For Barack Obama, Stimulus Effort a Communications Catastrophe

Michael Maslansky, CEO of Luntz, Maslansky Strategic Research, advises Fortune 500 corporations, industry associations, major litigation practices, and nonprofit organizations on what to say, how to say it and, why it matters.

Passing the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (a.k.a. "the stimulus plan," a.k.a. "the bailout," a.k.a. "the spending plan") was a policy victory, but it is a communications disaster.

Whether you agree or disagree with the plan's particulars, it is tough to say the administration did an effective job of managing the conversation about the plan itself. Rather than controlling the conversation, they were controlled by it—forced to go on the defensive when they should have been on offense from the beginning.

The Obama team made three crucial mistakes. We see these problems all the time when we are working with clients on issue communication. And these mistakes, when taken together, are often fatal:

1. He sold the problem, not the solution. For many years, salespeople have been taught that the key to selling is to create a "disturber"—to highlight the problem and then fill the need you have created. They used fear to create desire or a heretofore nonexistent need. And, by and large, it worked. Our research has consistently shown, however, that this approach has lost its relevance. In a world where we do not trust companies, institutions, or government, we respond to fear-based selling as an overt form of manipulation. And as a society becomes more media saturated and therefore more media mature, the same messages and techniques from the past begin to lose their potency. Fear-based selling, much like propaganda, is only effective to the extent that you don't recognize it as such. The moment you do, it loses everything. So, at best, it paralyzes people. At worst, it sends them in the opposite direction. But in most cases it doesn't work because everyone can so clearly see the boogeyman standing behind the curtain.

Obama's sales pitch to the nation was based almost entirely on fear. He went from a candidate who spoke of the "audacity of hope" and "the fulfillment of dreams" to a president who talks about "crisis," "catastrophe," and "loss of confidence." He spent most of his time talking about the problem and not nearly enough selling the solution. Though he began to emphasize the goal of 4 million new jobs in the end, he never spent the necessary time explaining how his plan would actually create the jobs, similar to a salesperson telling you his product will leave you with a clean house without explaining that he is selling you a vacuum cleaner.

2. He never articulated the principles that define an effective plan. In every sport, there are clearly defined rules. One of the most important benefits of these rules is that they allow us to judge success and failure. Without the rules, anyone can make their own case for what constitutes a run, basket, or touchdown. When it comes to communicating about an issue, rules are equally necessary. And the party that defines the rules usually wins the debate. In healthcare, if we all agree that finding the lowest cost medicines should be the rule, then generics companies win. But if we agree that innovation is critical to healthcare, then the pharmaceutical companies have an edge.

In the stimulus debate, Obama never set the rules of engagement. He told us we have a huge problem. He told us that we needed to act urgently. And he told us that we needed to create 4 million new jobs. But he never laid down the ground rules for judging whether his plan was a good one.

So what should Obama have said to the American people that would not only engender real confidence and support but also keep with this overarching narrative (the one that won him the presidency) of hope and change?

Something along the lines of: Every element of this recovery package must (a) have an impact in 2009 or 2010, (b) clearly demonstrate that it will create new jobs (not just stop the hemorrhaging), (c) represent a new approach to solving old problems, and (d) have provisions to ensure that those responsible for implementation will be held accountable for success.

Then he should have forced Republicans (and Democrats) to agree with these rules.

Having framed the issue on his terms, he would have controlled the conversation. He could justify millions for resodding the Mall if that expenditure met the agreed-upon criteria. Instead he had to defend every odd-sounding line in the bill because he never explained what success should look like and how any government plan should get us there.

3. He let his so-called friends and his enemies control the language. Hank Paulson learned quickly the risks of not defining the terms of the debate. Call it a bailout and people are not likely to accept it willingly. And once the wrong word is in the media and public lexicon, it is very tough to put the genie back in the bottle.

Obama had the right words—recovery package—but he missed his opportunity to infuse them into the debate. He let Speaker Pelosi lead the initial charge in her own words. He let the Republicans criticize in their own words. And very quickly, this was a "stimulus" plan and a "spending" plan rather than a "recovery package." Furthermore, this allowed the conversation, for a while, actually to center upon the name of the bill rather than what was in it. And once you're wasting time talking about what to call an issue instead of the issue itself, you're only making an already uphill battle that much steeper.

Often we see that companies and associations start talking about an issue only after it has been defined for them. They start using the words and terminology handed to them, either by their opponents or the media, without fully understanding just how much of an impact that language can have on their cause. In those cases, it is often extremely difficult to rename a problem. Once the problem is named and the media echo chamber picks it up, the gel is set. In this case, Obama had an opportunity to control the conversation from the start—but he seems to have missed it.

This is new territory for the Obama team. The campaign was never really about issues—it was about the proper framing of issues and controlling how the candidates, and by extension the American people, talked about them. And it certainly wasn't about selling specific policy ideas. In many ways, selling specific policies is much harder. The dirty task of actual governance doesn't lend itself to the oratorical flourishes of a well-crafted piece of prose. In this game, it's all about using the power of the bully pulpit and the news media to set the terms and language of the debate before the debate even begins. The big question is whether this Great Communicator can do it.