Program Adviser at the George C. Marshall Institute
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#53934
No — The withdrawal demonstrated to the people of Iraq and their neighbors that democracy works
LAWRENCE J. KORB, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress
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#63026
Yes — Iraq's fragile coalition government has begun to come apart at the ethnic and sectarian seams
ILAN BERMAN, Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council
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#73433
Yes — Iraq might take 15 or 20 years to become a functioning democracy
MICHELE DUNNE, Director of the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East
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#73231
Yes — The real winner in the Middle East will be Iran
HELLE DALE, Senior Fellow in Public Diplomacy Studies at the Heritage Foundation
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#93031
Yes — Pulling the covers over our eyes and leaving the region is not a thought-through strategy
THOMAS HENRIKSEN, Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution and at the U.S. Joint Special Operations University
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#11819
No — Arms sales to Iraq also will provide a continuing source of connectivity
DANIEL GOURÉ, Vice President at the Lexington Institute
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#124153
No — The Iraq War cost the United States 4,421 lives and $806 billion
DENNIS KUCINICH, U.S. Representative, Ohio's 10th District
