Here's What Went Wrong in Iraq

It is all too common to hear a top government official grudgingly acknowledge that "mistakes were made," a formulation that conveniently sidesteps the questions of exactly what the mistakes were and who made them. So it was all the more stunning that Adm. Michael Mullen, President Bush's nominee to become chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, presented the Senate Armed Services Committee with a concise list of what he thinks were the "most significant mistakes to date" in Iraq.

His list:

1. Did not fully integrate all elements of U.S. national power in Iraq.
2. Focused most attention on the Iraqi national power structures with limited engagement of the tribal and local power structures.
3. Did not establish an early and significant dialogue with neighboring countries, adding to the complex security environment a problematic border situation.
4. Disbanded the entire Iraqi Army, a potentially valuable asset for security, reconstruction, and provision of services to the Iraqi people, providing a recruiting pool for extremist groups.
5. Pursued a de-Baathification process that proved more divisive than helpful, created a lingering vacuum in governmental capability that still lingers, and exacerbated sectarian tensions.
6. Attempted to transition to stability operations with an insufficient force.
7. Unsuccessful in communicating and convincing Iraqis and regional audience of our intended goals.

A damning list of mistakes. Mullen, of course, didn't name names, but he hardly needed to since these mistakes were based on key decisions and orders so closely tied to former Iraq occupation chief Paul Bremer (who disbanded the Army and ordered de-Baathification), former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (who held down troop levels and froze out the State Department in post-war planning), Vice President Cheney, and President Bush himself.

It was, in a sense, the nominee to be the nation's top military officer--and top military adviser to the president--sticking up for the military services and pinning blame for the Iraq mess on the political leadership, which has been generally adverse to mea culpas.

Separately on Tuesday, Cheney told CNN's Larry King that "I firmly believe that the decisions we've made with respect to Iraq and Afghanistan have been absolutely the sound ones in terms of the overall strategy." But he conceded that he was wrong in May 2005 in when he said the insurgency was in its "last throes."

In his written response to committee questions released at his confirmation hearing Tuesday, Mullen went on to say that "I believe that many of these [mistakes] are still having an impact. The void left by a disbanded Iraqi Army has not yet been filled by the Iraqi Security Forces, allowing sectarian violence to continue in too many areas. I believe that pursuing a balanced strategy in Iraq, with full interagency support, and an aggressive strategic communications plan, can mitigate this impact."

As for the future, Mullen wrote that "there is no purely military solution" in Iraq. "The enormous complexity, historic differences, competing views of the future Iraq, and lack of trust in new institutions will require long-term political and social solutions," he wrote. "In the near term, political progress requires demonstrated commitment to national reconciliation in order to address: 1. de-Baathification and lack of proportional Sunni representation in the government, Army, and police; 2. Equitable distribution of oil revenue; 3. Amnesty.”

--Terry Atlas