Denial and Hope in the Mideast

Absent these reforms, the Palestinians will be unable to confront and subdue Hamas, the jihadists, and the various warlords of the local militias in the West Bank.

The Israelis are naturally leery of Abbas because they witnessed how Hamas so humiliatingly chased his men out of Gaza. They remember that Hamas beat Fatah to win a plurality of the vote in the West Bank during the last election; they have been warned by their security services that Hamas could take over the West Bank if the Israeli Defense Forces weren't there. The Israelis will be reluctant to fund, arm, and embrace a new Palestinian leadership that has yet to tackle terrorism, yet to stop instilling hate in the young, yet to stop printing maps without Israel, and yet to confront their own people with the clear message that the end of terrorism is a precondition to progress. Had there been a peace education in the West Bank parallel to that in Israel after Oslo, no one would have joined Arafat's calls for war. Without such a program, signing a piece of paper with the Palestinians is meaningless.

Honest government. Fayed knows that Fatah must win popular support by focusing on health, education, law, and order to improve the lives of the Palestinians; he knows this means establishing an honest administration and a civil society that can develop a functioning economy and middle class, rather than support a corrupt, rich elite. (No wonder the Palestinians refer to Abbas's government as the government of salaries.) He knows that the Israelis will be unable to pull out of large sectors of the West Bank while they fear a Gaza-like repetition of rockets raining on Ben-Gurion Airport and Tel Aviv.

The Israelis fear that even if a Palestinian state is officially demilitarized on paper, it could accumulate within a few years a vast arsenal of weapons that could kill thousands of Israelis. Gaza has shown that a security fence cannot prevent missiles from flying over and killing and wounding Israelis. Then there is the fact that Palestinians in the West Bank would control 60 percent of Israel's water. The Israeli defense minister put it squarely: In those circumstances, Israel could not leave the West Bank until it develops a defensive system against rocket attacks.

Expectations about the forthcoming meeting should not be high, for high expectations risk a disappointment that would result in negative consequences, such as those that followed Camp David under President Clinton. Of course the Palestinians support the meeting, and yes, Abbas's words about a peaceful resolution of conflict are music to the West. But he has an incentive to talk softly, because apparent moderation might bring money and economic support for his administration. Of course the Palestinians want concrete, fundamental political agreements to help rebuild their political credibility. The question that will haunt the negotiation is whether they will be able to implement the agreements they do make, given the hostility of Hamas and their own record of nonperformance. And given the current status of the Palestinian government and its impotence, a far-reaching agreement could cause the breakup of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's coalition in Israel. Meanwhile, Hamas lies in wait to sabotage the dialogue, either by portraying Abbas as a servant of the United States and Israel or by resorting to terrorism. There already has been a noticeable rise in violence from the Gaza Strip and an average of 63 threat alerts a day in the West Bank.

The Israelis will be cautious about the specifics of their proposals, knowing that when something is on the table it is always on the table, and they do not want commitments made now to be used as a point of departure, should the current Palestinian leadership collapse or be replaced. They fear that neither Abbas nor Fayed is a man of the sword: Both lack the muscle of effective intelligence services and security organizations in a culture where men are willing to kill and be killed. That is why they worry, as one Israeli put it, that these negotiations will be a "soufflé"—a lot of hot air and very little substance.