Hopes for Peace

Now, the administration has shifted its primary focus from that original commitment. Instead, it is focusing on establishing a "political horizon" that would outline the terms of a final settlement. This settlement would be in the form of what is called a "shelf agreement," which would not be taken down and implemented until the Palestinians have lived up to their commitments on security and ended the incitements to violence. This is a very problematic approach. Experience suggests that a shelf agreement may well be then taken as the starting point for the next round of negotiations, leaving Israel in a very difficult position.

The Israelis legitimately must ask: Who is going to monitor and enforce the commitments to ensure security and end incitement? Who will be able to ensure that the Palestinians shun terrorism over the longer term?

Spoiled. One conventional view is that the Palestinians will be persuaded to keep the peace by the influx of foreign aid that will give them a stake in their society. This is an illusion. They have already been given the largest amount of per capita aid ever. Much of the money was siphoned off by corrupt Fatah elites, paradoxically undermining the political support they now need. Being overgenerous to people who fail to meet their responsibilities is like giving sweets to a spoiled child in the hopes that he will improve his behavior. The results are often the opposite.

Nobody wants Annapolis to fail. But it was prematurely arranged, hereby enhancing the danger of longer-term failure. The sequence is wrong. The Palestinians should have had to build up a civil administration and an effective and reliable security force first.

If you doubt this, just think that the Israelis and the Palestinians have met for the past three months trying to compose just a simple agreement on the basic principles of their relationship, but they were unable to do that. Who can realistically expect them to negotiate a final settlement over the next year when all the pressures of the public spotlight will exaggerate every minor disagreement?

In fact, the United States organized this meeting without an agenda and without knowing who was going to come. American officials then announced it in a manner that gave all the Arab countries the sense that by attending they were doing the United States a favor and exacting a price. What we needed to do was find out whether the Arabs would support an honest peace process and not just treat every meeting as a chance to force more Israeli concessions.

Where is the contribution from the Arab world? The Arabs are drowning in extraordinary oil wealth. They could make a vast difference to the quality of life of the Palestinians. Instead, they have been reticent participants in the region of the world where the consequences of this seemingly never-ending struggle can only radicalize their own populations. That they haven't changed much is revealed by the facts that the Saudis rejected only the Israeli press at their Washington press conference and that none of the Arab countries would meet with Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni. The peace process seems to exist more in the minds of western diplomats than it does among the Arabs in the Middle East.

It has led the administration to pressure Israel to accept the process in large and small ways that are different from the relationship of previous administrations to Israel, undermining Israel's confidence because it knows that ultimately, a process becomes substance. As for the gains, there is a benefit in uniting the pro-western Sunni camp and bringing a number of Arab countries to the meeting at Annapolis, if only to demonstrate some kind of unity in the continuing struggle against radical Islam and Shiite Tehran.

It is not enough to say it is always good to talk. That is not so if the talks do not succeed, for failure can make things worse. What happens on the ground is what counts. At Annapolis, each leader spoke to his own audience. Stagecraft is not statecraft.